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A BST RAC T 
The objective of this research is to identify how production 
planning and control theory may be successfully applied in a 
practical situation. 
The thesis is presented in b~o distinct parts; Part I representing 
a survey of literature concerned with theory and research findings 
on production planning and control. Part 11 focuses on the 
development of selected material from the literature survey and the 
application of the product to an actual industrial situation where 
the appropriateness is tested. 
The majority of order quantity techniques involve some economic 
criteria in their formulation. This criteria has been discounted 
. . 
and an empirical lot size is selected which results in an acceptable 
level of disruption to a given master production schedule. 
A time phased order point technique is used, employing an item IS 
demand forecast directly as a given requirement creating a master 
production schedule for an item experiencing independent demand. 
To reduce the 'nervousness' of the system, the lot size is held 
constant throughout the planning period and adjustments made to the 
replenishment timing to accommodate any major discrepancy between 
the master production schedule and. the actual customer requirements. 
The model basically applies the 'management by exception' rule to 
production planning and control, where management plan and provide 
resources in detail to meet future requirements. To prevent over-
reacting to unplanned occurrences, management will only take 
additional action when activities extend beyond set control limits 
(iii) 
with provision made for re-setting the control limits 
should any new trend in demand be recognised. 
It is concluded that the model developed will allow a stable 
production plan to be effectively used to meet the random volatile 
aemand for a product with minimal disruption to the plan. The 
disruption, however, can be readily accommodated with the use of 
existing resources available to the company. 
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PAR T I 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Objectives of Production Control 
Universally acceptable objectives of Production Control are 
difficult to formulate; they depend on the type of product, market 
. and plant which collectively influence the objectives of production 
control. A minimum requirement of production control will be : 
"The co-ordination of the production facilities to produce 
a product at an optimal cost." 
A more extensive objective of production control is given in the 
Dictionary of Production and Inventory Control Terms : 
"Production Control is the function of directing the 
orderly movement of goods through the entire manufacturing 
. cycle from the requisitioning of raw materials to the delivery of the 
finished product, to meet the objectives of customer. service, 
minimum inventory investment, and maximum manufacturing 
efficiency." 
It is not uncommon to find production control compared to the 
nervous system of the human body; this is a realistic comparison 
for, as the human body responds to the nervous system, so does the 
whole manufacturing system respond to production control through a 
comprehensive communications network. The nerve system assures 
conformance by many feedback links, as does the production control 
system. 
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Regulation of the system neb,ork by the feedback of information 
produced in the system is the core of cyberr.etics. The term 
cybernetics is derived from the Greek word 'kybernetes!, meaning 
pilot or steersman. The term was coined by Norbert I'leiner and 
developed in his book by the same name published in 1949 [70]. 
The subtitle of the book "Control and Communication in the Animal 
and r'lachine", serves generally to indicate the nature of his 
study. Cybernetics concerns itsel f with the way in which human 
beings reach decisions and control various functions and operations.· 
It then seeks to structure these decision procedures in such a way 
that they can be duplicated by machines, usually the electronic 
data processing machines, or computers. 
Synergetics and Symbiosis are both concepts, presently of considerable 
utility in other scientific disciplines,which show promise of useful 
application to the problems of Hanagement Science. 
Synergism refers to the joint action of agents which, taken together, 
increase each other's effectiveness. When related to a manufacturing 
concern it implies· that the judicious combination of men with men, 
or men with machines, or one department with another, will often 
yield a potential far exceeding that of the separate components. 
The term symbosis, drawn from the natural sciences, refers to the 
living together of two dissimilar organisms, eapecially when the 
association is mutually beneficial. Depending upon the way the 
dissimilar organisms are defined, there can be many examples of this 
felicitous relationship not only among feathered, furred and finny 
creatures, but also among areas of present business enterprise. Not 
the least of these is suggested the man-computer accommodation so 
necessary to optimiseperformance by large organisations functioning 
in a complex society.· 
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1.2 Responsibilities of Production Control 
Production Planning will be considered an integral part of 
the production control function; if a distinctiQn is to be made 
bebleen planning and control it is that the planning function 
establishes the requirements whilst the control function is 
concerned with keeping the activities within these requirements. 
The noted inventory consultant Oliver \~ight divides production 
control into two essential problem areas : Priorities and .Capacity. 
Priorities refer to what material is needed and when it is needed, 
and capacity refers to how much human and/or machine time is needed 
to transfer the material to a finished good. Since inventories 
are the quantities of materials that must be made available in the 
appropriate time schedule, it is perhaps obvious that the inventory 
control and scheduling activities of production control management 
are thoroughly inter-dependent. 
It must be accepted that different responsibilities of production 
control will be indentified in different organisations; a list of 
·responsibilities which might be included in a production control 
department would be : 
Receive and record orders from sales 
Estimate the cost of new jobs 
Liaise beb.een the fac·tory and sales 
Forecast sales 
Issue Purchase requisitions 
Make decisions to make or buy 
~laintain control over raw materials and finished goods 
Establish inventory levels 
Determine routing of purchased material 
Determine routing of finished goods 
Determine internal transportation of material 
Estimate manpower and machine requirements 
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1·lake schedules and maintain production throughout 
the plant 
Replan schedules 
Assign jobs to men and machines 
Despatch production orders 
Expedite orders 
Evaluate performance 
Design and redesign data processing systems 
Data processing 
Install data processing systems 
Program computers 
Evaluate data processing systems. 
1.3 Conflicting Roles of Production Control 
It has been established that the prime objectives of Production 
Control are 
1) Orderly movement of goods throughout the manufacturing 
cycle. 
2) Requisition of raw materials. 
3) Delivery of finished goods to customers on time. 
4) Keeping a minimum investment in inventory. 
5) Haximising the efficient use of the manufacturing facility. 
If financial resources were not limited, the production control 
function would be relatively simple, but production control is 
competing for financial resources within the organisation, 
consequently the differing needs of sales, manufacturing and 
inventory have to be balanced to maximise the colle·ctive benefits 
of the limited resources available. Production control must 
co-ordinate the production facilities and this can only be achieved 
by linking communications between the inter-dependent and 
~ 
intra-dependent parts of the system. Processes5uch as communications, 
decision-making and balance are necessary for a basic interaction to 
take place which sustains the life of the organisation. Deutsch.[21] 
points out, communication allows the parts of the organisation to 
'talk' to each other; it brings in information from the outside, 
and it provides th~ means for storing and retrieving information within 
the system. 
The separate parts of the organisation have a commonality of 
, 
interest in making a product on schedule at an optimum cost, but the 
method of achieving this is, at times, a source of disagreement. The 
sales department is interested .in sales; this can be accomplished 
only if the customer is satisfied and he is usually satisfied if he 
obtains a product of the quality he desires at a reasonable cost and 
on time. Usually the delivery date. becomes the point of conflict 
between production control and the sales department. To the sales 
personnel the delivery date is more important than producing within 
a budget because a record of poor delivery can damage customer 
relations, with the resultant loss of customers. 
The purchasing personnel require requisitions placed well in advance 
of the time the material is needed and to be able to purchase all 
materials in economic quantities and to have the freedom to substitute 
whenever this is desired. 
Engineering would like to have designs accepted by the factory, 
regardless of the manufacturing difficulties; it would also like to 
instigate design changes instantaneously. 
Quality control are concerned with meeting the product standards, 
regardless of the production schedules to be met. 
The personnel department would like to maintain a constant labour 
force and supply skills from the available pool of labour. They would 
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also like to have forecasts of future labour requirements in 
order that they can train or attract the people to fulfil the 
requirements. 
Factory management is interested in long production runs with 
infrequent changes. They would like to keep in'ventories low, but 
at the same time have sufficient inventory available to keep the 
factory ,busy. It is amongst all these conflicting objectives that 
production control must operate'and a successful outcome is only 
possible when the interests are balanced to enable the overall 
objectives of the organisation to be achieved. 
The areas of conflict have attracted the efforts of interested 
bodies who have made provisions to overcome the harmful effects of 
their divisions, Co-ordination of the activities may be achieved 
if the organisation structure is designed to facilitate this. One 
approach outlined in a paper presentee by members of the Board of 
Hanagement of the Institution of Purchasing commented that "a further 
significant measure of development must be applied novl8days in the 
general management field 
tO'related disciplines. 
the rationalisation'of functions common 
This is not simply a result of basic 
economic studies; it has emerged by natural evolution in many 
organisations where activities common to several functional 
departments have been concentrated in a separate department, with 
the general effect of co-ordinating the total range of activities 
in meeting the total objective." [56] The Purchasing Institution 
recommended the following definition: "Haterials Hanagement is the 
total of all these tasks, functions,' activities and routines which 
concern the transfer of external materials and services into the 
organisation and the administration of the same until they are consumed 
or used in the pr'ocess of production, operations or sale." 
7 
Materials management offers some solid benefits as a type of 
organisation but, unfortunately, it is not the cure-all that some 
expect it to be. This organisation structure does not permit 
the UGC of syutemn, procedures, or techni'lues for controlling, 
thot cannot be used without· it. The principle benefit to be 
derived from this form of organisation, in which all the people 
concerned with the flow of material through the plant report to one 
man, is that he can direct activities to get the most co-operation 
and effectiveness. from these people working together. If the only 
way to get the managers responsible for materials handling, traffic, 
purchasing and production control to work together effectively, is to 
have them report to the same boss, then the materials management 
~oncept offers real potential benefits. In companies that have 
grown so large that the span of control is unNieldy for the top 
level managers, to whom the purchasing manager, production control 
manager, traffic manager, warehouse manager, etc., report, a 
materials manager is undoubtedly justified. 
f.1anagement literature in the mid 1960's introduced the term 
"operations management". Wild [75] offers two reasons for this 
development. One reason is that much of what .,as used to be 
discussed under the title of production management was of little 
relevance in non-manufacturing systems, and therefore, there is some 
justification in considering, under one heading and as one subject, 
the management of manufacturing and non-manufacturing systems. 
Secondly, in the 1960's production management, whilst being 
recognised as being of considerable importance, had attracted little 
interest in academic circles. It was convenient, therefore, to 
encourage this subject to 'expand' with the prospect of its developing 
as a more attractive field for study. 11ild says that, although 
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operations management has become established in the past 
decade, it has to a large extent failed precisely where production 
management failed. The operations manager is seen as a key 
central figure in management but in too many cases he, and his 
function, is inadequately represented at a policy level in the 
organisation. 
The operation management concept is concerned with an increase in 
the areas of responsibility outlined in both the Production Control 
and f.1aterials t·lanagement approaches. The involvement in Strategy 
and Policy Haking activities is a justifi3ble Concern of operations 
management. Policy, and Strategy have direct and indirect 
implications for the Production t~anager. Ansoff [1] considers 
that the operating decisions usually absorb the bulk of the firm's 
energy and attention. The major decision areas are resource 
allocation among functional areas and product lines, scheduling of 
operations, supervision of performance, and applying control actions. 
The key decisions involve pricing, establishing marketing strategy, 
setting production schedules and inventory levels, and deciding on 
relative expenditure in support of research and development, marketing 
and operations. Strategic decisions assure that the firm's products 
and markets are well chosen, that adequate'demand exists, and that the 
firm is capable of capturing a share of the market. Strategy imposes 
operating requirements : price-cost decisions, timing of output to 
meet demand, responsiveness to changes in customer needs and 
technological and process characteristics. The administrative 
structure must provide the climate for meeting the operating require-
ments. The structure is formulated by the Strategy, the product-
market characteristics create operating needs, and these in turn 
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determine the structure of authority, responsibility, work (lOl<IS, 
and information flows IVithin the firm. Sloan [61] in his memoirs, 
diagnosed one of the major requirements which strategy has imposed 
on structure: "to organise the firm's management in a way IVhich 
assures a proper balance of attention between the strategic and 
operating decisions". 
Plossl and Wight [55],intheir views on the future of production 
control, state "The new organisational forms that will develop as 
a result of the current revolution in information management are 
difficult to predict to-day, but there is no question that 
traditional organisational forms are going to change drastically 
and that the 'production control' departm·ent, as. we know it; may 
disappear. The title of the function is really of secondary 
importance - no matter what it is called, the basic information 
required to manage 8 manufacturing operation in the· face of intensive 
competition will become more and more vital to every company. This 
planning and contrel function will not only become more important 
in the operation of the company, but will become a vital training 
area as well. A background in systems, particularly manufacturing 
control systems, will undoubtedly be one of the requisites for top 
managers of the future". 
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CHAPTER II 
THE EVOLUT ION OF PRODUCT ION AND INVENTORY CONTROL 
2.1 Development of Production Control 
Production. Control and Inventory Control developed separately. 
Production control was one of the functions carried out by the 
early foreman. He ordered material, controlled the size of the 
work force and level of production by hiring and firing people, 
expediting work through his department and controlling customer 
service through the inventories that resulted from his efforts.-
-As the foreman's workload increased, he 'was assisted by a clerk 
who would take care of timekeeping, keeping records and answering 
the telephone in· his department. These functions brought the 
clerk into frequent contact with the Sales Department while 
answering requests for the status of jobs and for delivery promises; 
,he also began re-ordering materials and planning other preparations 
needed for production, in addition to following progress of work. 
He was really the beginning of the production control functi::>n. 
The increase in demand resulted I.ith the increase in the 
activity of the clerk and the record keeping duty was transferred 
into the main office, the clerk's main 'role was that of Stock 
ChaseI'. One prominent New England company in the 1890's had a 
department known as the 'Hurry-up-Department' which might be 
applicable today if an organisation does not adopt a responsible 
approach to the production control function. 
One of the earliest documented production control systems was 
installed at the Watertown Arsenal in the 1880's [60] but general 
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application did not develop prior to \'Jorld \'Jar II. 
By \'Jor ld I'Jar I I, the posit ion of stock chaser had fallen into 
disrepute;' the worker associated him with crises, upsets, pressures 
and tr'ouble. Henry Kaiser gave his Shipbuilding company stock chasers 
t.he name of 'expediters' and, with the help of a Readers Digest article, 
popularised the concept of the expediter as an action orientated 
go-getter who made a vital contribution to meeting production schedules. 
By the 1950's the term 'expediting' was often used in books defining 
production control; the activities associated with the expediter were 
ordering the necessary parts to, make an assembly after receiving the 
customer's order, following the order through manufacture, and, if 
delayed, putting a 'Rush' tag on them. Even today the expediter is an 
integral part of most production control systems. However, the 
efficiency of the system could be measured using an inverse factor of 
the number of expediters employed. 
Inventory control" on the other hand developed, at least in theory, 
along more scientific lines. The basic concept of the economic lot 
size was first published in 1915'[35] and the statistical approach to 
determine order points was presented by R.H. IHlson in 1934 [76]. 
However, these fairly sophisticated techniques of inventory management 
found little application, the name of the game in the 1930's and 1940's 
was survival; the depression did nothing to 'encourage scientific 
management. 
During the late 1940's, customer demand for products could not be 
satisfied, resulting in a ready market for every article produced. 
The objectives of inventory control - levelling workload or competing 
on the basis of customer service - were not important. It was not 
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until markets became saturated that interests other than 
'mass production' and 'lo'"est pr ice of product' were considered. 
Even Henry Ford had to respond to the market and change his 
often quoted phase of 'Give it to them in any colour so long as 
it is black'. 
In the early 1930's General Hotors triggered a shift from 
production to a market focus. ·The introduction of. the annual 
model change was ~mbolic of a shift in emphasis from standard to 
differentiated products. By contrast with the earlier 'production 
orientation' the new secret to success was by way of 'market 
or ienta tion' • Henry Ford, having tried to replace a Standard 
Model 'T' with a Standard Hodel 'A', was forced to follow the multi-
model package of General ~lotors. 
The shift to the marketing orientation meant a shift. from an 
internally focused, introverted perspective to an open extroverted 
one. It also meant a transfer in power from production-minded to 
market-minded managers. Consumer industries and technologically 
intensive producer industries were early in accepting the marketing 
orientation, whilst in the process industries and producer durable 
industries, the marketing concept was slOl-I to penetrate. 
Out of I~orld l'lar II C2me operations research - the application of 
scientific techniques to solving the problems of war, where the 
allocation of limited resources was a matter of victory or defeat. 
These operations research techniques were quite effective in World 
I~ar II [57]. When the scientists t:onnec'ted with this work got 
back to the problems of a peacetime world, their attention focused 
on production and inventory control, where elements of the problem 
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can be expressed numerically, where statistical probability theories 
can be applied and \',here so many of the decisions are the result of 
balancing alternative. solutions. Some notable results were 
produced in forecastin~, inventory control and mathematical 
programming, and whilst operations research has not solved all the 
business problems it set out to solve, it has generated a new interest 
in a more rational approach to production and inventory control. 
Probably the biggest prohlem in applying scientific techniques in 
industry has been the fact that companies were not ready for these 
techniques because they had not even begun to solve. many of their 
basic problems in controlling manufacture.' ~lany companies did 
not even have accurate lists of. the parts that made up their 
products or route sheets to list the operation sequences; they 
depended instead upon the memories of the men in the factory who 
had made the product for years. Before scientific techniques 
could be applied, basic information had to be readily available and 
accurate. In addition, the volume of calculations required for. 
applying such techniques as the statistical determination of order 
points, which were highly developed by operations research, was 
considerably beyond the capabilities of manual systems. 
From the mid 1950's, accelerating and cumulating events began to 
change the boundaries, the structure and the dynamics of the 
business environment. Firms were increasingly confronted with 
novel, unexpected challenges which were so far reaching that 
Peter Drucker called the new era an 'Age of Discontinuity' [22]. 
Alvin Toffler's book published in 1970 called 'Future Shock' had a 
wide appeal because of its dramatisation of technological change [65]. 
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Toffler's hypothesis is that change is upon us so fast that 
we are personally and organisationally unable to adapt to it or 
cope with it. A view presented in the book by a management 
consul tant, Bernard f.1uller- Thym, considers that the ne", technology, 
combined vlith advanced management techniques, creates a totally 
new situation. "Iihat is within our grasp is a kind of productive 
capability that is alive with intelligence, alive with information, 
so that at its maximum it is completely flexible; one could 
completely re-organise the plant from hour to hour if one wished to 
do so". 
By the late 1950's the electronic computer was being widely used 
in industry, but, as with most new technologies, there were as many 
failures as successes in applying this powerful tool. All the 
information processed had to be accurate, since the personal interference 
that even a good clerk could give was no longer available to cor'rect 
obviously 'ridiculous errors and compensate for missing information. 
While the computer offered almost unlimited capacity in computation, 
it focused attention on the need for disciplines in information handling 
that many companies had failed to develop in the past. Efforts to 
apply the computer were often attempts to install a mechanical system 
in companies that had never taken manual systems seriously enough to 
make them work satisfactorily and these efforts were doomed from the 
very start. The restrictions of the earlier analog-type.computer 
limited the practical application of the computer, the upper capacity 
of such machines barely overlapped the minimum size and complexity that 
was required to deal with non..J.inear problems. The appearance of the 
high speed electronic digital computer ·remcved the practical 
cow.putational barrier. The technical performance of electronic 
computers increased by a factor of nearly 10 per year over the decade 
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of the 1950's [28],in almost every year there was a ten fold 
increase in speed, memory capacity or reliability. 
Today, with the introduction of the silicon chip we can 
recognise a further. rapid increase in computational power widening 
the gap even more between the technology and its industrial 
application. \~e have a tremendous untapped backlog of potential 
devices and applications; the availability of relative low cost 
computers removes the earlier barriers preventing their wide 
application in industry and,organisations of all sizes. Companies 
need to take up the challenge and harness this computational power 
to improve their overall efficiency and remain competitive in the 
world market. 
The foregoing outlines the changing demands on Production Control. 
The current picture is one of marketing change; if Toffler's 
predictions are true the rapid changes in the market will present a 
formidable challenge to management, and only the organisations 
capable of reacting to the challenge :will survive. The computer 
will play a major role in supplying the information in time to 
enable decisions to be made, or alternatively, the computer will 
make decisions and implement these as part of the· production system. 
CHAPTER III 
PLANNING OF ~IORK SEQUENCE 
3.1 Scheduling and Loading 
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Scheduling and loading are two planning processes used 
in production control. Both are 'processes designed to assist 
in the efficient and systematic planning of work sequence. 
Scheduling is mainly concerned with finding the optimum starting 
and finishing times for each task in relation to attainment of a 
plan, whereas loading is concerned with the efficient utilisation 
of capacity and the determination of reliable delivery promise dates. 
There will be, by necessity, a certain amount of overlap between 
the two activities. Scheduling prescribes where and when each 
operation shall be performed, also at the same time 'loads' the 
work centres concerned. The main difference between sCheduling 'and 
loading is one of intention. I'then engaged in planning the order 
and sequence of work with the view to completing it by a given due 
date, the operation is called schedulin9. When attempting to 
compare load and capacity to determine if there is sufficient 
capacity available for a given programme or if there is spare capacity 
which can be used for other work, the operation is called loading. 
The success of scheduling and the eventual· loading of a product in 
a manufacturing situation is largely dependent upon the long term 
strateQic plan which is prepared by senior management. The strategic 
plan commits the company to a configuration of manpower, skills, 
plant and equipment. Because the plan can require a substantial 
amount of capital in its realisation, it needs to be approved well 
·in advance of the need of the resources in question. This time delay 
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can result in a constraint of actual resource requirements 
identified closer to the production date. 
In the very short ·term, control involves putting men in the 
right places, working on the right jobs and regulating production 
and. inventory levels. To enable the short term plans to be 
realistic it is necessary for the longer term strategic plan not 
to unduly restrict decision making at the 100"ler level. Flexibili t y 
to react ·to new information and deviations from high level plans 
must be built into the system at all levels. Feedback information 
on actual conditions and performance must flow upwards through the 
system to ensure that long range plans are based on a realistic 
assessment of the production organisation ability to· produce. 
information flow and planning must be an on-going process to be 
successful. 
Scheduling and loading can be carried out in two distinct ways -
(1) INFINITE LOADING which is usually based on backward 
Such 
scheduling which tends to minimise work in-process. ~lith 
backward scheduling the planner starts with the 'date wanted' 
on the requisition and works backwards to the required starting 
date.· This is achieved by deducting the cumulative lead times 
of operations in series from the date wanted, thereby establishing. 
the start time for each operation in the work centre. Updating 
an infinite load is relatively simple; completed jobs are 
removed and new jobs added as they are released. 
If the required starting date is in the past, which would result 
if there is insufficient time to manufacture the article in the 
lead time allmled, then the planner must use forward scheduling 
to arrive at a realistic planned completion date. An alternative 
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decision to this could be to manufacture the article in 
less than allOl.,ed· lead time but this should be the exception 
rather than the rule. 
(2) FINITE LOADING: this approach is not simple and requires 
considerably. more effort than Infinite Loading. It starts 
.with a schedule of work orders determined in the same way as 
for infinite loading. Before finite loading can commence, 
however, priorities must be set on individu~l orders. 
Obviously, the highest priority orders should get first claim 
on available capacity in each work centre. The next step is 
to set limiting capacities for each work centre. This is 
usually done with two values - 'Standard' capaci t y and '~Iaximum' 
capacity, the latter including overtime or an added shift. 
The jobs are then loaded into the individual work centres in 
priority sequence. As soon as the ·,/Ork centre is filled to 
its limiting capacity, additional jobs are re-scheduled, 
either .earlier or later, until they find available capacity. 
Because the requirement to load is based on capacity, a finite 
load cannot be up-dated using the add and deduct approach as 
with infinite loading. The only way to revise the finite load 
is to start again, re-arranging jobs in the new priority 
sequence and reloading. 
\'light [53] states that 'loading should commence on the infinite 
load basis; this will show what capacity is needed, whereas finite 
loading will not. It assumes the capacity is absolutely 
inflexible. The result of finite loading is predictable. Some 
orders will not be completed on ·time and the master schedule will 
have to be changed. Capacity requirement planning will quickly 
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identify a capacity requirement that cannot be met, with a 
resulting change in the master schedule \.ithout the sophistication 
of having to go through the finite loading procedure. 
Capacity requirement planning does not try to plan based on an 
accumulation of backlogs, but instead works from a forecast of 
capacity requirements based not only on released orders but also 
on the planned orders that would shOl. in a material requirements 
plan, or in the time phased order point system. The plan will 
indicate \.tien serious under- or over-loads are going to develop 
before they happen. This provides management with the ability and 
the time to plan alternative courses of action, such as sub-contracting, 
expediting or re-scheduling to smooth loads, using overtime, or possibly, 
revising the master schedule. 
This practical approach to scheduling and loading is due mainly to 
the inability of a mathematical solution being realistic of the 
situation. Knowing the inputs to the system, such as firm customer 
orders, forecasted demand, inventory status and production capacity, it 
would seem ideal to establish a master production schedule that minimises 
total relevant costs, while staying within the capacity constraints. 
However, the relevant costs are not restricted to those at the master 
level. The complicated nature of a manufacturing environment rules 
out cost minimisation. Instead, one strives for a feasible master 
schedule that appears to keep costs at a reasonable level. 
3.2 Forecasting 
In order to maintain a smooth flow of work in the production shops 
and to ensure that the product demand is met, the management of most 
manufacturing companies have to make estimates of future product demand. 
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These estimates might be based on an educated guess, close 
liaison with the customers, the use of mathematical models or 
a combination of all three. 
Plossl and 11ight [55] consider it ironic that' forecasts made by 
marketing or sales departments often have greater effects on 
customer service than any other manufacturing activity. Forecasts, 
while they can definitely be improved, will always be wrong. The 
goal of progressive companies is to improve their forecasting and 
simultaneously, to develop sound, flexible production control syste'ms 
based on forecasting principles and characteristics. 
Forecasting future events will be less accurate as the period 
covered by the forecast increases. The duration of the forecast 
for inventory requirements is governed by the lead times of items 
used in the final product. The forecasting of individual items at 
all levels of manufacture is discussed else'there in the thesis, the 
outcome being that dependent items should not be forecast, only 
independent ones. However, this principle requires that the 
minimum forecast period for the product will be the duration of the 
cumulative lead times of all items manufactured and assembled in 
sequence. It is not unknown for cumulative lead times to be in 
excess of twelve months, i.e. 'time elapsed between ordering raw 
materials and the completion of the product. In such instances, 
a twelve month forecast of customer needs will not be reliable. 
Any adaptive forecasting technique such as the tracking signal 
method developed by Trigg and Leach [67] will filter out small 
random variations in demand, allowing the tracking signal to detect 
sudden changes and with the use of a computer, automatically up-date 
the forecast. 
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If adaptive forecasting is applied to the inventory system 
outlined above, the long lead time will negate the advantages 
of forecast modification. The information ,.ill arrive too late 
to influence decisions already made and acted on. 
In most organisations the customer demand fluctuates and it is 
extremely di fficult, if not impossible, to predict correctly the. 
future level of demand. Hm'lever, the calculation of the forecast 
error in itself helps to maintain a correct level of safety stock 
over a period, and, therefore, cushion the effect of variations 
in the demand level. 
Orlicky [49J states that the time-phased order point used with 
material requirements planning, has the ability to replan and to 
keep replanning quickly, accurately, and automatically. This 
ability to replan is effective whether the need is caused by a 
change in the forecast or a disparity between actual forecast and 
demand. The self adjusting capability of the technique makes the 
relative forecast accuracy almost unimportant. 
110rking with poor forecasts is still the order of the day, and will 
likeiy continue to be. If so, refinements in forecasting techniques 
are a lot less important than the development of planning methods 
that enhance the ability to live with poor forecasts. 
One might consider that, should the production forecast be optimistic 
hence supplying goods in excess of normal customer demand, the onus 
is then on the sales department to actively sell these goods using 
any or all of the sales techniques at its disposal. 
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3.3 Master Production Schedule 
Plossl [52] states that it· is becoming more widely recognised 
that better planning and scheduling. can improve customer service, 
reduce capital invested and increase productivity simultaneousl>:,; 
nothing else has the ability to do this. The basic elements required 
in a control system which are necessary to achieve the above . 
conditions are : 
1) The Master Production Schedule - which translates marketing 
forecasts into specific quantities of 
individual products to be ma~e in various 
i time 
time 
periods over the short and intermediate 
period. Over the longer:·time ·period 
• more general information such as data on 
typical products or totals for families of 
products can be· used in the master 
.. . 
production schedule to develop capacity 
requirements and capital needs. 
2) Plan and Control Capacity - this determines the manpower and 
equipment requirements needed to meet the 
master production schedule, measuring 
actual output compared to the plan and 
publishing any deviation to initiate. 
corrective action. 
3) . Plan and Control Priority - involves translating the master 
schedule. into individual components to be 
produced,.determining how many and when 
required. 
Figure (1) shows the activities required for planning and control· 
and indicates clearli the relationship between the master production 
schedule and resource requirements. 
. -
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An interesting result from an improved understanding of the 
control system is the significant change in the role of the sales 
forecast [52]. Companies need no longer spend much effort trying 
to improve the accuracy of a short range detailed product forecast. 
Flexible priority planning and control systems which can react 
quickly to change, will overcome errors in such forecasts. However, 
the vital need for sound capacity planning,increases the pressure 
to obtain better long range forecasts, p'articular ly anticipating 
upturns and downturns in business cycles. 
3.4 Resource Reguirements Planning 
A master production schedule must De considered in relation to the 
load it places on the resources of the company. If the resources 
are not adequate to meet the schedule, the resources must be 
increased or the schedule modified to suit available resources. 
Unless a thorough planning of resource requirements is carried out 
before the planning of production, on-time deliveries cannot be 
guaranteed, and much of the effort spent in detailed planning is 
wasted. Such' an exercise is called 'resource requirements planning'. 
The resources considered can vary from design personnel to plant' 
'square footage. Should, for example, the resource under 
consideration be production capacity, this may be sub-divided if 
required into either the entire machine shop or the functions carried 
out within the machine shop, e.g. heavy casting, machining or 
fabrication. 
A still further breakdown would identify work centres or even 
individual machines; hQl-/ever, at the resource requirements planning 
stage, such a breakdm1n would not be necessary. The intention is 
. '. 
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not to determine the exact load on an individual resource, but 
rather to evaluate the overall impact of a given master production 
schedule. Resource requirements planning is conducted on a 
'macro level', using general approximations of load, and a precise 
'fit' is not sought. The important thing is to be able tc present 
the alternative loads quickly, so that several different master 
production schedules may be tried out. The greater precision of 
loading individual equipment, etc., is carried out later at the 
~apacity requirement planning' stage. 
The process of developing a master production schedule is 
essentially one of trial and error. A useful construct to employ 
is the load profile; this presents the approximate needs in terms 
of the various resources by time period associated with one unit of 
a particular product being put in the master schedule in a base period. 
Such load profiles are developed for each product, but need only be· 
done once in a lifetime for a product.· However, should the product 
be redesigned drastically, a new load profile .will be required. 
Extending load profiles by the quantities called for by a given 
master production schedule and summarising them, period by period, 
is a simple matter using a computer. The result is a report printed 
or conveyed through a visual display unit, showing the effect of the 
master production schedule over the entire planning horizon, on the 
various resources for which prOfiles are maintained. These are 
called 'resource requirements profiles' and provide a good indication 
of the loads that can be expected for a particular schedule. The 
loads may be segregated into individual product lots, to show which 
of these are causing potential capacity. problems. See Figure 2 [49] 
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Resu'~rce: Total labriCI)lion 
Periods 
FIGURE 2 A resource requirement profile. 
If the load generated by a proposed master production 
schedule is unsatisfactory because of sign~ficant overload 
management must decide whether to increase tKe resource in 
question to meet the load, or modify the schedule to reduce 
the load. Should an underload be shown it will indicate the 
need to reduce the resource or, more likely, to add mo,'e work 
onto the schedule 
Everdell [24J considers the master schedule to be the key 
element in the overall control system; it is the means of 
co-ordinating the management functions related to the flow of 
materials, from suppliers through production to customers. 
The master schedule is the.brain centre of production control. 
It enables all the related functions in manufacturing to 
complement each other by being a contract between the different 
functions. It should be regarded as the basis for resolving 
the inevitable conflicts behleen the management functions. The 
master schedule converts customer demand into production 
" . 
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requirements by time period. It thus becomes a 
manufacturing plan for the use of facilities, equi~ment, 
manpower and materials; so it becomes the basis for 
management control of component ir,ventories, production and 
purchasing. In addition it becomes manufacturing commitment 
to marketing, and marketing commitment to customers', resulting 
'in the control over finished goods inventories and their 
distribution. 
Everdell states that by using the master schedule as the basic 
control system, it permits an almost universal adoption. It can 
be readily modified to suit a broad spectrum of manufacturing 
companies. For example, it can be applied to companies that 
are mainly involved in assembly work, or parts fabrication, or 
both. And these companies car. feature continuous or intermittent 
production of standard or special products. 
from stock or make products to order. 
They can deliver 
For any 'live' system to be successful it is not only important 
to produce an effective plan, it is of paramount importance that 
the system is under control. To allow the system to be controlled 
it is necessary to have feedback and data flow between all 
functions within the system. It is the flow of control data that 
links all these functions and makes them work together as a 
unified system. 
An example of lack of co-ordination within a manufacturing concern 
was outlined by Oddey [48]. The company concerned was persistently 
failing to meet its delivery commitments, yet carried a huge 
inventory of. work in progress. Investigation revealed a fundamental 
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lack of understanding among production management of the 
inherent problems posed by the company's manufacturing and 
assembly activities, which led to a serious·failure to co-ordinate 
the activities of the feeder departments with the requirements of 
the assembly and erection shops. The feeder departments organised 
work to suit their own domestic situation, which resulted .in the 
. assembly and erection shops receiving a plentiful supply of parts 
not immediately needed, but were constantly short of items required 
to complete the jobs they were currently working on. This was a 
'classic' production cDntrol problem, where supervision spent most 
of their time chasing shortages. 
The solution was comparatively simple to formulate but not so 
simple to implement because it meant changing long estaulished 
practices. For example, staff in the machine shops believed that 
batching parts to reduce unit set-up costs must always be the best 
course of action, even though, in most cases, some of the items in 
each batch were not needed· for months ahead. 
To focus the attention of all the parties concerned with manufacturing 
the product, and thereby effectively co-ordinating their individual 
activities, stage/week charts were introduced. The purpose of the 
stage/week chart was simply to show the broad sequences in which parts 
and assemblies of parts were needed to suit erection purposes. A 
stage/week chart was issued to every production shop; this enabled 
shop management to decide which job in the queue waiting against 
each machine was the correct one to load next. 
The introduction of stage/week charts proved successful in three 
companies, according to Oddey, with an improvement in the flow of 
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parts through production to final assembly. This in turn 
reduced shortages and the consequential disruptive effect 
of expediting the completion of missing parts. 
Perhaps the most interesting lesson of all emerged in the two 
companies who had hitherto been using computers to 'assist' 
their production control. The stage/week chart routine was 
entirely manual and is very basic and easy to understand. The 
shop supervisors and others involved' had a full understanding of 
the new routine; they began to come forward with ideas and 
suggestions of how things might be iw-proved for everyone if these 
routines were put on the computer. 
Only minor changes were needed in the existing computer programmes. 
Once these were carried out and the results, published, the print-
outs were used far more intelligently than their predecessors had 
ever been. 
3.5 Priority Dispatching 
~light [73] argues that production supervisors should not be placed 
in the situation where they have to decide the priorities of the 
backlog of work in their department. The backlog is caused by 
production control's usual abdication of responsibility for keeping 
work flowing to the supervisor at a steady rate. Production 
control should hold back orders when the production capacity is 
fully loaded. This will enable production control, not production 
supervisors, to identify the job priorities immediately prior, to 
release. The avoidance of large in-plant queues will also reduce 
the expediting activity associated with queues. Ho., many expedi tors 
would really be necessary in a company where there was only one job 
behind each operation ? 
30 
'light's concept may be applied effectively in a flm~ production 
environment where all the batches of work flow through the processes 
in the same sequence. Hm·,ever, in a jobbing production environment, 
the situation is quite different and the application of the above 
concept would present difficulties. It is usual in jobbing production 
for the sequence of operations to change from product to product, 
and work waiting for a particular operationto be carried out, will 
comprise many different items which have arrived from many different 
previous operations in a random manner. The sequence in which this 
work should be processed bears no relationship to the sequence of 
work hitherto. The start of every operation should be the result 
of a decision that it is the right job. to be processed next, taking 
account of the ever-varying mix of work and the possible alternative 
routings. 
A technique which may be used to identify and maintain priorities 
amung.jobs.in the factory is called 'Critical Ratio Scheduling'. 
The critical ratio itself is an index by which the relative priorities 
of jobs can be determined. It is a time relationship between when a 
product is required and when it can be supplied. 
the critical ratio is as follows : 
The computation of 
Critical Ratio = Date required - Today's date 
Days req~ired to complete the lot 
The importance of the critical ratio value can be summaraised 
Greater than one means there is ample time to finish the 
job ahead of schedule. 
Exactly one means that the job is on schedule. 
Less than one means that the job is critical and will 
have to be expedited if it is to be completed on schedule. 
The farther behind a job is, the lower the critical ratio 
and the more critical the job is. 
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The fnllO\"ling advantages are claimed l1ith the application of_ 
critical ratio scheduling -
1) The relative priorities among jobs are established on a common 
basis. 
2) The status of each particular job can be determined. 
3) The schedule can be adjusted automatically I1hen there are 
changes in demand or job progress. 
4) Both stock and make-to-order jobs can be compared on a 
common basis. 
5) A properly installed critical ratio system, with the necessary 
feedback,. will help eliminate expeditors and the scheduling 
crisis of production. 
6) Critical scheduling is a dynamic system. 
WassHeiler [69lconsiders that other options are available through 
material requirements planning that can be applied to critical 
ratio shop floor control. Some of these techniques are: audits 
to ensure the calculated lead time of work remaining is consistent 
with the offset lead time used in the inventory master record, or 
utilising pegging methods that discriminate betl1een work-in-process 
for customers' orders and orders being run against an inventory 
forecast. .Knowing which jobs are for customers and which are fer 
inventory can aid shop planning and maintain proper emphasis. 
Early ·simulation studies designed to screen a large number of possible 
priority dispatching rules were carried out by Rowe -in 1958-[58] and 
Baker and Dzielinski in 196D [2]. Both studies showed the 
superiority of the 'shortest operation time' rule. These preliminary 
findings prompted further work to he carried out in the area of 
priority despatch decision rules. The Nanot Study [44] tested ten 
static .and dynamic rules. In static rules relative priorities stay the same 
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once assigned. With a dynamic priority rule, however, the 
relative priority position cha~ges through time as, for example, 
with ~ due date priority 0here a new order entering the queue might 
go to the head·of the line. 
An alternative basis to static versus dynamic rules is to classify 
the priority dispatching rule on the basis of the information available. 
A local rule determines priorities entirely on the basis of the 
information available about the order in question at the time it was 
initiated; for example, its processing time or due date. r~ore 
global rules might take into account overall job load, the status of 
the work centres downstream, or changes in due dates. 
The Nanot Study showed that the 'shortest operation time' consistently 
had the lowest mean flOl; time and concluded that the shortest operation 
time rule is an excellent local rule from most points of view. The 
rule is realtively insensitive to errors in estimating process times. 
It would seem that a .priority dispatching decision rule superior to the 
shortest operation time would probably have to be one with a broader 
horizon which might 'look ahead' to anticipate bottlenecks which could 
produce long waiting times. 
Conway [18] also concluded that the shortest processing time priority 
rule was probably best over-all, but considers it appropriate to 
distinguish 'who' is setting the due dates for orders released to the 
shop floor. If the due dates are set by an external agency, and·without 
any regard to processing characteristics of the job itself, its contemporaries 
in the shop, ot the priority rule to be used; then the problem is simply 
to find a procedure that is capable of 'enforcing' such a set of due dates. 
11hen the due dates are in some sense 'internal' and can presumably be 
rat ional, one must jointly select a priority rule and a due date assignment 
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procedure. Due date assignment in this case is closely related 
to the problem of predicting individual shop times. Since the shop 
time depends not only on ~haracteristics of the individual job and 
the particular priority rule in use, but also On the nature and status 
of the other jobs in the shop at the same time, perfect prediction is, 
for all practical purposes, not attailmble. 
The problem 'fs, one of finding a combination of due date assignment 
procedure and priority sequencing procedure such' that : 
(1) The 'natural' shop time of a particular job can be predicted 
with some precision. 
(2) A due date can be set based on both the natural passage of time 
and exogenous considerations of relative urgency. 
(3) The priority procedure can react to this due date to accelerate 
or retard a job with respect to its natural rate of progress. 
Conway suggests that a great deal more work needs to be carried out in 
this area and that computer simulation techniques can be an effective 
tool for the task. 
Berry and Rao [6] in their experiments with the critical ratio rule 
found that static critical ratio rules significantly out-performed dynamic 
ones and suggested that this finding will help in reducing the overly 
nervous H.R.P. systems, such as those that tend to be associated with net 
change information systems, producing dysfunctional results at the shop 
floor level. 
3.6 Hanual v Computer Scheduling, 
Burbidge questions the value of using computers for operation scheduling[13]. 
It is submitted that an intelligent human being can perform the task of 
scheduling better than the computer and more economically. It is also 
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submitted that even in the future should .it prove possible to 
programme the computer for efficient operation scheduling, it would 
still be undesi rable because this type of work is highly valued by foremen 
and workers on the shop floor, "and because this form of participation in 
decision ma~ing is essential for workers' motivation and job satisfaction. 
Western Electric have developed an inter8ctive scheduling system [30]. 
The system can USe either type\"lriter or display terminals and thereby 
places the production superviser, or scheduler, in a loop with a computer 
programme. By interacting with the programme the scheduler develops 
and/or alters the schedule. Schedules are generated by making choices 
from among sets of decision rules, for example, rules for the acceptance 
or rejection of orders, rules for sequencing orders, and rules for 
allocating the use of overtime. 
The computer programme can carry out simulation of shop schedules so 
that the supervisor can test various alternative assignments and try to 
anticipate future problems. Various reports, such as shop status, a 
history of w"ork by operator or by machine, or load summarised by standard 
hours, can be called for at any time. The interactive nature of the 
system provides operating personnel the opportunity to test a wide variety 
of solutions. Involvement of this kind should promote motivation of the 
people concerned and improve job "satisfaction. t·lanual intervention can 
also improve the effectiveness of the system by overcoming the restrictions 
imposed on a computer programme by the large number of variables in a 
manufacturing system. Lockyer [13] has identified over one hundred 
scheduling rules alone, and although each one of these has some value in 
particular circumstances, it is obvious that none of them are universal 
in their application. 
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CHAPTER IV 
LEAD TINE 
4.1 Control of Lead Time 
The success or failure of production planning and control is 
governed by the information used in m3king decisions which enable 
the manufacturing concern to operate effectively. The lead times 
used in planning and control systems can be regarded as one of the 
more important 'factors in the decision process. However, lead 
times are particularly difficult to quantify, mainly because in 
practice they are in a continuous state of flux. 
Lead times can be divided into two separate categories 
(i) vendor lead times 
and (ii) manufacturing lead times 
Although the elements I.hich constitute the lead time are identical 
in each category, the degree of control which a manufacturing concern 
has on each is normally different. 
Vendor lead times can be difficult to influence since the load/ 
capacity relationship of a supplier is not usually within their 
customer's control and supplier performance will vary. It is known 
for large customer organisations to have control of their s'upplier's 
production resources, particularly when the supplier does not have the 
knowledge or facilities to apply sophisticated control techniques to 
its manufacturing processes. 
"Iethods for, minimising the effects of uncertainty of, a supplier, 
particularly if these are caused by the uncertainty of customer demand, 
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can include the reservation of supplier capacity, the detailed 
orders in time and quantity being placed with an a'Jreed lead time. 
Another technique \'Iill be to negotiate terms with the vendor I'lhich 
encourage him to hold stocks for the customer. 
If a supplier invariably delivers late it is fatal to extend the 
delivery lead time; it is much safer to regard poor vendor performance 
as a vagary of supply and either replace the vendor or adjust the 
Safety Stock levels •. 
One of the primary missions of production and inventory control is 
the construction cf a master production schedule. This schedule 
recognises capacity limitation and focuses on planning and controlling 
the productive capacity of the "inside firm". Fisk [27] states that 
it is also necessary to 'consider the planning and control procedures 
for the "outside firm", i.e. the vendor. Without the vendors' 
co-operative efforts, valid master production schedules are not possible. 
This co~operation is.particularly important because in the typical 
company, purchased material content exceeds. labour content by a 
substantial amount. 
To assist the inside firm in enlisting the co-operation of vendors 
and knowing what the vendors are doing in terms of meeting their 
schedules, it is necessary for the inside firm to incorporate 
procurement planning and control in the production planning hierarchy 
(See Figure 3 ). A master procurement plan will include a forecast 
of those items which must be purchased in future periods. In 
constructing the procurement plan a company may.start with a material 
requirements plan and from this generate the planned procurements to 
meet production requirements, while making necessary adjustments to 
inventory or backlog of purchased items. 
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Once the procurement plan is completed for a given time period, 
it is sent to purchasing for disposition. It is then purchasing's 
responsibility to procure the materials at the right price and 
quality and on time to meet the firm's production schedules. 
The above system should improve vendor delivery performance by 
increasing the amount of communication and co-operation between 
vendors and the firm. If es"timated throughput times are made 
available for each vendor on an item-by-item basis, the system provides 
an excellent control'device against which vendors can be measured. 
This procedure relieves purchasing of much of the day-to-day effort 
invol ved in handling paperwork and expediting needed materials, and 
thus frees them to' do the "important jobs of negotiating and vendor 
selection. The procedure also creates vendor delivery schedules 
which are realistic and which correspond to the master production 
schedule of the firm. Internal manufacturing lead times can be 
directly controlled by production management. Tc identify how and 
where control may take place it is necessary to breakdown the lead 
time into its constituent elements, as recognised by Night [74]. 
Lead time = Set-up time + Running time + 110ve time 
+ 11ait time + Queue time 
where Set-up time is the time the job is being positioned on the 
"machine with the correct tooling available 
Running time is the time the job is on the machine being 
worked on 
Hove time 
11ait time 
is the actual time the job is in transit 
has been separated from the Queue time so that it 
can be arbitrarily associated with l'love time, since 
Queue time 
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in many factories the dispatching job is not 
highly organised and the forklift truck does not 
get to a job as soon as it is ready to move. 
In some plants an operator of a forklift truck may 
'empty' one department once a day. This could 
mean an average wait time of half a day. 
is that time a job spends waiting to be worked on 
because another job is already been operated on at 
that particular machine centre. 
The set-up and running times are normally easy to establish and 
remain reasonably constant, being fixed mainly by technology. 
the remaining times may fluctuate considerably; they are partially 
intended to act as a protection against work stoppages, but mostly 
they develop in an uncontrolled manner as a consequence of machine 
breakdowns, operator behaviour and fluctuations in the arrival rates 
and service rates of individual items. The lack of formal control of 
non-productive times is one reason for high levels of work in process. 
It is a frequent experience that the set-up time and running time is 
a small fraction of the lead time, sometimes less than 10%. The 
queue time usually constitutes the majority of the lead time and 
highlights the fact that the bulk of the work in process inventory 
is typically not being worked on and control of >lOrk in proce'ss is poor. 
Consequently, it would appear that if advantages are to be obtained 
by reducing lead times, it '-'ould be more appropriate to 'concentrate 
on the queue time which should prove the cheapest and most effective 
way of lead time reduction rather than attempting to reduce the 
set-up time and running time. These latter two elements of lead time 
should be at a minimum anY'1ay i f ~lethod Study and \~ork t1easurement 
have been involved in the manufacturing process. 
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This vie,', on lead time co'ntrol is endorsed by Orlicky [49]. 
In his exposition on lead time he distinguishes between the planned 
and the actual 'manufacturing lead time, and considers the overall 
lead time can be reduced by compressing the queue time. I'then r'1RP 
is used, the planned lead time is the value supplied to the system 
and is used for planning order releases. 
an order reflects the planned lead time. 
The original due date of 
Actual lead time reflects 
a revised due date which coincides with the date of actual need, if 
the latter has changed, since the time of order release. The 
di fference bebveen the two lead times, planned and actual, can be 
major, reflecting the order' priority. The concept of 'good' or 
'accurate', planned I'ea'd time must be discarded; planned lead times 
need not, and should not, necessarily equal actual lead times. 
Actual lead time is flexible, lead time is very much a function of 
priority, when necessary lead time can often be shortened to respond to 
specific needs [51]. 
Belt [11] in an article called "The New ABC of Lead Time Hanagement" 
states that the modern concept of lead time is that it is a 'controllable' 
resource' like the number of drill presses or the amount of raw material 
investment, and should be managed like other resources to make a 
maximum return on investment. Companies which manage lead time 
lik~ a controllable resource rather than an uncontrollable 'given' 
achieved better operating results, both on the balance sheet and on the 
shop floor, than those' which do not. 
This ne .. concept immediately implies three different actions on the 
part 'of production control practitioners : 
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1) If lead time is a resource it must be allocated as 
carefully as other production resources. 
2) Lead ,time cannot be allocated indiscriminately, just as 
turret lathes, cannot be bought and placed in the shop 
without any regard for floor space and trained operators. 
Rather, it must be' balance with other production and 
business resources. 
3) Once allocated and balanced, lead time must be measured 
quantitatively at regular intervals to ensure that it is 
not deviating too far from plan and that it is furnishing 
the desired return on investment. 
Valentine [68] considers selection, investigation and con.trol 
techniques should be applied to lead times, but lead times have 
special characteristics. If the master production schedule is 
overstated, causing a general overload in the factory, products' 
and components will be made within their specified lead times ·only 
by accident, or as a result of special attention, or one section 
independent of the others happens to be lightly loaded. Moreover, 
the situation will rapidly worsen as the time period of overload 
increases. The forecast will become less accurate as time goes by, 
and the validity of the due dates of orders will deteriorate 
accordingly. 
A cost accountant, speaking on the relationship of cost to production 
control, made the following statement [3] "If you want to do the best 
possible job for· your customers and for your company, control lead times." 
The manufacturing lead time comes under the direct influence of the 
production control department. It is here that production control 
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can do more to meet its mm objectives: maximum customer service, 
maintaining an efficient plant operation and minimising investment 
in inventories. There is no one area that will do more for 
meeting the objectives of production control than will the control 
of lead times; the success of any of the .techniques such as 
requirements planning, re-order points, critical ratio and lot sizing 
in the absence of good lead· time control, is debatable. 
Lead time control begins with the master schedule. There are three 
rules to good scheduling which have the greatest effect on lead times: 
Rule 1 
Rule 2 
Rule 3 
Do not schedule more than the plant can realistically 
handle. 
Do not release any more work to the shop floor than 
is absolutely necessary for planning purposes. 
Do not allow any more time than is actually necessary 
to get the job done; control lead times. 
If·the lead times in a company's system are valid, the cumulative 
lead time of parts and assemblies on the critical. path of production 
manufacture can be used to determine whether to accept schedule 
changes. Moreover, the manufacturing manager can evaluate more 
precisely the effects of any schedule changes that violate the 
cumulative lead time; he may then order the product to be built in 
less than the cumulative lead time. Obviously, if the lead times 
are inflated, schedule increases can be readily accommodated up to 
the point when the excess lead times are used up. 
To allow the manufacturing system to operate effectively, with 
reduced lead times, management should consider carrying an extra 
c 
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inventory of items on the critical path to permit a fast response 
to schedule increases. A modest investment in this extra inventory 
I.ill undoubtedly permit a reduction in lead times but I.ith many 
investments, however, sooner or later it will reach a point of 
diminishing return. If there are many items on the critical path, 
management will find· this approach less practical. Carrying extra 
stock also increases vulnerability to high inventory investment if 
the product schedule decreases or designs change. The balance 
beb·,een shorter lead times and carrying extra stock is crucial if 
the advantages of responsiveness to market changes are to be achieved. 
In reality, increasing demand should only pressurise lead time·s 
when plant capacity is overloaded. \'Ihen a manufacturer or vendor 
faces such a capacity problem, he is tel1]pted to increase lead times, 
resul ting in a larger ,.ork in process inventory which is counter 
productive. 
lead times. 
The ans'.er is to solve the capacity problem, not. lengthen 
Should the decision be made to increase lead times due to capacity 
restriction, the overload will progressively increase, which can have 
disastrous effects on the plant. For example, suppose a 
manufacturer increased his lead time from six weeks to ·eight weeks, 
this would immediately generate an extra two w~Eks worth of work for 
the manufacturer which would iOlcrease the backlog, thus increasing 
the lead times. If the actual lead times are now observed, they will 
be longer than ever· and if they are built into the inventory plans, 
orders will be generated sooner, again increasing backlogs and once 
more increasing the lead time. This is one of the most danger04s 
and most common misconceptions in industry, yet many companies have 
even developed sophisticated computer programmes to average historical 
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lead times and build these into the planning system. 
Unfortunately, a computer is amoral; it can be used to do the 
",rong thing faster than it '.as ever possible to do it manually. 
r,rany vendors quote longer lead times in the belief that this 
will give them a better chance ef producing a customer's requirements· 
on time. This again has the effect of encouraging the customer to 
place a larger order to compensate for demand during the extra lead 
time. If he once more quotes a.longer lead time, most of his 
customers will send him more purchase orders. Eventually they will 
not accept ·inflated lead times and decide to purchase goods from 
another vendor. This will rec!uce the backlog and consequently reduce 
the lead time; the remaining customers' needs will be red'Jced in line 
with the lead time, again resulting in a reduced backlog. The 
foregoing puts emphasis on the disastrous effects on the organisation 
when lead times are not under control; 
" 
it is important that 
management are fully aware of these effects. 
It is essential to establish objectives for lead time reduction for 
the directors of purchasing and manufacturing, and to hold these 
individuals accountable for their attainment. The initial setting 
of such objectives can prove difficult. At first, set the objective 
arbitrarily to reduce a certain percentage of lead time; this will. 
set a target for everyone ,to aim for. The efforts required to 
achieve this set objective will demonstrate the validity of the 
objective and indicate if there is a need. for change. This procedure· 
m2y be repeated resulting in an objective reflecting a realistic 
challenge to management. 
To a large degree, marketing and manufacturing objectives are opposed. 
Harketing requires a fast response to changing customer demand resulting 
45 
in quick production schedule changes and greater expense in 
overheads and in premiums to vendors to accelerate deliveries. 
Hanuf3ctur ing, hOl-lever, would prefer a gradual schedule change_ 
in order to minimise product cost and inventory and overhead 
expenses, and-to maximise ~~tput; but this posture reduces 
responsiveness. The answer is to trade off these conflicting 
objectives in a way that optimises results in a company. 
Unfortunately, such a trade-off is difficult to accommodzte. 
l"lainta-ining objectivity in a trade..:off analysis of schedule changes is 
also cl iff icult because of the psychological pressures. When demand 
is strong FelV companies like to turn dOlVn or delay new business 
even though the probability -of attaining schedule increases may be 
low, the urge to schedule them anyway is usually overlVhelming: 
\"Ihen management succumbs to this urge, inventory and product cost 
objectives are bound to suffer. The answer to the problem is to 
maintain the shortest possible lead times for assemblies and 
component parts in order to allow maximum responsiveness to product 
schedule increases and decreases without harming inventory and 
product cost objectives. 
A schedule to manufacture products is normally set from a sales 
forecast, as with all forecasts the longer the per-iod included in 
the forecast the greater the probability of forecast error. An 
extended cumulative lead time, or even long single item-lead times, 
will prove vulnerable to demand changes and increase the probability 
of schedule changes. Figure 4 shows the probability of schedule 
changes in relation to lead time [38J. 
46 
Probaolllty (percent) 
------------ -
100 I -
- ! 
PrObability 01 a 
SCI'IedUl8 cf'lang8 
80 
! , 
, 
--;- . 
80-]------ . . . , 
, 
-. 
, ;; . 
• 
- .-40 1 .! ---._-+_. ,. --- .-- --
---, -- 11 ~- ... - ~ - ; 
I-ii!! 
---I f f I ! 
!oL U) ... 2 
· 
· 
· 
· 
· 
, 
, j .... 
. ' 
. 
.. 
.. 
, 
, 
. 
, 
~'I: ~ i ~ ! 
-....,.-------:-;-:-....:...----11 Product's critICal palh _~ .1 .. , _, " __ '_'_"_' "_' ,_,. __ . ~ - 2 3 • 5 8 -, -;; -- -8 ---.-
MonthS in the I\Jture 
10 
PROBABILITY OF A FUTURE SCHEDULE CHANGE 
FIG. 4 
Shmtn on the Figure is the critical path of a typical product, 
totalling 6~ months. If the cumulative lead time can be reduced 
to 5~ months, the probability of a schedule change that violates 
the cumulative lead time is reduced from 40% to 5~~, again emphasising 
the advantages of lead time reduction. 
4_2 Input/Output Control 
It has been previously established that one element in the lead 
time cycle, which can be excessively large, is the backlog of 
production scheduling. The erratic nature of work coming in each 
week cannot be predicted; companies, however, seldom measure the 
incoming work rate or know how erratic it is. 
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Figure '; simplifies a manufacturing unit, if the flOl" of \'lOrk 
through the unit is to be constant, work input 'A' must equal 
work output 'B' 
\'IORK INPUT 
'A' 
~Ianufacturing Unit 
L \10RK OUTPUT ~I ~ 'B' 
L-. __ ~j . 
BACKLOG 
FIG. 5 
If input 'A' is increased, the manufacturing unit will utilise 
additional capacity if output '8' is to increase at the same rate. 
It is reasonable to assume the input and output rate will seldom 
be equal, consequently there will be a need for a backlog to minimise 
the detrimental effect of fluctuating demand on the unit. However, 
should the cverall input rate increase at a greater pace than the 
output rate, the backlog will be increased. Input/Output control 
is the major factor in controlling the level of backlog and lead 
times. \'Ihen the manufacturing unit's output consistently falls 
short of input, it is necessary to either expand the capacity or 
reduce the input in order to reduce the capacity constraint. 
The benefits of successful input/output control are cumulative. 
The reduction of backlog and lead time facilitates priority control, 
with resulting less work in process, making it easier to manage 
the remainder. Lead time instability is a direct result of 
shortcomings in planning and control. The key to stabilising and 
reducing lead times is control and reduction of backlog. 
Input/output control addresses two problems separately - Capacity 
and Priority. These are approached in three stages 
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First, a family uf items which require a common production 
area are identified and capacity requirements projected for 
the total group. Capacity is thereby reserved and manpo",er 
and equipment requirements are planned accordingly. 
Second, reduce the lead time by eliminating most of the queue 
time from the total lead time, leaving only order preparation 
time, manufacturing time and transit time. The backlog is reduced 
in this manner until it includes only those orders in process in 
the plant. 
Third, select the input to match capacity for the family of items 
previously identified, using the highest priority selection procedure. 
By applying the three foregoing steps, capacity has been reserved and 
committed but the selection of the specific item to be manufactured, 
priority determination. is not made until the last possible moment. 
Input/output control must equal capacity .or backlog will increase. 
If backlog is allowed to increase; the spiralling lead time problems 
such as expediting and missed deliveries, will emerge. The input 
should not be less than capacity or work shortage will occur and the 
plant and vendor will retreat to their old habits of building a 
backlog for security. Input/output control is working most effectively 
when capacity is correctly established and inventory control is pulling 
work ahead to avoid future peak loads. At this point management is in 
the enviable position of acting to stay out of trouble instead of 
reacting to get out of trouble. 
The follmling results \.ere reported after Fisher Controls initiated a 
system utilising the principles of Input/Output control with a cast iron 
49 
foundry [29]. The programme "/8S started during a time "hen 
the foundry's lead time was increasing from 12 to 24 ,.eeks. The 
control successfully held the lead time to an average of 10 w~eks 
initially, and this was later reduced to 4 weeks. Expediting 
was reduced from daily phone calls from Fisher Controls Buyers to 
bi-monthly phone calls by the foundry. The programme was expanded 
to cover 75~o of Fisher Controls foundry purchases vdth equally good 
results. Vendors were initially reluctant to accept an Input/Output 
control programme. The idea of shorter lead time and less backlog 
is discomforting. However, after a short experience with Input/Output 
control, the vendor becomes one of the system's greatest supporters. 
No longer does he rely on a short range forecast from his marketing 
department; he has a firm capacity commitment with zero deviation 
for three months into the future. He has a forecast beyond three 
months from the source of future business - the customer's inventory 
systems. 
The vendor is no longer vulnei'able to unexpected surges of increasing 
orders which he has not the capacity to satisfy within the standard 
lead time. He is not plagued with mounting files of open orders and 
the inevitable multiple re-schedules which follm •• Fisher Controls 
report that their vendors, who are involved with Input/Output control, 
have requested their other customers to adopt the system and offer 
shorter lead times to entice them. 
The purchasing viewpoint of Input/Output control is that the buyer 
is relieved of the endless job of expediting hundreds of individual 
orders, and gets the opportunity to buy - negotiate better prices, 
better quality and develop new sources. 
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Inventory Control is also enthusiastic 1'1,11, this type of control; 
when the inevitable forecast error is ",,,,,,,",t.ered, the Inventory' 
Planner has a faster recovery time to ""::1 ""e inventory levels and 
meet customer requirements. He does n,d lI"vtJ to resort to the . Hot 
List I emergency systems. \'/hen the Sal,,:; Il':partment calls and has an 
em2rgency order or wants short delivery I",. " special order, he can 
immediatel y determine .,hat other purch",;" ',,'''ers, if any, i.ill be put 
in jeopardy and confidently make deliv",.y promises because he now 
controls the priority of orders. 
4.3 Backlog and Job Security 
Pressures for faster deliveries and for I"',illced product lead times have 
been _ increased by industry's insistence "" '"aintaining 10., finished 
goods inventories; but manufacturing I "'''I' I" find it almost impossible 
to reduce cycle time because of backloq:; I. i thiri the plant. Gomersall [31] 
calls this condition 'the backlog syndr",,,,,,. To reduce backlog in a 
company it is necessary to distin'guish 1"'1 \'I""n 'good' and 'bad' inventory,. 
Once this division has been made it is t 1"," necessary to reduce,.or when 
possible, eliminate, 'bad' inventories. 
Good work in process inventories may in!: 11101" the follo.'ing : 
1) Inventory required by a production """':I,:;S (such as, bake for 
three hours afte'r painting) 
- 2)' Temporary banks for balance. Such j"ventory occurs during the 
workday but,bydefinition, must be I:lill,in3ted during the day in 
which it has been created. 
3) Banks for breakdown or mainter,ance. III highly sophisticated plants, 
downtime for maintenance and breakdltl-III "'''y be carefully comput.ed. 
Inventories are then created and stlll',-d '1:0 compensate for lost 
machine time. 
'Bad' work in process inventory is any i l,v",II:ory other than the above, 
for example : 
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1) Inventory queued for processing in excess of station time. 
2) Banks created by loss of balance 
3) Banks created· by over-scheduling 
4) Banks for rate ·guarantee 
5) Banks for schedule guarantee. It is an old manufacturing 
--",-' 
practice for the supervisor to mainta,n a bank of goods to 
assure compliance with the week's schedule. By doing this, 
line balance, random absente~ism, and performance variation 
disappear as critical elements requiring managerial attention. 
6) Banks for capital equipment utilisation. It is considered 
good business practice to use expensive pieces of capital equipment 
to the fullest extent possible. This encourages the use of such 
equipment irrespective of the need of the good being produced on it. 
Once 'bad' work-in-process has been built it will tend to remain at 
one level. The prime motivator for the maintenance of backlogs is 
the sense of security it gives to both operators and the supervisor. 
If the production team gets a sense. of security from the knowledge that 
there is plenty of work to be done, . this hypothesis can be made as 
the amount of work to be done diminishes, the sense of security 
diminishes. The only effective way an employee can resist the 
reduction of the work in process is to try and maintain it. The 
methods employed to maintain the backlog at an acceptable employee 
level ·can be subtle. Other than actually reducing .the work pace, one 
or more of the follmling techni·ques may be employed 
1) Increase of lost time or down time by questioning set-ups, tools 
work fixtures, etc. 
2) Random depletion of parts and supply items. 
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3) Increase in indirect time through visits to personnel, 
visits to Stores, increased number of grievances, etc. 
4) Increase of re-I'lork for quality reasons. 
Once the security level of in-process inventories is reached, 
the employees and supervisors pay little or no further attention to 
'building security'. Noticeable traits of the operator above the 
security level are the converse of those outlined previously. These 
conclusions were reached by Comersall after carrying out extensive 
controlled experiments to confi~m his backlog syndrome theory. He 
also.considers that 'feather bedding,automation and job guarantee' 
all have their roots firmly embedded in job security. Host major 
job security controversies occur in industries where it is difficult 
for employees to 'store work'. It is logical to assume that all 
employees will tend to develop an informal assurance of security if 
this is not guaranteed by their company or union. 
There is a word of caution for 'those embarking on computerisation 
and total management control systems. ~lany of the efficiencies 
which such systems bring, result from the reduction or elimination of 
excess inventories and decreased process times. Unless careful 
consideration is given to' the psychological efcects on the people who 
depend on their 'pads' for security, irreparable damage may be done 
to the organisation. 
There is a need to involve the work force in any backlog reduction 
plan and secure their acceptance of the advantages accrued by the 
reduction. It is necessary to belay their natural fears of job 
security; this will be no mean task and reassurance needs to be 
frequently given that lead time reduction will promote a more 
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competitive stance of the company, attracting additional orders 
due to better customer service, the net result being long term job 
security for. the employees. 
Wight [73] considers that the problem of the security level of 
work built by operators is aggravated by management's fundamental 
rule of measuring people on the functions they control. The 
supervisor is measured on idle time; if a man is not "Iorking, pressure 
is applied to the supervisor to find him 'tork ·or get rid of him. On 
the other hand production control personnel feel they are responsible 
for delivering goods to schedule. It would be more logical to place 
the responsibility for delivery with the supervisor and let production 
control be r·esponsible for keeping the work flow through the shop at 
a steady rate. Some companies charge all idle time for the lack of 
work to production control. 
CHAPTER V 
HATERIAL REQUIREHENTS PLANNING 
5.1 Handling of Information 
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Production and inventory control is achieved primarily by 
receiving, processing and passing on information. The handling 
of information is one of the major determinates of the effectiveness 
and efficiency of a manufacturing concern. 
The size of the concern, the complexity of the end products and 
the manufacturing process effect the amount of information which 
needs to be handled. Suffa and I'filler [11] classify production units 
into b"o categories: continuous systems, and intermittent systems. 
This dichotomy is largely a function of process technology, since 
continuous systems are those designed to produce a continuous stream 
of products, while intermitterit systems are geared tb producing in 
batches or lots. 
The difference in planning, scheduling alid control behleen the 
continuous system and intermittent system is substantial. \'Ihile 
both may be producing finished products for inventory, the intermittent 
nature of production of parts, components, and products of the latter 
produces a more complex detailed scheduling problem. The nature of 
forecasting and planning production lot sizes is unique because of the 
dependent nature of the demand for parts and components. Demand for 
parts and components is dependent on the production schedule for the 
primary product which, in turn, is dependent on market demand. In 
the case of complex assembled products, these may have sub-assemblies 
that in themselves may be produced for inventory to be sold as spares. 
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Prior to the application of the computer in industry, the 
greater the amount.of information to be processed resulted in 
increasing the constraints on the controllers. ~lanual systems 
never really worked because of their limitations in the speed of 
response and the cost of control which of necessity made them 
functionally incomplete. The failings of the formal recording, 
planning and control systems were compensated for by the introduction 
of an informal system seeking·to respond.to immediate needs. 
The formal system can be identified as a 'push system' which 
controls the inventories and scheduling to meet thE customers needs. 
The informal system is related to the 'pull system' where progress 
chasers, expediters or priority lists pull the most urgent or 
overdue orders through the works. The informal system is usually 
regarded as 'firefighting' identifiable by the following actions: 
(i) preparing 'hot-lists' of products to be expedited 
(ii) kitting materials from stock ahead of schedule to find 
out if there are any shortages 
(iii) batch splitting to avoid manufacturing idle time caused 
by poor planning of·the.formal works order launching system 
(iv) cannibalism of kits or \lork in process 
(v) urgent requests to vendors to supply material ahead of 
normal lead time, usually involving excessive costs; 
The. first computer applications around 1960, in production and 
inventory management represented the beginning of a break with tradition. 
The problem of information storage, processing and retrieval, was 
reduced and many of the older methods and techniques devised in 
light of these constraints suddenly became obspletE. The companies 
which maintained the old methods for use with the computer found little 
advantage; they merely accelerated the use of inappropriate techniques. 
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It became feasible and desirable to sort out, revise, or discard 
previously used techniques and to introduce new ones which previously 
would have been impractical or .impossible to implement. It is now a 
matter of record that among manufacturing companies that pioneered 
inventory management computer applications in the 1960's, the most 
signi ficant resul ts were achieved by those \1ho chose to undertake a 
fundamental overhaul of their systems, not those who refined and 
speeded-up existing procedures [49]. The result was the "abandonment 
of unsatisfactory techniques and the substitution of new, radically 
different approaches that the availability of the computer made possible. 
With the declining cost of computation and the rising cost of inventory 
it became an even more \10rthwhile exercise to use computers for 
inver,tory control. In the area of manufacturing inventory management, 
the most successful innovations are embodied in what has become known 
as materials requirements planning systems (HRP). 
Haterial requirements planning was developed out of frustration with 
the complexity of large-scale manufacturing control and with the 
failure of the statistical inventory control (SIC) methodology to 
provide adequate management control within reasonable cost constraints. 
5.2 Limitations of St~tistical Inventory Control 
Statistical inventory control has certain I"leaknesses, particulary when 
applied to intermittent systems. There is no need to statistically 
forecast the requirements of a component. Once the production plan for 
all items in which the component is used has been established, then 
the requirements of the component follow, as dependent demand, by 
simple arithmetic. 
SIC methods rely on a smooth demand pattern for components. It has 
been recognised else\1here in this thesis, particularly in batch 
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production systems, that lc)\·ter level demands are usually' lumpy'; 
Stock control systems \·,hich replenish stocks immediately following 
large demands can result in unnecessary stock carrying cost due to 
the inactivity of demand which follow the depletion. This cost 
is also aggravated by the cost of carrying safety stock associated 
with statistical theory. 
~/here several components are needed for a single assembly, the 
inventories for those individual components should not be treated in 
isolation. 
Consider the case where b,enty di fferent components are required 
for a particular assembly. Suppose, under independent control of 
the components, that each component has a 95 percent chance of being 
in stock. Then the probability of being able to build the complete 
assembly is only (0.95)20 or 0.36, that is, 64 percent of the time 
at least one component would be unavailable, thus delaying the 
completion of an assembly. 
Material requirements planning overcomes the limitations of 
statistical inventory control basically with the provisioning of 
materials in the quantities required at the time required. 
5.3 Appl ication of Haterial Requirements Plannin'l 
Material requirements planning is not a ne" concept; logic dicbtes 
that the Romans probabl y used it· in their construction projects, the 
Venetians in their shipbuilding, and the Chinese in building the Creat 
Wall, Building contractors have always been forced into planning 
for material to be delivered when needed and not before, because of 
space requirements. 
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The amount of literature on N.R.P. appears very modest when 
compared with the amount available on S.I.C. This can be partially 
explained by the fact that N.R.P., although considered superior to 
S.LC •. for manufacturing. inventories, was difficult to apply in the 
pre-computer era. ~toreover, r·1.R.p. is based on very simple ideas and 
offers fe,"er possibilities for abstraction than S. LC. Therefore, 
mainly practical people are dealing with r·t.R.p. which could never 
become of great interest to theoreticians. 
In jobbing and batch environments·the smooth flow of production 
depends upon a number of factors, a major one being the availability 
of required material in correct quantities in the right place at the 
right time so that production schedules can be met. The production 
schedule relies upon forecasts for future demand and actual customer 
orders. When a company is able to forecast future demand accurately, 
the problem of the availability of material diminishes, but when 
accurate forecasting is not possible the provisioning of material. 
becomes an important issue, particularly when operating with the 
constraints of available cash which is imposed on most companies. 
It was mentioned earlier that the formal 'push' system of production 
and inventory control relied upon the use of 'hot lists'. To be 
effective a series of hot lists are necessary' which break down the 
requirements and associated shortages into time periods showing in 
which period a shortage would occur if the items are not expedited. 
This concept, if extended through enough' time periods to cover the 
entire manufacturing lead time, is, in effect, the basis of materials 
requirements planning or time phased order points. 
, 
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The distinction bet\'leen material requirements planning and 
time phased order points is that time phased order point is applied 
to service parts and finished products. The system processing 
logic is identical to material requirements planning except in the 
manner in ,"hich item demand is arrived at. Requirements for 
independent demand items are forecast because they cannot be calculated. 
Material requirements planning is a computer program for production. 
It enables management to time in the most efficient '"ay, the ordering 
and manufacturing of components and sub.-assemblies that make up 
completed products. In a broacer sense, hO\"lever, it represents a 
complete set of related activities that begin with forecasting and 
order entry, and end with feedback from the shop' floor. This feedback 
closes the loop and thereby allo\'ls planners to schedule '"ithin 
expected capacity limits. 
The master production schedule, considered in detail else,"here in 
the thesis, is the main driving force behind the MRP system. It 
provides the order release dates by time phasing lead times and 
quantities for production derived from forecasts and actual requirements 
for a product. Haterial requirements for the product are identified 
by exploding the product, thereby creating a complete list of parts 
and sub-assemblies called the 'bill of materials' 
With the product quantity given by the master production schedule, 
the explosion technique presents the 'gross requirements'. The 
'net requirements' are calculated simply by subtracting any products, 
sub-assemblies or parts which are in store or already in process from 
the gross requirements. It is important that parts are subtracted in 
the order given above, i.e. products first, or the true net requirements 
at each.level of production will not be shown. 
iii 
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By off-setting the lead times, the or,der release dates for net 
requirements are calculated using the product requirement date on 
the master production schedule as the datum. 
5.4 Hixed Systems 
An HRP system user may feel that not all inventory items warrant a 
sophisticated ap~roach for procurement. If certain items are 
excluded from the r1RP system and controlled by some statistical 
inventory control technique, a mixed system is created. 
Usually a mixed system is obtained by performing an ABC value 
analysis and placing the low usage value items 'C' under stalistical 
inventorycontrol. Orlicky [49] stated that there also exist r1RP 
systems that cover 'A' items only, but in his opinion only purchased 
items 'C' may be considered exception to the rule that an r·IRP system 
should cover all classes of inventory for purposes of priority 
planning. For purposes of assembling the product, the lowly 'C' item 
is as important as an 'A' item - both must be available in the right 
quantity at the right time. Furthermore, some 'A' items have 
components classified 'G' and 'C', and shortage of one of the latter 
will prevent the completion of the 'A' items. 
A situation in which a mixed system would be necessary occurs 
when items with long delivery lead times present a cumulative lea.j 
time which exceeds the planning horizon of the HRP system. The ~IRP 
system would produce,orders that are behind schedule at the very 
moment of release. 
Praise for the accomplishments of the HRP system is Vlell documented 
along with experiences of disappointment. Berry and \'Ihyba rk [7] 
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report that "The APIeS HRP crusade has been closed and 
pronounced successful". Evidence of the success is sho,"n in 
the grm,ing· number of HRP systems that have been installed in 
industry and the diverse nature of the companies making these 
installations. APIeS members report significant operating 
improvements in such areas as inventory control, production 
scheduling, delivery perFormance, and·operation costs [54]. 
Disappointment ,"ould appear to occur in most instances, not with 
the theory behind r·IRP, but in the application. It has been 
mentioned earlier that Failure of the r·tRP system can be expected 
iF it is simply 9rafted onto an existing system. File dat~ 
integrity pertaining to inventory status data and the bill-of-
materials data. is a pre-condition for the system'seFFective 
operation. Orlicky [49] states that it is a Fact that typically 
the inventory status data and bill-of-material data are chronically 
in poor shape under any system preceding the installation of ~tRP. 
Under a stock replenishment order point system it does not overly 
matter that inventory records are unreliable and that bills of 
material are inaccurate, incomplete or out of date. Order point 
acts merely as an·order launching system, and it must be complemented 
by an expediting system in order to function at all. 
Education of management and users of a proposed HRP system is 
absolutely necessary if the system is to have any chance. of success. 
The implementation of HRP is a major challenge to management and 
requires commitment of large amounts of money and time. It must 
be properly planned For with the involvement of everyone who will 
be associated ',,fith the system. The company, as well as individuals, 
must believe in r·IRP and both must recognise the long term benefits 
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because the project duration is longer than most people 
anticipate even when all the required software is available. 
Hany production/manufacturing managers are trained to d8al with 
day-to-(jay problems, and are impulsive by nature [41]. Left 
to such people r'lRP will never become really effective because, in 
addition to converting the system, it is necessary to ensure that 
the attitudes of people using the system also change. It is a 
serious mistake to implement an r'1RP system when the managers and 
other users still think in terms of independent demands. The 
users themselves must be actively involved in the project; the 
staff should be informed that a requirement planning approach is 
going to be used for running the business so that they do not 
maintain informal systems in parallel with the formal one. People 
have to be sold the HRP strategy; it is only then that they will 
appreciate the facilities available and allow themselves to be part 
of the system. 
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CHAPTER VI 
LOT 5 IZES 
6.1 Economic Cri ter ia 
The lot size problem I.ill be liinited to a manufacturing situation 
where ral'i materials and components ar,e processed to the stage where 
a product is made available to satisfy customer demand. In such a 
situation the determination of lot sizes can be divided into two 
types of supply 
(i) The purchase of ral. materials and components from an 
outside supplier, and 
(ii) the supply of the raw materials and components for 
processing at different levels of manufacture within 
a company. 
The objective of inventory management is to maintain optimal lev~ls 
of inventory consistent ,.ith customer demands and plant capacity. 
!·lanugement must determine what to order,· when to order and hDl. much 
to order. This is not an easy task for there are many conflicting 
goals. Nevertheless, manugement must inevitably make the decision 
to order what it considers to be the ',right' quantity. 
A considerable amount of literature is available to the.manager 
I.hich prese·nts solutions to the lot size decision problem. The 
majority of.methods employ solely economic criteria to determine a 
. particular lot size, generally in the form of a balance between 
ordering or set-up costs and holding costs. 
The decision to plan inventory lot sizes on ordering or set-up costs 
and holding costs has certain limitations and there are other factors 
"ihich, in the practical application of the lot size, may ,.ell be more 
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significant than the economic criteria. Other considerations 
may include: 
(i) Physical dimension 
(ii) Product life cycle' 
(iii) Irregular supply 
(iv) Supplier lot size 
(v) Scrap rate 
(vi) Shortages 
(vii) Tool life 
(viii) Process capacity 
due to storage difficulties, large 
volume components are usually ordered 
in small lot sizes 
if the life cycle of a component is, 
knO\;n there I.ould be no advantages in 
producing the component in lot sizes 
greater than the knDl'In demand 
to compensate for irregularities in 
supply, it is advantageous to order in 
large lot sizes 
it probably will have economic 
advantages to order lot sizes which 
match ,the manufacturing lot size of 
the supplier. It is very unlikely 
that the order v holding cost balance 
will produce similar lot sizes for 
both customer and supplier 
when th'e scrap rate for a process is 
high it will be necessary to increase 
the lot size to ensure the expected 
quantity is made available 
the larger the lot size the frequency 
of possible shortages will decrease. 
The probability of a stock-out 
increases as the replenishment order 
is due 
a lot size can be determined by the 
life of the tool producing the item 
where a process or equipment has a 
limiting capacity it might be reasonable 
to use the capacity as the lot size or 
a discrete division of a lot size 
(ix) Product Structure 
(x) Price 
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there are advantages in setting lot 
sizes to suit the requirements of 
items, sub-assemblies, etc., at higher 
levels in the product structure, 
otherwise an imbalance of parts will 
result. This basically is the 
independent/depeAdent demand concept 
which considers that lot sizes are 
dependent on the demand at the next 
higher level in the structure. Only 
the highest level, the product, should 
be considered independently. 
discount for bulk orders, anticipation 
of price rises and a 'one-off' bargain 
might well decide on the quantity to 
be purchased. 
In many instances the lot size decision is influenced by the item 
cost and usage rate in relation to other items in the A B C 
classification. The rationale of A B C classification is the 
impracticality of giving an equally high degree of attention to the 
records of every item in inventory. Orlicky [49] considers the 
A B C concept irrelevant with the application of computers, equal 
treatment of all inventory items, as far as planning is concerned, is 
now feasible.. However, Orlicky concedes that there could be 
exceptions such as certain extremely low cost items, especially 
purchased ones, that may have safety stocks and be ordered in large 
quantities. Such exceptions are made not because of the inability 
of the computer system to plan and maintain the status of such items 
but because of the impracticality of accurate physical control. 
One of the limitations of applying an economic based formula to arrive 
at lot sizes for individual items is the cumulative impact the 
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individual optimal policies. have on the total cost cif inventory 
investment. A company's resources are necessarily. limited and 
it would be quite unreasonable to expect a company to automatically 
find sufficient capital to finance the·total inventory associated 
with optimal levels of individual items. To overcome the excessive 
investment associated with individual item policies it is necessary 
to find a rational policy for the aggregate inventory. 
6.2 Families of Items 
The first to consider a departure from the stereotyped approach to 
lot sizes was W. Evert Welch [71] who recognised that very significant 
savings could be. made by applying the theory of EDQ's to families of 
items, even without evaluating the cost factors in the formula, 
specific values of ordering costs and holding costs '"ere not used. 
\'/elch's approach to EO[j calculations has significant advantages, 
particularly when compared with intuitive methods. A constant factor 
is applied to all items included in the 'family' which eliminates 
the uneven treatment of individual items. The normal outcome is to 
reduce the lot size inventory of the family of items while continuing 
to place the same number of orders, or to reduce the number of orders 
while holding the lot size inventory constant. \'/elch pointed out that 
his method did not produce the most economical results, just more 
economical than intuitive methods. 
Hentioned earlier was the fact that there may well be other constraints 
which make it impractical to achieve the full benefits of ED[js. 
Among these are shortage of capital for investment in inventory, 
restricted space to store inventory, too few skilled set-up men and 
limited capacity available for manufacture. 
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A technique called LlHIT (Lot-size Inventory flanagement 
Interpolation Techni'lue) \'laS developed in 1963 as part of a special 
project for the American Production and Inventory Control Society. 
LIt·1! T is a technique for obtaining the most economical lot sizes 
when there is a limitation on the number of orders which can be' 
processed. The limitation may be caused by the number of order-
handling personnel, set-up men, or machine time available. LIflIT 
is designed to handle a family of items which pass over ,common 
manufacturing facilities: the technique is applied in two phases -
'Phase 1 
Phase 2 
Trial economic lot sizes are calculated for each 
item in the chosen family, using a standard [00 
equation. The total set-up hours required for those 
'economic' lot sizes is then compared with the total 
set-up hours required for the present lot sizes. New 
LIMIT order quantities are then calculated which result 
in a total of set-up hours equal to the present total. 
The result usually is to reduce the total lot size 
inventory' substantially 'without changing total set-up 
hours, giving benefits from reduced inventory 
investment without changing operating conditions. 
A series of alternatives is presented for the family 
of items, shm.ing the effect on the lot size inventory 
when changing the present ordering conditions. It 
reveals what happens to inventory when more orders are 
placed or more time is spent on setting up machines. 
The number of alternatives can be varied to suit the' 
existing' condi tions. This phase of the proqramrne 
presents for study the alternatives available if it is 
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desirable to move in controlled steps from present 
conditions towards operations which result in lower 
total costs. 
Figure G shm"/s the average order quantity inventory for various 
alternative set-up levels for a family of items. The curve is 
sometimes called 'The Exchange Curve'. 
Total Average 
Order Quantity 
Inventory 
£ 
Solutions not 
'" 
Non-Optimal Solutions 
above curve 
possible in this 
area --~-
Total Set-up Hours 
CURVE OF LOT SIZE INVENTORY V's SET-UP 
FIG. 6 
Closely related to the LUll T technique is the application 
of the 'EFFICIENT SURFACE' approach to lot sizing by Feeney [26]. 
Inventory control operations involve two distinct types of problems 
which may be identified as 'tactical' decisi"on problems and 
'strategic' decision problems. The solution to the tactical 
problem defines a family of decision rules while a solution to the 
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str<:ltegic problem involves a final selection of some particular 
member of this family. Feeney suggests that much attention has 
been given to· the tactical decision problem; the methods typically 
employed to solve the strategic problem are·frequently less· than 
satisfactory. 
Feeney criticises the costs used in formulating the exchange curve. 
The cost of holding inventory, for example, involves not only the 
cost to the company of obtaining money but must also take into 
account the policy restrictions the company places on the extent 
of indebtedness which, in many cases, may be entirely unrelated to 
the market price for capital funds. Inventory holding costs must 
als·o take into account obselescence risks as well as the capacity 
and variable operating costs of storage facilities. 
The unit costs of processing purchase orders may depend heavily 
on the volume of orders actually processed. Thus, a curious 
circular situation results in which the unit cost of ordering 
depends on the volume of ordering, but the volume of ordering depends 
on the unit cost that is used in the decision rules. In the case of 
finished or semi-finished material that is being ordered on the 
company's own manufacturing facilities, order costs must also take 
into account the effect of different order sizes on plant congestion, 
and-is thus related to the whole production priority system. 
If the model includes some consideration of stock shortages, 
measurement of the shortage cost offers even greater problems than 
the previous two. The strategic decision will take into consideration 
the outcome variables of the system which could include average 
inventory investment, number of orders placed per year, numbers of 
stock shortages per year, etc. v/hat is required is some method of 
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relating the alternative outcomes defined in the efficient 
surface to the overall objectives and restrictions Ivith l'lhich the 
company operates. Fortunately, a mechanism exists in every 
company for carrying out complex analyses'of this sort. 
mechanism is in the mind of the decision maker himsp.lf. 
This 
Feeney 
concludes, therefore, that in situations in which it is not possible 
by direct methods to obtain meaningful measures of the cost 
parameters contained in the decision rules, the strategic decision 
might best be made by confronting the executi ve ~Ii th a picture of 
the efficient surface. The final selection of a point on the curve 
as a target for company inventory operations is a decision that he 
himself must make. 
Feeney simulated the behaviour of inventory items selected randomly 
from a system, in order to derive a synthetic efficient surface. 
System data was computed to determine average usage, unit cost and 
lead time. A decision rule Ivas formulated to decide when an order 
should be placed on each item and how much material should be ordered. 
The computer kept track of both actual usage and orders placed and 
maintained a running balance of stock on hand. Measurements were 
made simultaneously of the value of inventory investment, the number 
of orders issued and the number of shortage delays that resulted over 
the period studied; cost ratios were varied during the exercise. 
The procedure was to select particular values for each pair of cost 
ratios, insert these values in the decision rules, and then simulate 
the behaviour of the inventory Over a two year period. Figure 7 
shOlvs a lattice of points in the cost ratio space. Corresponding 
to each point studied the outcome I'I8S observed in terms of average 
. inventory investment, the number of orders processed, and the number 
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of shortage delays. In this way a group of points on the 
efficient surface of the outcome space was defined. 
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COST RATIO SPACE OUTCOHE SPACE 
where 
c 1 = tile annual cost per £1 invested 
c2 = cost per order processed 
c3 = cost per shortage delay 
FIG. 7 
Figure 8 shOl.s a complete picture of the outcome space as 
generalised from 'the particular values obtained. The curves 
show the entire range of alternative outcomes available to the 
company under the formulation that wa's employed. Any given point 
in this chart could be identified with a particular pair of cost 
ratios and could thus be attained through the decision rules. At 
this, point it was possible to confront the principal executive 
involved with the entire range of alternatives available so that a 
decision could be made on inventory control operations which best 
related the outcome of these operations to the overaliobjectives of 
the company. 
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6.3 Parent/Subordinate Stock Relationship 
Brmvn [10] states that in a time-phased planning system it is 
possible to plan to receive a lot of material just at the time a 
substantial part 'of that lot is consumed into the assembly of a 
parent item. In that case the lot size for the subordinate 
material should be an integral multiple of the lot size for the 
parent (assuming the material has only one use). When lower level 
inventory items are depleted by eratic demands, a large demand may 
be followed by several knmvn periods of inactivity. In such a 
situation it makes no sense to immediately replenish the stock 
which would involve extra carrying costs. Figure 9 shows hO\'I 
multi-level lot sizes can create 'lumpy demands' at lower inventory 
levels. 
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Brown derives lot sizes for multi-stage requirements using a 
modified EOQ formula. The equation (1) below. shmlS the total 
annual cost expression for the lots of two items. The lot quantity 
for the subordinate is substituted as a mUltiple of the lot quantity 
for the parent which gives an expression for the economic parent 
lot quantity in equation (2). The effective set-up cost is the 
parent set-up plus a fraction of the set-up for the subordinate. 
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Similarly, the effective unit cost is the sum of the costs of 
The ratio bell-Ieen the lots is given in equation (3). The 
procedure is first to use equation (3) to find the multiple k; 
round it to an· integer (at least 1); substitute .into equation (2) 
to find the parent lot quantity; finally, set the subordinate lot 
quantity as k times the parent lot quantity. 
EQUATION (1) Total annual cost = (5 O/n)+ J,Q e I + (5 O/Q ) + ~ Q e I 
s "s s s p p p p 
let Q
s 
= k Qp 
~-,----
EQUATION (2) Qp = /2 (5 + 5 Ik) 0 p s 
J 1(e + k e ) 
, p s 
= J 5 e IS e s p p s EQUATION (3) k 
where 0 = demand per year Subscripts p = parent item 
cost s = subordinate item 5 = set-up 
e = unit cost per piece 
I = carrying charge per year 
Q = lot size 
Applica tion: (a) find multiple k, round to an integer 
(b) solve equation· (2) for parent lot Q p 
(c) subordinate lot Q = k Qp s 
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New [45] is critical of the applic3tion of the lot sizing 
techniques Ivhich are based solely on economic performance or 
computational efficiency. New points out the problems involved 
in applying such techniques to systems where lot sizing is 
carried out at more than·one level, and considers the problems 
are sufficient to question the whole concept of economic models 
and economic comparisons of performance, and offers some 
alternatives for examination. 
New's attention is focused on the ordering or set-up cost and 
the unit variable cost in the multi-level context. In the heuristic 
presented the effects of using the 'added value' batch formula or 
the 'full c·ost' batch formula demonstrated that the relationship 
between the subordinate lot size and the parent lot size varies 
considerably with an adverse effect on the inventory total cost. 
Nelv concludes that there are enough weaknesses in the basic 
philosophy attached to the setting of economic parameters, even 
without multi-level problems. Perhaps more important is the fact that 
making such a choice may overlook other alternatives. One such 
alternative considers the effect on manufacturing capacity when 
lot sizes are changed. 
6.4. Lot Size and Resource Availability 
New [46], in an article entitled 'Hatching Batch Sizes to r~achine 
Shop Capabilities : An Example in Production Scheduling', presented 
a new practical approach to the lot size problem. New considers 
that 
(i) Batch sizes cannot be considered independently of lead time 
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(ii) the constant batch size approach based on the 
assumption of a continuous demand is totally 
inappropriate when applied to discrete period planning; 
and 
(ii1) the decisions ccncerned with any single part number 
interact strongly with similar decisions for other part~ 
and this interaction should be considered in the decisions 
themselves. 
The principles of the heuristic developed are very simple; first 
a 'reasonable' batch size based on economics is determined. Checks 
are then made to see that the batches, when actually issued, will not 
upset the operations of the shop. The first of these checks is to 
compare the slack time for a batch with "the expected queueing time 
in the shop. See Figure 10 for explanation. 
,~. ____________ L_EA_D~_T_II_"E ______ -. ______ ~~I· 
I KNO\'/N CONDITIONS 
~ qUEUE TIHE PROCESS HACHINE ALLDI'/ANCE TlI·IE -"--~-~I-~ 
I ~I qUEUE T HIE I~'" TOLERANCE ALLDI'/ED 
I SLACK TIHE -~ I PROCESS j HACHINE ALLO\'/ANCE T II,IE 
-- p 
PROPOSED CONDITIONS 
FIG. 10 
If the slack time is within the queue time tolerance zone the 
associated batch size is acceptable. If the slack time is less than 
the minimum queue time, then the batch size should be reduced until an 
acceptable queue time is reached or the batch size must queue jump, i.e. 
the total lead time for the work is reduced. Should the slack time be 
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greater than the maximum queue time, then the batch size is too 
small and may be increased. 
New calls this approach the 'Slack Time Launching· Rule" (SLR). 
When the control of input to a shop is a priority order based on 
the slack calculations, then a first-in-first-out (FIFO) sequencing 
system can be used. 
However, in certain circumstances the FIFO system will never maintain 
relative priorities correctly. These are 
(a) The due dates or quantities required. can alter significantly 
after launching. 
(b) Individual machine group capacities can be reduced for time 
periods which represent a significant proportion of the average 
lead time for jobs. 
(c) "Rush order" due to scrap, shortages, urgent requests, etc. 
represent a substantial proportion of the total load. 
When such conditions prevail it will be necessary to resort to some 
other priority measure. One adaptive sequencing rule is 'least 
slack time per remaining operation' (LSOP). 
A simulation model was developed which linked·the launching of 
batches with their sequencing through a shop. Comparative results 
\.ere achieved for b.o sequencing rules : 
(a) FIFO 
(b) LSOP 
and b.o launching rules : 
(a) existing constant batch quantity system with constant lead times, 
and batches normally based on simple EB~ model calculations 
(b) the slack time launching rule (SLR) system. 
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Due date performance is shown in Table 1 and other results "re 
shown in Table 2 for the-LSDP sequencing rule. 
,----::------------, 
Queue Launch: 
Sequenc 1ng 1 I 11 
1 ru e . ean ru e (t.-
______ J_-=_m_e_u_nl:~ j------=-:'c=-
FIFD EBQ 20 
LSOP 
SLR 17 
EBO 
SLR 
12.4 
4.3 
Lateness 
j--S-t-a-n-d-a-rd late) . deviation 
., 30 
20 
1
---
7.9 
5.3 
TJ\BLE 1 COHPARATIVE PERFORHANCE TO DUE DATES 
Criteria 
Result of using SLR 
instead of mo 
----t---
Work-in-process inventory 
I·lean time batch is in shop 
No. of batches launched 
Machining time/(total 
involvement time) 
Down 18?, 
Down 20?, 
Down 20?, 
Down 1'--, 
TABLE 2 OTHER PERFOm-1ANCE I-IEASURES 
The comparative results shown indicate the considerable gains 
to be made from the use of the SLR system, particularly when it 
is linked to a continuing sequencing system based on a similar 
rule. However, even if no control is exercised other than at 
input, tne gains are significant: a 15 percent decrease in mean 
lateness and a 33 percent decrease in the standard deviation of 
lateness. 
6.5 FlOl. Control Order in9 Systems 
Burbidqe [14] states that there are two types of ordering systems:-
(1) Stock control ordering systems in which the release of purchase 
or manufacturing orders is controlled by the level of stocks in 
Stores. The primary aim of the system is to maintain stocks to 
satisfy the demand made on them. 
(2) Flow control ordering systems in which the prime aim is to 
79 
provide the components needed to complete specific 
programmes of knOl,n, or forecast sales. 
on 'explosions' from these programmes. 
Orders are based 
Burbidge considers the stock control ordering systems are 
inefficient and unstable, particularly when they are used for 
ordering direct materials for the manufacture of standard assembled 
products. Furthermore, Burbidge considers that most of the 
companies at present using stock control for standard assembled 
products could substantially increase their profitability by changing 
to a "flDl' control" ordering system. However, in spite of the 
disadvantages of stock control, the system may be efficiently used 
when the fdllowing conditions prevail -
1) Usage rate is even and known 
2) The lead time is short 
3) Receipts are.in full batch quantities 
4) Issues are in small quantities 
5) The unit value Is small 
In situations where the above conditions are satisfied there should 
be little problem of stock control, hence the system will not be 
pursued further. The flow control ordering system, in contrast, 
would appear to offer certain practical advantages when applied to 
the needs in a manufacturing environment, which are not characterised 
by.the above conditions. 
Flow control ordering systems can be divided into two categories 
(i) Single cycle systems- orders are released together in 
product sets, on a series of .common due dates, for 
completion by a series of common due dates. Batch sizes 
may vary each order period to meet changing demand. 
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(ii) f.iulti cycle systems - each item has its o"n special 
ordering cycle and is ordered independently of any other 
required items. Batch sizes are fixed ,.ith the time 
varying bet"een order periods to allow for changing demand. 
Burbidge highlights one special advantage of single cycle systems 
when applied to cyclic planning. It is possible with this system, 
when making standard products, to establish standard load charts 
which can be used repeatedly, period after period. 
The relationship betl,een ordering cycles for the different components 
in production at the same time has an important effect on the 
characteristics of material.flow. Because all components fora 
product are ordered together and processed in a single cycle, further 
orders for these components will be released ,.i th each cycle 'in phase'. 
This condition allmlS easy scheduling as opposed to the difficulties 
encountered when products in the multi cycle system are out of phase 
and cyclic planning is not possible. 
Burbidge [15] notes that. over most· of the quantity range changes in 
average batch quantity generally have an insignificant effect on total 
cost, and that a change from multi-phase to single-phase ordering can 
itself lead to substantial cost reductions. Ordering should be in 
balanced product sets, and the best batch quantity is the smallest. 
Burbidge [16] favours the Period Batch Control approach to inventory 
control which is a single-cycle flow control system. In real life 
conditions in industry, new short term sales and production programmes 
must be planned at regular intervals, progressively throughout the 
year. Each short term sales programme should cover a cycle starting 
only a short period ahead. These conditions are necessary because 
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it is impossible, particularly in multi-product batch production, 
to .make accurate forecasts of future product sales by type for long 
periods ahead. Re-casting the short term programme at regular 
intervals makes it possible to follOl-/ changes in market demand without 
accumulating stocks of unsaleable products and without leaving part 
finished ·'·lOrk standing idle in the factory. 
It is not uncommon in industry today, when using multi-cycle systems, 
to have a throughput time of six months, and a six month lead time for 
ordering materials. The sales programme for each cycle must be issued 
at least one year before the start of the cycle. All industrial 
experience shows that it is impossible to obtain accurate forecasts 
consistently for such long periods ahead. To make the system work, 
both the throughput and lead times must be reduced. 
Burbidge states that throughput times can be greatly reduced by the 
introduction of single-cycle ordering, and furlher reductions can be 
made by introducing group technology to simplify the material flow 
system. Purchase lead times can be reduced by separating shop 
ordering from purchase ordering. 
Cycle periods of four weeks are usual for fairly complex products; 
periods of one and two l'leeks have been successful for simple products. 
Prior to the start of a cycle a programme meeting approves the next 
short term sales programme. The meeting decides the 'Hinimum ~lake 
Quantity', which is the sales required, less stock, for each ~roduct •. 
If the l·n·IQ is less than capacity some of the most popular product lines 
are made for stock, or capacity is reduced. I f the l·n·1Q is more than 
the capacity, the capacity is increased, initially by additional 
sub-contracting or overtime, or delivery times are extended. The 
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follo,"ing advantages are claimed \~ith the application of Period 
Batch Control -
1) The system can follOl~ changes in market demand, without waste. 
The· progressive issue of 13 new, short term programmes during 
the year, makes possible the frequent revision of forecasts. 
2) The system can operate efficiently with a low investment in 
stocks·and with a high rate of stock turnover. 
3) Because all parts are ordered in product sets, materials 
obsolescence is eliminated. 
4) Because all parts are made in product sets and only those 
products required for despatch in the forecast period must be 
included in the programme, the system is ideal for products with 
seasonal sales. 
5) The system produces predictable, small variations in both stocks 
and the load on the component processing departments. 
6) Because large numbers of parts are ordered together on each 
ordering day, savings in setting time and an increase in capacity 
can be obtained, using the tooling family method. 
J. Duff [23] made the following observations on economic batch sizes. 
Duff Batch sizes and lead times are mathematically inter-related. 
considered a simple shaft with one turning operation and one drilling 
operation. Each turning operation is completed on the whole batch 
before drilling commences; should the economic. batch size be infinitely 
large, the second operation is never started. Conversely, should the 
batch size be one component, then as soon as it is turned it passes to 
the drilling operat ion \·,hile a second component starts its turning 
operation, This simple demonstration emphasises the relationship of 
lead time to batch size and vice versa. 
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If " m"nu·facturin'l facility is constrained by time I"hich "ill 
not a 1101" for normal lead time production, then the batch size can 
be modified to suit the time available, Conversely, if the batch 
size is fixed in relation to a delivery quantity and the batch 
is required to pass through a manufacturing facility, then the time 
taken for the batch to pass through the facility is fixed and 
all the progress chasers in the "orld will not shorten the cycle. 
The advantages of splitting batches are well recognised. Ho\;'ever, 
the temptation to do so is generally resisted,. particularly in 
organisations where the geographical location of facilities make' 
it difficult to monitor the progress of work. In Duff's example, 
should the lathe and drilling machine be positioned adjacent to one 
another, there would be no advantage, if the drill is available, to 
. wait for the completion of the turned batch before commencing drilling. 
The intermittent process ,"ould be transformed into a continuous process. 
This logic highlights the advantages to be obtained with Group 
Technology; manufactur ing batch sizes can be at a minimum' level, 
work-in-process can be drastically reduced, together with manufacturing 
lead times. The control of a product manufactured in such a system is 
made easier. Collectively, these advantages should ensure better 
customer service I.ith a reduction in manufacturing costs. 
6.6 Base Stock System 
The distinction between the 'push' and 'pull' inventory systems has 
been made else"here in this thesis. The 'pull' system is generally 
regarded as informal. However, the 'pull' system can be used for 
formal inventory control as described by Dr. George E. Kimball [39] 
in his Base-Stock system. 
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In the bnse stock system, ,-,hen the order for an item is placed 
against any inventory, it is filled from the inventory providing 
the level is not zero. If the inventory is zero or insufficient 
to meet the order the outstanding order quantity is placed in a 
back-order file, to be filled when sufficient inventory arrives. 
In any event, a manufacturing order is immediately placed with the 
preceding manufacturing station to replenish the items which have 
been consumed. The manufacturing station, in turn, immediately 
places an order for the required raw materials against the 
preceding inventory; as soon as the order is filled it proceeds to 
operate on it to produce the required items. In this way, an 
order against the last inventory for a finished item is immediately 
transmitted all the way back along the line to all manufacturing 
stations, each of which meets the requirements. This transmission 
of orders for finished items into production orders is called 
explosion; the idea of transmission back along the line step by 
step, is merely a conceptual one. Each manufacturing station 
makes replenishments based on actual finished item demand rather 
than a replenishment order from the next higher level. lhe 
instantaneous communication of finished item requirements to all 
levels of inventory, helpsto overcome the fluctuation of demand as 
recognished by Forrester [28] in his study of "Industrial Dynamics". 
Figure 11 shows how the finished items demand information should 
be communicated to all inventory holding points. 
ll5 KEY: ORDER 
-- - - -- DEHIIND 
INFORI·I;\ flON 
./ 
1- - --, "," ..... ', ~ - - --- ~ -:. - - -:..'~ ~eplenishment ~~ . cfr';;;lenishment.~ replenishment _~ 
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INFORHA lION AND STOCK FLm~ IN A BASE STOCK SYSTEH 
FIG. 11 
This base stock system is ideal for a continuous production 
environment but could result in large in-process stock le~els 
and' frustrated' scheduling, if applied to an intermittent 
system. 
Kimura and Terada [40], employed by the· Toyota Motor Co. Ltd., 
'considered the design and analysis of a pull sy3tem applied to 
a multi stage production system. They consider the conventional 
push system applied to production control has inherent problems 
which increase with the increase in the size of the system. The 
following problems are identified -
a) When drastic changes in demand or snags in production happen, 
it is virtually impossible to renew the production plan for 
each process. Therefore it is likely that such difficulties 
cause excess inventory or even dead stock. 
b) It is practically impossible for production control staff to 
scrutinize all the situations related to production rate and 
inventory level. Hence, a production plan must have excess 
sa fety stock. 
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c) Improvement \-/i th regard to lot size and timing of processing 
could not progress, because it is cumbersome·to compute optimal 
production plans in detail. 
The pull system may solve such problems; im~rovements should be 
achieved providing that it is possible in a simple and dependable 
manner to replenish items, at the rate that the succeeding process 
has consumed them. 
Kimura and Terada state the following aims of their pull system :-
In multi stage production processes, including outside suppliers: 
(1) To prevent transmission of amplified fluctuations of demand 
or production volume of a succeeding process to the preceding 
process. 
(2) To minimise the fluctuation of in-process inventory so as to 
simplify inventory control. 
(3) To raise the level of shop floor control through de-centralisation: 
to give shop supervisors a role of production control as well as 
inventory control. 
The Toyota Hotor Co. Ltd., have applied the pull system \'/hich the 
\'Iestern world have named "The Kanban System" and give a loose 
translation to the \-Iord Kanban as 'just in time'. The system is 
designed so that materials, parts and components are produced or 
delivered just before they are needed. Kanban is the name of the 
'ticket' or 'tag' which is used to communicate the requirements 
between processes. 
Kimur" and Terada, in comparing the push system IVith their research 
findings of the pull system, acknowledge the experimental results 
of the push system \'/hich have been found by Tanka and Tabe [64]. 
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Figures 12 and 13 illustrate the comparisons. 
from these experiments are 
The conclusions 
(1) In the case of the pull system, the size of the order unit 
has much importance. In cases where the size is small 
compared with the production quantity level, production 
fluctuations will not be amplified in the preceding stage. 
Amplification will be brought about.when the size is rather 
large, although, in this case·also, the amplification is not 
further magnified in preceding stages. 
(2) In the case ·of the push system, amplification of production 
and inventory fluctuations occur under the influence of errors 
in forecasting. As far as amplification is concerned, the 
choice beb.een push and pull systems is determined by the degree 
of errors in forecasts. 
(3) The other factor in the system parameters of the pull system, 
which affect the amplification ratio, is the lead time from the 
moment when a Kanban is removed from a container to the moment 
when production of the stage is completed. The longer the 
lead time, the larger becomes the amplification ratio. 
The 'Kanban System' would appear to.be an extremely simple procedure 
to follml, and if the Japanese manufacturing results are an indication 
of the credibility of the system, then serious consideration must be. 
given to adopting the approach. Perhaps one becomes cynical about 
the re-invention of an old concept. 
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Hayes [35] wrote an article following his visits to several 
Japanese factories. The conclusion dra'1n from the visit was 
that "no exotic gimmickery, only deliherate attention to the 
humdrum details of operations management. No secret formulas, 
only painstaking sensitivity to the strategic implications of 
those operational details. Nothing earth-shaking, only a 
reminder of ,.hat good manufacturing management has al,.ays been -
and of what American managers used to know". Starr [62] made 
the follOl.ing comment on the above conclusion "f.1anagers would 
like to think that the solutions to their productivity problem 
is that simple, but critical changes have occurred that make the 
return to the way things were,invalid. These changes include 
enlarged markets with increasing volume, ne,. controls derived from 
computer based inform'ation systems, new products embodying major 
technological innovations, and ne,. process technologies. 
Plans are hidden from observers. Certainly, the economies of 
scale for large batch volumes can be ignored if set-up costs are 
reduced, but how is this done? Innovative process technologies 
are responsible. They necessitate attention to integrating product 
line and process designs. 
Perhaps the Japanese "lOuld like us to believe in simple solutions 
like going, back to what we used to know; meam.hile, they are 
" preparing for the next generation of what can be done. 
6.7 Lot Sizes in a f.1.R.P. System 
8iggs et al [8] state "there has been limited research developing 
or determining efficient heuristic decision rules for coping with the 
recurring lot sizing problems'in an N.R.P. system." 
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The N.R.P. system uses the master production schedule to identify 
planned order releases for the necessary production items. However, 
the mechanics simply generate a set of net requirements that must be 
met if the master production schedule is maintained. The production 
schedule thus generated may be considered incomplete because M.R.P. 
has no built-in method considering economies of scale, such as 
combining the net requirements of more than one period so lots can 
'share equipment set-up costs. Orlicky [50] also notes that an 
~1.R.P. system is insensitive to. system capacity. This means that 
the decision maker still needs a lot-sizing rule unless he wants to 
use the net requirements schedule of the M.R.P. as his lot sizes. 
The lot-size decision is made difficult, particularly with a 
fluctuating demand for the end product; It is not al\-l8ys desirable 
even if possible, to compensate 'for a fluctuating demand by holding 
excess levels, of stock or by smoothing out the production rate. 
\'Ihen these techniques can not be employed a company manufacturing 
items in lot-sizes has the following choices. 
(i) adjusting the lot-size to meet the 'change in demand 
(ii) keep the lot-size constant and adjust the timing of 
lot-size replenishment. 
(iii) a combination of lot-size adjustment and replenishment 
timing. 
\'1. A. Ruch [59] introduced a moving EOQ concept ,vhich he applied 
to a varying demand situation. The technique was compared on a 
cost basis with the following alternative systems : 
1) Traditional EOQ - a 'standard. EOQ formula "Ias employed using 
the average demand for 12 periods .. \'Ihenever the net requirements 
exceeded the EOQ, enough items were ordered to fill that 
requirement. Unused items were carried in stock for use in 
subsequent periods. 
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2) Periodic Order Quantity - using basic data an economic order 
interval I.as determined and an order placed to cover the needs 
for all periods I.ithin that interval. 
3) Part Period Balancing - this algorithm orders materials for 
successive periods in the future until the carrying cost is equal 
to the order cost. 
4) vlagner-\'Ihitin Algorithm - an application of dynamic programming, 
the algo.ithm examines every feasible ordering possibility and 
selects the one with the least cost. It is, thus, the best possible 
answer to the problem. Ruch uses the results as the standard by 
which other methods are measured. 
Although the \'Iagner-\'Ihitin procedure has been available for some 
time, it has not found widespread use because of computational 
complexities. Carlson et al [17] question the appropriateness 
of the \~agner-\~hitin algorithm on other grounds. First, in any 
system with an hierarchical assembly structure, the algorithm 
guarantees optimal order of production lot sizes only for each 
level of the hierarchy treated independently. The levels of the 
hierarchy are not independent; in fact the essence of· an M. R. P. system 
is to exploit the dependence among levels in projecting future 
requirements. The second way in which the real world differs from 
the rnodel involves the use of up-dated information in re-scheduling. 
The model assumes that demand data remains unchanged during the 
planning horizon. In fact, most schedules are developed on a rolling 
basis; as each period passes, a new period is appended to the 
horizon. This can cause chanaes in the optimal lot sizes, though 
obviously having a much greater effect on the. later periods in the 
horizon than the earlier periods. 
5) Silver-Head Algorithm - this algorithm is similar to the Part Period 
Balancing in that it evaluates at each decision point whether to 
place an order for 1, 2, 3 •.• periods into the future. The heuristic 
is simple to use and yields comparatively economical decisions. 
The moving EOQ example given by Ruch is shown in Fig. 14 The traditional 
EOQ attempts to use the same order quantity throughout the time horizon, 
based on the overall average demand, the moving EOQ takes on a shorter 
time horizon and thus adjusts to radical changes in requirements. 
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Ruch used demand patterns for his study published in previous 
.Jork by Berry [5] (see Table 3) He considered the use of the 
same assumptions and the same data "ould permit a better comparison 
of the various algorithms, considered. Using demand pattern 4 from 
Berry's data sets, an EOf) was calculated based on the average of the 
first three months' demand. This yielded an EOf) of 59. Since all 
the material for a period must be on hand at the beginning of the 
period, there is no reason to carry over part of a period's requirements. 
Therefore, rather than ordering 59 units, the order is placed to cover 
as many periods as are necessary to approximate the EOf). In this 
case, 55 units will cover periods 1 to 4. 
r,10V ING EOf) EXA~IPLE 
PERIOD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9 10 11 12 
I D i10 I 
------- ---------- -- --,- --- - ,- -'\-- -'---1------, '--;:;-r I Requirement 10 1 10 I 15 20 i 701180 i 250 \270 i 230 40 
I Hoving EOf) 59 ; 1 224 1274 : 232 1 164 71 
I I 'I I 
f)uantity Ordered 55 250 I' 250 1 270 i 230 50 
Befjinning 55 45 1 35 20 250 1180 ! 250 I' 270 '230 50 Inventory 
:_n_d_i_n~_I~_e_n_t_o_r~ 143135 I 20 i 0 180! 0 i 0 0 0 10 
FIG. 14 
An order must be placed in period 5, so an EOf) is calculated based on 
the average demand for periods 5, 6 and,7. The EOf) of,224 is best 
approximated by ordering 250 units to cover periods 5 and 6. In period 
7 the process continues. (See calculations Page 94 ). 
The results of Ruch's research are shown in Table 4 • The 
comparison shows the Wagner-Whitin algorithm is always the lowest cost 
and that the traditional EOf) performs very poorly by comparison. The 
93 
Data Stts 
Per-i od 2 l 4 
I 92 80 50 10 
2 92 100 80 10 
l 92 1.25 180 15 
4 92 100 se 20 5 92 50 0 70 
6 92 50 0 180 
7 92 100 180 250 
8 92 125 150 270 , 92 125 10 230 10 92 100 100 40 11 92 50 180 0 
12 
-.!l 100 ~ --1Q. 
1105 1105 1105 1105 
St.nda,.d Devtati"on 0 27.0 66.1 130.0 
Coefficfent of" Variation 0 .293 .718 1.410 
OEtlANO PATTERNS 
TABLE 3 
Cost 
Or-der ~nc1 Pat!~,.n 
Cost Procedure _1_ -L _3_ ..L 
Traditional EOQ 5120 5435 4951 4365 
Periodic Orde,. Qty. 4011 4055 3615 3945 
SlOO 'art·Period a41~ncin9 4011 4055 3545 3485 
Wa9ner-\Jhitin 4011 4055 3435 3145 
S t 1 ver-""ea 1 4011 4055 3554 3245 
. ""vin, EOQ 4011 4105 3635 3105 
Tradition,l EOO. 3859 4873 3747 3199 
Periodic Or-der Qty: 3447 3491 3145 3381 
1206 Part-Period Bdlanci.ng 3577 3359 2933 2181 
W.gner-Whitin 3447 3313 2811 2681 
St1ver":~al 3447 3541 2811 2101 
""vln, EOQ 3441 3359 3113 2941 
TOTAL INVENTORY COST PERFORf·1ANCE 
TABLE 4 
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CALCULATIONS 
Using EOQ = J 2~S i,here D = demand 
S = order cost 
I = inventory 
rate : 
( $2 per unit 
Dem.and over first 3 periods (1 - 3) = 35 units 
EOQ = J 2 x 35 x 
2 x 3 
= 59 Units 
300 
But period 1 to 4 requires 55 units, 
hence order .55 units to cover periods 1 to 4 
Next 3 periods 5 - 7 = 500 units 
EOQ x 500 x 300 
2 x 3 
= 224 Units 
Periods 5 and 6 require 250 units 
hence order 250 units to cover period 5 and 6 
Next 3 periods 7 to 9 require 750 units 
EOQ = 2 x 750 x 300 
2 x 3 
= 274 Units 
But period 7 requires 250 units 
hence order 250 units to cover period 7 only. 
Next 3 periods 8 to 10 require 540 units 
EOQ = .J 2 x 540 x 
2 x 3 
= 232 Units 
300 
But period 8 requires 270 units 
hence order 270 units to cover period 8 only etc. etc. 
($300) 
carrying 
per period) 
95 
other methods, however, shDl1 varying degrees of 'fit' or 
approximation to the Wagnet-Whitin algorithm, It is clear that 
no method, apart from the \'/agner-\'/hitin algorithm, is best under 
all circumstances. 
6.8 System Nervousness 
One problem associated with t~.R.P. is called 'system nervousness'. 
This is caused by the hierarchical nature of M.R.P. where the demand 
at high levels in the production process as shown by the master 
production schedule, is exploded to determine 100018r level item 
demand. Consequently,. changes in demand at the higher level will 
cascade down through each level of .the bill of material amplifying 
the original change, particularly .. hen a lot-sizing approach is adopted. 
An alternative approach to those listed previously, which uses a 
constant order quantity and adjusts the timing, has been proposed by 
Hoskin [37]. The method claims to overcome the problem of random 
oversells and undersells that happen with any forecast. The oversells 
and undersells cause re-schedules of both open and planned orders; 
resulting in the master schedule constantly 'churning', giving very 
different priorities with each re-planning; the problem, known as 
system nervousness, compounds as the re-schedules pass through each 
level of the Bills of ~Iaterial. Hoskin's time -phased order point 
removes this nervousness from ·the system; he considers it" 
advantageous to generate a plan that is stable, yet contains the 
priority information so necessary to maintain customer service. 
Stability is an important component on two counts: first, for 
realistic capacity planning. and second, because it is almost 
impossible to schedule IDl1er level parts to hit a moving target. The 
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stability is absolutely critical over cumulative lead time 
for an item, and certainly desirable beyond that". Hoskin states 
that his solution to overcome the nervousness aver8ges out the 
oversells and undersells to equal the forecast. No forecast runs 
to a dead flat average; demand can be very 'lumpy' in the short 
term but results in fairly predictable demand over the longer term. 
The problem is two-fold: how,do you keep producing while an item 
is going through a temporary lull in sales, yet not distort your 
priorities? I f the forecast is true, then carry for"ard the pluses 
and minuses until they even out. The cumulative adjustment is 
carried forl"ard indefinitely and action taken only' when a permanent 
ske," to one side of the forecast is apparent. l'ihen a dramatic 
undersell or oversell occurs an exception message would be triggered 
off, calling for a re-schedule. The advantage of this approach is 
that it does not change the order quantity; the plan calls for an 
adjustment in timing not quantity. The damping of the master schedule 
nervousness, hm.ever helpful in scheduling, must not be allowed to 
mask a trend or forecast error. This problem can be readily solved 
by calculating the ratio of the cumulative adjustment to the average 
forecast: the adjustment tracking signal. 
EXAHPLE: 
Adjustment to gross requirements = 
(unsold forecast carried forward) 
Forecast quantity per week 
Ratio + 600 -:- 100 
Signifying 6.0 weeks undersell 
= 
+ 600 
100 
+ 6.0 
This ratio is a simple forecast tracking signal, and can be reported 
on ,.hen it exceeds pre-set bounds, unless there are unusual market 
circumstances. An item with a 6.0 week undersell should certainly 
have its forecast revised downward. 
,/' 
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Through the tracking signal, undersell and oversell priority 
inFormation can reach the master scheduler .. Underselling items 
are re-scheduled, which provides vacant capacity for other, needed 
materials, otherwise they represent an undesirable inventory 
commitment. Oversells may be accompanied by a backlog and by 
standard exception messages to 're-schedule in'. IF vacant capacity 
is present, this may be used to build some of the oversell items 
early to absorb the capacity and maintain customer service. 
The logic of Hoskin's approach lies in the principle of 'management 
by ·exception' • A good Forecast is one in which actual demand follows 
the predicted distribution around an average demand. The approach 
allows For a normal distribution of demand around the forecast, but 
gives a I<arning when serious deviations take place. This is more 
logical than haVing· the master scheduler wade through pages of 
exceptions, sorting out the trivial From the important, and trying 
to re-schedule Fast enough to keep up with an item whose demand may 
normally vary over plus or minus several weeks average forecast. 
The concept of having undersold or oversold 'x' weeks of forecast 
is readily understood by people who can deal with it without a 
statistical background. 
Steeh,'sarticle [63] on the causes of the nervous system states 
that "dynamic lot-sizing of intermediate levels can be nearly 
disastrous for a system where nervousness is present. The dynamic 
lot-sizing may actually amplify upper-level twitches as they are 
passed to low levels". HOI<ever, the impact of lot-sizing nervousness 
can be dampened by using a fixed order quantity as the lot size. All 
the advantages of discrete lot-sizing are lost, but if changes are 
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occurr ing frequently, orders matched exactly to requirements 
would be temporary any,·,ay, and the resulting stability could be 
invaluable. 
The fixed order quantity does not pass quantity changes, through 
to subordinate items. Only the timing of the second and subsequent 
planned orders is changed. Since the vast number of'S' and 'C' 
items would have long order cycles, there would be time to react 
to changes in the second order. The 'A' items could then receive 
maximum attention. Steele also comments on the possible short-
comings of the fixed order concept in that it does not automatically' 
'change once set. It may become an uneconomical quantity under a 
revised master schedule, or it may over order a part with declining 
usage; then it becomes necessary to review at regular intervals the 
appropriateness of the lot-size. 
~light [74] states that dynamic lot-sizing techniques can be used 
effectively, but it is very important to recognise that when they are 
used in higher levels of the product structure they can cause added 
expense at the lower levels. A good rule to follow : never change 
a lot-size inside the cumulative lead time for lower levels in the 
product structure without first checking to see what the effect will 
be. 
The preceding arguments in favour of using a fixed order quantity and 
varying the period of time b,.tween orders to meet a fluctuating demand 
pattern ,.ithin agreed limits, would appear promising. 
The next hurdle, if a fixed order quantity is to be,used in an 
inventory system, is to adopt a technique which arrives at a suitable 
lot-size. The choice of the most appropriate'lot-size can have a 
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dramatic effect on the control of inventory, perhaps even more 
so when the quantity l"Iill not change over a period of time. There 
are many·different approaches, some previously mentioned, which 
claim to provide an optimal lot-size. The yardstick used to measure 
optimality changes depending on the data used; it is necessary to 
carefully consider which data to accept for use in calculating the 
lot size. 
IHght [74] says, traditionally, production and inventory management 
books cover lot-sizing and forecasting in the early chapters. IHght 
purposely moved. them to the sixth section - out of the mainstream -
because experience has shown that operations can be improved 
dramatically even if very approximate lot-sizes are used and even if 
no new forecasting techniques are introduced. 
The writer accepts ~Iight' s vie," on forecasting but· not his statement 
on lot-sizing.· The lot-size quantity and its application can have 
a significant effect on operations. Part of this thesis will 
consider this aspect. 
6.9 Flexible Manufacturing Systems 
The economic approach to batch sizes is further challenged with 
the introduction of Flexible Hanufacturing Systems. A special report 
in The Production Engineer (April 1980) outlines a series of machine 
types with various degrees of flexibility, in order to produce a 
series of parts belonging to the same family, or to different families, 
with ID." or even non-existent, change over tool and fixture times. 
The manufacturer of the machine lines presently supplies lines .,hich 
can handle 'closed' families of parts; these are similar and have in 
common the type of machining and the shape, they differ only in 
dimensions. 
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The 'open' family of" parts has di fferent shares and dimensions, 
but a common type of machining \·lith maximum dimensions constrained 
within a certain volume. 
The Flexible Hanufacturing System consists of integrated systems 
of numerical ,controlled machines and automated transfer devices 
managed by 'real time' process computers for 'open' families of 
parts. These systems have been used for production rates varying 
from 5 to 40 parts an hour with a variety of parts ranging from 
3 to 35 different types. 
\'Iood [77] states "There is no future for manufacturing industry 
other than the Flexible t'lanufacturing System, one which can mass 
produce batch quantities as small as one saleable unit". 
Before such a situation can become a reality in the majority of 
industries, the Production Engineer must first· change his philosophy 
from 'floor-to-floor' to 'door-to-door'. Jobbing or batch industry, 
with shop layouts based on like processes and like skills, as against 
process flow lines, immediately imposes a financial penalty on the 
organisation in terms of working capital. The cost of putting 
material on the shop floor, .picking it up again, moving it and the 
necessity of indicating priorities in a never ending queue, far 
oubveighs the cost of converting material into finished goods. 
The jobbing or batch plant mainly devotes all its energy into 
optimising the plant and labour resources at the expense of the 
material; yet the material is the only resource for which the 
organisation will ultimately receive cash. Can any business, 
therefore, afford to optimise labour and plant at the expense of 
work-in-process ? 
101 
The optimisation of l"bour and pJant resources is the objective 
in the organisation, which will achieve the best floor-to-floor 
time. In all the effort to devise economic batch quantities, there 
is the assumption that all machining belongs to the machine shop 
and likewise for press shop and assembly. This is because the 
cost system is based on material, labour and overheads. It is a 
system based on 'hOl. we make things', where the real truth of 
profitability is more bound up in '\.hen things are made'. 
If Hanagement could change their emphasis from "why is that machine 
not working" to "why is that component not being I.orked on", there 
would be a different outlook on the shop floor. 
~tanufacturing industry has only been able to respond to a volatile 
market by using large stocks of machined parts or sub-assemblies, which 
require a heavy commitment of capital. G.E.C. Machines is carrying 
out a study into providing a facility which can serve its customers 
within 24 hours or within machining time, plus 5 percent, from raw 
material to finished component. 
Companies not employing these latest techniques will have problems 
gaining orders against a" competitor's short lead time supply, and with 
competitive pricing of the product. 11hen the manufacturing costs 
can be dramatically cut with the reduction of work-in-process, 
inevitably the producer will reflect the savings in the price of the 
product. 
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C H APT E R VII 
SAFETY STOCK 
7.1 Need for Safety Stock 
Safety stocks may be associated with all materials needed in 
the manufacture of a product or indeed with the product itself. 
In a continuous system safety stock will normally be considered in 
the ra\1 material, service parts and finished good state. In an 
intermittent system additional safety stock may be required at each 
stage of production. Company policy should determine at which ~ 
stage or stages in the production cycle safety stock should be held. 
Safety stocks constitute one of the major means of dealing \1ith the 
uncertainties associated \',ith variations in demand and lead time. 
They are amounts of inventory held in excess of regular usage 
quantities in order to provide specified levels of protection against 
stockout. 
If demand for the product is known precisely, it is feasible, though 
not necessarily economical, to produce the product to meet the demand 
exactly. In the usual case, however, demand is not completely known 
and a safety stock must, therefore, be maintained to'absorb variation. 
Increases in demand due to promotional campaigns or seasonal demands 
can be planned for. Such seasonal inventory allows a gradual build 
up of stock in anticipation of this higher demand and permits a 
more stable employment level with lower capital investment. Other 
factors ,.hich need to be taken into consideration when determining 
.safety stock levels, may include: 
1) Forecast error 
By definition, forecasts are probFlbly going to be wrong to 
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some degree, consequently, when inventory levels are initially 
set by a forecast. it·will be necessary to make adjustments when 
forecast requirements and actual requirements do not agree. 
2) Exposures to Stockout 
Stockout occurs when the nel" supply does not arrive in time 
to satisfy demand. The new supply. may be provided either from an 
outside supplier or from a process within the organisation. An 
internal stockout could be the result of machine breakdown, 
equipment malfunctions or tool failure. The stockout risk is 
greatest just before the new supply of material is received; 
consequently, the number of stockout risks is a function of the 
number of re-orders per year. 
3) Lead Time 
Forecast error increases as lead time increases, thus items. 
with long lead times will need higher levels of safety stock than 
items with short lead times, but the relationship is not linear. 
If, for example, an item wi th a four week lead time requires two 
weeks safety stock, an item with an eight week lead time will not 
require four weeks of safety stock; the reason being that it is 
most unlikely that a b.o I'leek period with a high level demand will be 
followed immediately by another two week period with a high level of 
demanrl. 
4. Service Level Requirement 
It is usually desirable to have a higher service level for some 
items in inventory than for others. A company offering replacement 
parts would be more concerned about having spares in stock at all 
times when the demand for such parts is frequent and/or an alternative 
supplier is readily available. While the company may well stock less 
popular parts, these parts will usually have a lower level of customer 
service. 
• 
104 
5. Planning and Control 
In any manufacturing or supply industry, the quality of 
planning and control can vary considerably. 11hen the organisation 
has good systems ,.hich react to changing demands, then in general 
terms the amount of safety stock held will be minimised for a 
stated service level; Alternatively, an organisation which 
reacts slmvly to changing demands ,.ill need to carry an extra 
stock if they wish to match this service level. 
7.2 Safety Stock and Lead Time 
Tersine [65] considers that the traditional inventory models such 
as economic order quantity, economic production quantity and economic 
order interval, frequently do not account for risk and uncertainty in 
their formulation; they assume many of the variables are known. For 
example, the following assumptions are generally made in the inventory 
management theory of the 1950s and 1960s. 
(i) lead time is fixed and knQ\'Jn; or 
(ii) lead time is an independent variable; 
(iii) the due date originally assigned will not change. 
The theoreticians then concerned themselves with the computation of 
safety stock which would compensate precisely for the variation in 
demand over lead time or the interacting independent variation in 
lead time demand. 
It is now recognised that lead time is highly variable and that it 
may be shortened or lengthened by the expediting or de-expediting of 
the informal system. The'great breakthrough in thinking has been 
to recognise that in most cases, lead time is a reasonably controllable 
variable, and,that priorities must be revised continually to respond to 
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changing needs. In the real world : 
(i) lead time is usually variable based on the priority 
a job is assigned in the queue; 
(ii) lead time is usually dependent, at least relatively, upon 
need; 
(iii) with the advent of H. R; P. priorities can be updated 
regularly, based on needs. 
However, risk and uncertainty enter the inventory analysis through 
many variables, but the most prevalent are the variations in demand 
and lead time; these two variables may be absorbed by the provision 
of safety stock. 
Safety stock has two basic effects on a firm's costs - it will 
decrease the cost of stockouts and increase the cost of holding stock. 
Safety stocks would be unnecessary if an organisation were willing 
and able to make its customers wait until the items they wanted 
could be ordered or until their orders could be scheduled into 
production conveniently. These additional stocks are part of a 
business philosophy of serving customers needs without delay because 
of its implications on the long term effectiveness of an organisation. 
It would be ·fallacious to believe that safety stock is maintained 
for altruistic purposes. Stockout conditions result in external 
and internal shortages. External shortages can result in backorder 
costs, present a profit loss when a sale is not achieved, and endanger 
future profits with the erosion of goodwill. Internal shortages can 
result in lost production with idle men and machines and a delay in 
completion date with a possible cost penalty. 
Stockout cost is usually the most difficult inventory cost to ascertain. 
This difficulty is compounded by the uncertainty of future customer 
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actions on additional purchases. In one situation a sale is 
not lost, but only delayed a fe," days in shipment. Typically, 
a company ,vould institute an eme'rgency expediting order to get the 
item as.a backorder. The backorder results in -expediting costs, 
_handling costs, and frequently, shipping and packaging costs. 
In another situation, the sale is lost.· The stockout cost in this 
situation ranges bebveen the profit loss on the sale to some 
unspecified loss of goodwill cost. 
A stockout cost can result in an extremely high_cost if it is a 
raw material for a production line that cannot function without the 
material and consequently is shut dOlvn. It can be seen that a 
stockout cost can vary considerably for different items based on 
customer use or internal use. 
There is no universally accepted formula or rigid procedure to follow in 
determining safety stock. The calculations of different methods 
available are based on the amount of information known to management. 
The information is usually based on demand, lead time and stockout 
costs. The information known about these variables determines the 
complexity of the calculations. If demand and lead time are 
constant, there will be no need for safety stock since inventory 
decisions are made under certainty. Under these conditions the 
inventory will be at zero level when the replenishment order is 
received. This is a case of perfect knowledge of demand and lead 
time, which is probably an unrealistic situation. Theories on the 
levels of safety stock may consider the following situations 
(il variable demand and constant lead time 
(ii ) constant demand and variable lead time, or 
(Hi) variable demand and variable lead time. 
107 
In a 'live' situation both demand and lead time would normally 
vary, \1hich increases .the complexity of the problem. A joint 
probability distribution of demand during the replenishment period 
can be developed. The range of the joint probability distribution 
would be from the level indicated by the product of the smallest 
demand multirlieci by the shortest lead time to the level indicated by 
the product of the largest demand multiplied by the longe:>t lead time. 
An alternative approach to the joint probability method for 
determining safety stock \·,hen demand and lead time are variable. 
is by Monte Catlo Simulation [12]. To carry out such a simulation 
the data is required on both the demand and lead time distribution. 
With this distribution data, demand would be simulated during lead 
time and safety stock levels obtained for various risk levels of 
stock out. It is then necessary for management to select a 
particular risk level by applying the corresponding level of safety 
stock. V/hen the distribution is approximately normal the cost, 
in extra stock to achieve a corresponding level of customer service, 
rises rapidly as 100 per cent service level is sought. 
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7.3 Safety Stock and M.R.P; 
\~hen an H. R. P. system is used, safety stock at the item level is 
not normally planned [49]. It is, however, planned under a time 
phased order point. In either case the M.R.P.,logic common to both 
. types of system, tends to defeat the purpose of safety stock by 
preventing'it from ever actually being used if the system can help 
it. The following example, comparing the order point logic to 
the M.R.P. logic, will help demonstrate this point. 
An item has a planned lead time of four weeks, the forecasted 
demand during the lead time is 40 units; assume a safety stock of. 
20 units. The order point is, therefore, 60 units, i.e. when the 
stock levels fall below 60 units a replenishment order is released. 
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In Figure 17 the order point reaction to an excess in demand 
is shOl.n: the excess in demand is thought of as having been met 
from safety stock and the timing of the replenishment order remains 
unchanged. 
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\'Ii th H. R. P. logic, the system has reacted to the excess demand by 
moving the due date for receiving the order one period for'1ard, which 
keeps the safety stock at the or.iginal 20 units. (See Fig. 18) 
It is seen that the time phased order point approach a~tempts to 
keep the safety stock level intact by re-scheduling the replenishment 
order. Provided that the' re-scheduled order can be satisfied, 
safety stock proves to be dormant inventory that could be drastically 
reduced, if not entirely eliminated. There are, however, instances 
in the time phased order point system '1hen it is desirable to hold 
safety stock, for example. 
(i) at the master production schedule: In the N.R.P. 
system, uncertainty only exists at the master production 
schedule level; the exception to this is when spares, 
'are provided for 10l1er level parts. Safety stock, where 
required, should, therefore, be provided through.the 
master productio'n schedule for the end items. The 
explosion of the master production schedule will 
automatically include safety stock at lower levels of the 
structure and prevent duplication of such stock. 
(ii) For protection against demand variation over the shortest 
minimum lead time. The manipulation of lead times has 
been previously identified as a means of meeting surges in' 
demand. The shortening of lead times will eventually 
reach a point '1here no further reduction 'lOuld be 
economically ,viable. Safety stock for independent demand 
items could be computed 'statistical1y to protect against 
demand variations over this shortest lead time. 
Berry and \'Ihyb~rk [7] disagree with Orlicky in his views on setting safety 
stock at the end product level to compensate for fluctuation in demand. 
They consider this recommendation implies that there will be no 
uncertainty in the manufacturing process, such as shrinkage, spoilage 
or equipment failure, and that lead time flexibility will be able to 
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accommodate master schedule changes that are projected dmm 
to the 10l"Ier level components. In fact, there will be uncertainties 
in the process, and changes in the master schedule may give rise to 
substantial expediting costs to meet changing priorities. 
~layer [43] states that the economic lot size approach to inventory 
control IS complicated by the fact. that an inter-relationship exists 
betIVeen the order quantity and the safety stock. In the.determination 
of the amount of safety stock that should be carried, it should first 
be recognised that the order point approach to inventory control is 
able to make an automatic partial adjustrnent for unexpected increases 
in demand. If the actual consumption rate proves to be greater than' 
the expected rate, the re-order point will be reached earlier and a 
new order IVill be placed sooner than it othervlise IVould. Hm'lever, 
once the re-order point is reached and the order for replenishment 
stock is placed, the firm can do nothing but wait until the new lot 
is received. If an unexpectedl y high demand occ'urs du'r ing this 
period, the firm will either have to draIV on any safety stock available 
or fail to satisfy the additional demand. 
The importance of this lies in the fact that it focuses attention 
on when the risk of an out-of-stock condition arises. The out-of-
stock crisis is only IVhen the re-order point is reached. Further, 
because an increase in lot size results in a reduction in the number 
of orders placed per year, and, therefore, in the number of times 
the re-order point is reached per year, it becomes apparent that the 
frequency of the risk of a stock out is affected by the lot size, 
suggesting that the problem of safety stock determination cannot be 
considered independently of the lot size. 
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7.4 SaFety Stock v Safety Lead Time 
There are b'lo basic methods of providing safety stock to 
reduce the effects of uncertainty that can arise in an N.R.P. 
system. One method is to specify a quantity of safety stock 
in much the same manner as the statistical inventory control 
technique. The second method, safety lead time, plans order 
releases earlier than indicated by the requirements plan and 
schedules their receipts earlier than the required per-iod. 80th 
approaches produce an increase in inventory levels to provide a 
buffer against uncertainty 'but the techniques operate quite 
di fferently. 
\~hybark and vlilliams [72] have studied the use of safety stocks 
and safety lead times in order to determine the most effective 
technique under various types of operating conditions. They 
classified uncertainty into four different categories, according 
to the source of the uncertainty (demand or supply), and the type 
of 'uncertainty (timing or quantity) as shOlm in Fig. 19. 
TYPE OF SOURCES 
UNCERTAINTY DEI·IAND SUPPLY 
Timing Requirements shift from Orders not received 
one period to another when scheduled. 
Quantity Requirements for more or Orders received for less than planned more or less than. 
planned 
CATEGORIES OF UNCERTAINTY IN H.R.P. SYSTEI·l 
FIG. 19 
Their hypothesis was that there would be preference for either 
safety lead time or safety stock under each category of uncertainty. 
Using a simulation model, they tested the effect of the two strategies 
on service levels and average inventory levels under widely varying 
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cond i tions. Their conclusions '<ere that under conditions 
of uncertainty in timing (either in the arrival of supplies or 
demands), safety lead time is preferred. Conversely, when either 
the quantity demanded or supplied was uncertain, safety stock was 
the preferred technique. 
7.5 Customer Service 
Plossl [52] suggests that safety. stock levels can be set by trial 
and error methods. After excess inventories have been eliminated,' 
professional practitioners avoid the general question "\'/hat 
customer service level should we maintain ?" and develop instead 
trade-off curves. Using such data, management can determine that 
"to improve service levels by X percent will require Y additional 
cost in safety stock investment". Using these and similar 
approaches for other functional classes of inventory, some companies 
"ill soon be able to determine hm< much inventory they really should 
have. 
Corke [19] also considers the use of exchange curves in setting 
the levels of safety stock; the level of service being maintained 
by the order frequency in relationship to the usage value 
classification. The 'C' category items should be ordered less 
frequently, thus reducing the proportion of time at which there is 
any risk of stock-out. A high service level is likely to be met 
from stock with no need to carry safety stock. An exchange curve 
can be constructed for each category of stock as shown in Fig. 20 
A decision might be taken to operate at a higher service level on 
the 'C' items than on the 'A' items. This will reduce·the delays 
caused by stock-outs on perhaps half the items, but incur only a 
very small additional investment. 
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LEVEL C6' SERVICE 
Figure 20 UlUal spread of investment over A. B and C item. 
New[47] states that the service level approach for setting 
safety stock has certain limitations and considers four ways 
of defining service 
1) PERCENTAGE OF DEHAND SATISFIED rr~HEDIATELY FROH STOCK 
If, over a period of time, requests are made for 1,000 
items and 960 items are actually supplied 'off the shelf', 
this will represent a 961, satisfaction of demand-
immediately. 
11hile this measure is valid in a situation where a 
large number of customers and/or volume of sales are 
involved, it does not differentiate between the situations 
in which 
(a) the 40 items short were all for the same order, 
i.e. one stock-out; or 
(b) the 40 items were for 40 different customers, i.e. 
forty stock-outs. 
This service level approach takes no account of the frequency of 
stock-outs, and the effect of these on goodwill. 
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2) NUI,IBER OF ORDER CYCLE SHORTAGES 
Service is defined as the' percentage of replenishment 
cycles in which no shortages occur. If there is stock 
remaining in store when a new order arrives, then no 
shortage has occurred and if this happens 90 times out 
of 100 cycles, then a 90?~ service level is achieved, 
This service measure introduces some uncertainties in 
that it does not consider the extent of the stock-out 
on a given cycle. A more serious disadvantage 
occurs because the method does not ~onsider the time 
aspect of the shortages for items which have 
different replenishment cycles. The same percentage 
'service level' implies quite different levels of 
customer satisfaction. For example, suppose a 90?~ 
service level is applied to two items: 
Item A which has a two month replenishment cycle, and 
Item 8 which has a one year replenishment cycle. 
Item A en'ters the 'risk area' for a stock-out six times 
per year, while for item 8 only once per year 
(See Fig. 21 ). 
Stock 
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RISK AREAS DURING REPLENISHHHIT PERIODS 
FIG. 21 
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3) PART-PERIODS OF SHORTAGE 
The measure is obtained by the product of the number of 
parts and the number of periods for which the parts are 
out of stock. Having the items out of stock for two 
periods results in 2 x 10 = 20 part periods of 
shortage. 
The service level is defined as' the number of part-periods 
of stock s~ortage acceptable during a particular time 
period, for example 200 item-weeks ,per year. In most 
cases the cost of not having a part available will increase 
with time. This measure'does, however, imply an 
equivalence bebveen ten items for one period and one item 
for ten periods. The number of customer orders which 
might be, affected is not considered, neither are the possible 
effects on assembly plans for internally required parts. 
4) HORE SOPHISTICATED TECHNIQUES 
Many companies develop composite methods involving elements 
of all these measures since each has its own merits. One 
simple extension to the part-periods of shortage approach 
is to give a measure of the proportion of demand filled 
within successive time periods, for example -
Proportion of demand filled from stocks 88.6 ,. ., 
" " " " within one week 92.2 
,. 
., 
" " " " " 
two weeks 94.5 ,. ., 
" " " " " three weeks 98.8 
,. 
., 
" " " " " 
four weeks 100.00?~ 
which indicates the proportion of demand which was delayed 
and by how much. 
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Brown [9] carried out a number of experiments in which the 
exchange. curve technique \.as used to decide which of two safety 
stock rules gave the better results. DOle rule speci fies that 
a fraction of demand. shall be met from stock of each item, the 
fraction ranging from 85?~ to 99.5~~. The other rule uses a 
safety stock level computed to minimise the total cost of 
carrying safety stock (at 24%) and of expediting whenever .there 
will be a shortage. Because of the difficulty in measuring 
. the cost of a single expediting action,' a policy variable 
ranging from $1 to $128 per .shortage was used in the experiment. 
Fig. 22 shows the relationship of the two safety stock rules. 
From the' curves it is clear that the expediting rule is better 
than the equal-service rule, provided we are interested in the 
number of potential shortage occurrences. However, should 
the measure of service be changed to consider the value of 
back orders, that is the seriousness of the shortages rather 
than simply the number of occurrences, using the same inventory 
of stocked items we now have a reversal of the previous result 
as shown in Fig. 23. 
These two examples demonstrate the need for management to make a 
strategic decision; which of the two rules should be used? It 
depends considerably on whether the relevent measure of customer 
service is the number or the seriousness of shortages. If potential 
shortages can be averted by expediting, then one rule is better, 
·if the demand is simply back ordered when it cannot be met from 
stock, the other ~ule is better. 
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Safety stock levels arc normally calculated using an expected 
level of production. As production levels change there is a 
need to change the levels of safety stock. In all li~elihood, 
safety stocks will increase to meet the needs of higher 
production, but it is doubt ful if they will then be reduced in 
line with a long-term fall in production. It is necessary to 
review the allocation of safety stock regularly. ~Ianagement 
can secure an overall control by calculating the total value 
of safety stock provision periodically, and then by selecting 
items at random, ensure that·they ·comply with established 
policies. 
Hanagement should maximise the use of the cash available for 
safety sto·ck by distributing it in such a manner that critical 
items have a preference over other items which results in a 
satisfactory product service level commensurate with company 
policy. It should be understood that all company products 
may not be awarded the same level of service and product 
service levels may change, depending on such factors as 
market requirements, product life cycle, cash flow etc. This, 
once again, emphasises the need for mane.gement to make 
considered policy decisions and be fully aware of the implications 
of these decisions on the service levels which can only be. main-
tained with the associated levels of inventory. 
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CHAPTER VII I 
THEORY/PRACTICE RELATIONSHIP 
Grayson [32] states that "Management Science has now become arcane 
or nearly so; a bridge must be built between it and the real world 
of the executive. Management s~ience has grown so remote from and 
unmindful of the conditions of 'live" management that it has abdicated 
its usability. Managers for their part have become disillusioned by 
management science, and are now frequently unwilling to consider it 
seriously as a working tool for important 'problems." 
Management and management scientists, are operating as two separate 
cultures, each with its own goals, languages and methods. Effective 
co-operation, and even communication, between the two is minimal. 
There are, however, some management scientists who operate effectively 
in both cultures, but these are rare. Most management scientists are 
still thinking,' writing and operating in a world that is far r'emoved 
from the real world in which most managers operate. The' scientists 
often describe 'and structure non-existant'management problems, attack 
relatively minor:problems with overkill tools, omit real variables 
from difficult problems, and build elegant models comprehensible to 
only their own colleagues. 
Gregory et al [33] carrJed out an exploratory study of stock control' 
in small firms. The objective of the study was to determine the 
following 
(i) do small batch manufacturing companies use the techniques 
illustrated in the textbooks ? 
(ii) if not, are they aware of this body of knowledge? 
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(iii) are the techniques appropriate for application in 
the companies studied ? 
(iv) if they do not use them, what factors influence their 
stocking policies ? 
The conclusion from the study showed that overall the knowledge 
amongst the practitioners of the textbook techniques was limited, 
and the only techniques used were simpler ones, such as the two bin 
system and the lot-for-lot system. The practitioner generally 
considered that the literature tended towards sophisticated solutions 
to simplified problems, whilst they were looking for relatively 
simple solutions to sophisticated problems. 
The companies studied gave the impression that raw material stocking 
decisions were sometimes a straight forward matter involving basic 
arithmetic, and in other situations they involved highly intuitive, 
if not inspirational, decisions.-
The application of standard stocking techniques to the companies 
studied is questionable in terms of relevance-and potential benefits. 
It might be"considered that small companies, similar to the ones 
investigated, can operate successfully with intuitive and inspirational 
decisions However,"a large concern needs the co-ordination of a_ 
delegated_management team. Co-ordination of dissimilar activities 
is normally conditioned by the application of decision parameters 
based on theoretical knowledge. 
A comprehensive survey carried out by the University of Bradford 
and sponsored by the Institution of Industrial Managers [42] concerned 
i~self with 'The Practice of Production Management in the U.K.' 
"Selected findings from the survey are given in Appendix B-
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Preliminary results indicate that managers in U.K. owned companies 
make significantly less use of techniques that could help them reduce 
the load of routine tasks than do managers in foreign owned companies. 
Consequently, managers of U.K. owned companies have less time and 
other resources to concentrate on their more important tasks, 
resulting in a less efficient use of manufacturing facilities compared 
with their foreign counterparts. 
Also significant is that the American owned companies exhibit a 
greater use of good management techniques compared. with British firms 
of the same size. and their manufacturing operations, even in this 
country, seem to be more efficient than ours. 
Davis [20] presents a study of production. and inventory techniques, 
past and present in the U.S.A. (see Appendix C for results). The 
summary of the findings show that an earlier report in 1966 [25]. 
recognised a great untapped potential of theory which could be converted 
intb practice, and predicted that the next surve~ would be largely a 
matter of measuring the higher levels of success practitioners would 
be achieving in·applying scientific techniques. However, the 1973 
results reveal not so much a closing bf the gap in utilising scientific 
techniques in general, but a new gap appearing as further techniques 
are developed. The focus in the seven years since 1966 appears to have 
been towards the use.of older, simpler (e.g. A.S.C., [.O.Q.) and newer,· 
less mathematically sophisticated procedures (M.R.P., Capacity Requirements 
Planning). The use of the computer during the interval has undoubtly 
bep.n a signi ficant factor in the utilisation of the latter procedures, 
since many of these techniques depend upon the brute power of the computer 
for their effectiveness. Davis considers the overall picture of the 
study "is a field which exhibits some of the better aspects of 
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maturity, including, but not necessarily limited to, the ability 
to distinguish between the charms of frivolous sophistication and 
_ the promise of less glamorous but perhaps more lasting attributes 
of simplicity and effect-iveness." 
The objective of this research is to attempt to bridge the gap in 
one particular case between the scientist and the manager. It is 
not intended to produce a solely academic solution and then search 
for a problem. Instead, a real industrial problem has been identified 
with the understanding that any solutions derived may not be so 
elegant as they might be, but they may be used. 
During the literature survey associated with this thesis, it became 
apparent that Material Requirements Planning is a technique which 
offers many advantages to the manufacturing manager, particularly in 
the areas of inventory control and scheduling. The investigation 
considers the application of M.R.P. in the company reviewed, together 
with some of the basic needs of the system which may determine 
whether the technique would be successful or not. 
The innate ,constraints of the company such as forecasting di fficulties, 
random demand from customers with high variability and historically 
long lead times, present many difficulties. It is postulated that a 
certain degree of stability may be possible if a master production 
schedule can be derived which will minimise the effects of the constraints 
on the manufacturing facilities made available for production. 
Other constraints which need to be considered when formulating a 
solution to the problem include the contractural agreement of delivery 
lead time' between the manufacturer and the customer and the layout of 
the production facilities. 
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It is considered necessary to manufacture in batches at all 
levels of production and assembly, with the exception of the 
final assembly stage of the product. At this level it is more 
attractive to produce lot-far-lot to meet the final product 
special requirements. 
No attempt will be made to re-organise the production layout. 
It is considered that such an approach is unlikely to have a 
dramatic effect on the efficiency of the existing manufacturing 
and assembly facilities. 
Perhaps the most significant reason for resisting a revision of 
the production facility layout is the difficulty in optimising the 
layout of plant to·meet the ever changing demand associated with 
intermittent production and a large variety of products. 
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PART 11 
CHAPTER IX 
SELECTION OF A PRACTICAL SITUATION 
9.1 Choice of Company 
The objective of this research is to identify how production 
planning and control theory may be successfully applied in the practical 
situation. It is submitted that although there is a proliferation of 
research work which is directed at the improvement of production planning 
and control, there are nevertheless, many problems which remain in this 
area in industry. It may be that some research findings have little 
practical value, due to the basic assumptions made, and perhaps some of 
the theory may be considered to be too complicated by "the practitioner, 
resulting in its rejection. Although the practitioner may not need to 
follow all the steps involved, if he does not have confidence in the 
applicability of the assumptions made and in the plausibility of the 
outcomes, he is unlikely to use research findings on a shop floor for 
which he is responsible. It is worth mentioning that technology has made 
some of "the theoretical findings more attractive and the ever growing use 
of the computer in the field of production control is complementary to 
this observation. 
To enable a realistic comparison to be made between the theory and 
practice of production control, a company has been selected which is 
considered typical of manufacturing organisations in a similar production 
environment. Further, the manufacture of a particular product is 
examined in depth, with the appropriate application of historical data 
made available by the company. 
The company chosen for investigation is John Davis and Son (Derby) Ltd., 
a medium sized company employing 540 people. Davis is a principal 
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subsidiary company of Doulton Engineering Holdings Ltd., which 
belongs to S. Pearson and Son P.L.C., the ultimate holding company. 
The Pearson organisation comprises four main divisions employing about 
thirty thousand people, their 1979 turnover being £484 million compared 
with a £7 million turnover of John Davis. 
John Davis is one of the most widely known companies in the mining 
industry, tracing its ancestry back to the 18th century. The business 
stemmed from a familY'concern founded in Leeds in 1779, the company of 
John Davis and Son (Derby) Ltd., being established in 1828. The move 
to Derby coincided with the rapid growth of the Midlands mining industry, 
which was one of the most technically advanced industries of the day. 
Davis commenced production of a range of instruments for surveying and 
air measurement in mines and was one of the first manufacturers of the 
miners safety lamp invented by Sir Humphrey Davey. 
Davis were quick to recognise the advantages of electricity and in 1899 
the firm established an electricity generating station and began 
distributing electricity to a large number of organisations in Derby. The 
company's close association with the mining industry for more than a 
century, made it inevitable that they should pioneer the use of flameproof 
and intrinsically safe electrical apparatus in mines, in association with 
the Sheffield Safety in Mines Research Establishment. They manufactured 
electrical bells, relays, telephones and signal' { devices which could be 
used without the risk of igniting methane gas. 
Today Davis supply equipment to control, monitor and, if necessary, 
'computerise a mine, including surface, shaft and all underground operations. 
They have an engineering team on call to travel to any part of the world .to 
assist and advise in the planning of mine electrical and electronic 
applications and to install and commission the equipment. Davis satisfy 
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approximately fifty per cent of the National Coal Board's needs 
for communication systems, the remaining share of the market being 
divided amongst four other manufacturers. 
The experience gained by manufacturing equipment for use in inflammable 
atmospheres enabled the company to apply their highly specialised 
knowledge in other industries where similar-explosion-risks occur. 
The Marketing department at John Davis is divided to serve two main 
market segments, namely Industrial and Mining. The ma-nufacturing resources 
available _within the company are evenly utilised in producing goods for 
each market segment. 
9.2 The Production Department 
The production Department-within the company is controlled by a Production 
Director who has the following managers reporting directly -to him : 
1) Production Service t~anager 
2) Production Planning Manager 
3) Works Production Manager. 
Production planning and control is the responsibility of the Production 
Planning Manager, who controls the Product Planning Section, Materials 
Management Section and the Buying Section, these sections being staffed 
by the following personnel 
Production Control; 
1 Production controller 
1 Production scheduler 
4 Progress chasers 
2 Administration clerks. 
Stock Control; 
1 Stock controller 
3 Docket clerks 
.z Administration clerks. -
Warehouse Control; 
1 Supervisor 
1 Clerk 
2 Customer liaison clerks 
Purchasing; 
1 Chief buyer 
3 Assistant buyers 
2 Progress chasers 
2 Administration clerks 
Stores; 
1 Stores supervisor 
1 Section head 
1 Chief storekeeper. 
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9.3 Existing Computer Facilities 
The company have an NCR8250 computer which was initially installed 
for use by the accounting department. Production control currently 
have use of this computer but due to the problems of sharing this heavily 
loaded facility, and particularly when the 'accounting department have, 
priority use of the service, it is now intended to purchase a new computer 
for use solely by the production control department. 
The "DORIC" order processing and inventory control system is used on 
the computer. DORIC is designed to provide an inter-active, inter-related 
file, online, real-time material control and order processing system. The 
system may be considered as five sUb-systems as follows : 
1) Customer order entry and invoicing 
2) Requirements explosion 
3) Stock control 
4) File entry 
5) File maintenance. 
Each sub-system manipulates the data held on three main files', namely 
'1) Inventory 
2) , Customer Orders 
3) Material requirements. 
\ 
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Subsidiary information is held on other files 
1) Product structure 
2) Where used. 
The files contain the following information 
INVENTORY 
1) Descriptive data of the part 
2) Full cost and selling price 
3) Statistical history 
4) Stock control information. 
CUSTOMERS ORDERS 
1) Customer descriptive data 
2) Data to enable use. as sales ledger master file 
3) Details of orders outstanding for each customer. 
REQUIREMENTS 
1) All outstanding requirements 
2) All outstanding orders for an inventory item . 
3) Details of any planned production schedule for an inventory item. 
The DORIC system would appear to have the ability to provide good 
information for use by production control; however, a manual card system 
is-also in operation which appears to have priority over the computer. 
The warehouse and stores staff considers that the computer readouts are 
not up-to-date and therefore cannot be relied on. For example, stock 
used is not always deducted immediately from the computer file; in some 
instances it is only deducted when the order has been despatched. In 
the case of spares, these may not be deducted from the inventory file 
until the customer pays after the receipt of the goods.· 
At the beginning of the investigation it was acknowledged that the 
product structure file was not reliable due to two main reasons; the 
structure file could be modified at more than one source and wrong 
. information was entered in the first instance. 
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9.4 Production Planning and Control within the Compan~ 
Each product requires a number of operations to be carried out on 
raw material in a pre-determined sequence which differs from product 
to'product. An operation. is carried out by a single specified 
facility and occupies that facility completely for a length of time. 
\~here there is more than one similar facility ,available, which is capable 
of performing an identical operation, the batch of items may be split to· 
reduce the total batch lead time. 
The amount of work which i~ dealt with by sub-contracting depends mainly 
on the input of orders to the company. The only area Ithich is not 
dependent on order input·is the production of plastic components. 
The company ,has limited capacity·and expertise in plastics; consequently 
80?~ to 100?~ of this work is sub-contracted. Other areas where work is 
sub-contracted are : 
Capacity sub-contracted 
1) Fabrication 25 to 30~~ 
2) Machining maximum 15~~ 
3) Assembly * 5% 
* . the assembl y work contracted out is ba'sic unskilled work carried out 
by local hospitals. 
Bought out items may go directly into an assembly or may be operated 
on to suit a particular requirement. In some instances raw materials 
and bought out items will be consumed in the manufacture of different 
products, i.e. they are common usage component items. 
To allow the Production Control Department to prepare for future 
consumer needs, a production programme is presented for a twelve month 
period January to December. The information provided on the programme 
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is the result of product demand forecasts presented by the Mining 
Marketing Director and the Industrial Marketing Director. The 
Production Director has sole responsibility for the formulation of· 
the production programme after receiving the two demand forecasts. 
The computer facility is not used to assist in forecasting future 
reqUirements. 
The production programme is used by production control to project 
requirements for a three month period, taking into consideration any 
outstanding orders, new orders, current stock level, capacity and 
material shortages. 
Weekly meetings are held between the Production Control Department and 
individual production departments. Outstanding orders are reviewed and 
priorities set for the following weeks production and material shortages 
listed for action. 
Customer requirements which cannot be met from stock and in-plant orders 
for manufacture to stock are sent by production control in the form of a 
works order to each of the manufacturing departments concerned. The 
works order informs the manufacturing department of the product and the 
batch quantity required, the process routing, materials required (not 
including tools) and the start and finish dates. The start and finish 
dates are generally ignored, the actual loading on the shop floor being 
carried out by the supervisor who is guided by the availability of 
materials and priority decisions made at the weekly production meeting. 
A materials kitting list and material shortage sheet is sent to stores 
showing the requirement date of the materials listed. 
At the beginning of this research the company would kit out the 
requirements of an order to identify whether there were any shortages or 
not. When shortages did occur the part kitted order was placed in a 
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secondary storage area awaiting the arrival of the shortages. 
However, during the research the company modified the order kitting 
activity: Orders for major products aLe now vetted via the computer 
where a visual display shows \~hether a full complement of parts is 
available. Those parts available are allocated in the quantity 
required but not physically kitted; the kitting exercise is carried 
out just prior to the requirement of the parts in the works. Should 
any shortages, identified by the computer, not be available by the 
kitting date, the kitting procedure is delayed until the parts short 
are received. This method ensures that orders are not released to the 
Stores until all the material is available. It readily permits the 
de-allocation of parts should an order be cancelled or the re-allocation 
of parts should a high priority product requiring the same parts be 
needed immediately by production. 
Shortages of parts are inevitable if the amount of cash available for 
stock is to be controlled at a reasonable level in relation to sales. ' 
The company's average yearly stock/sales relationships over a six year 
period are as follows 
1976 4.37 
1977 3.7.9 
1978 3.04 
1979 3.81 
1980 3.55 
1981 3.54 
The majority of shortages in the company are recognised as "in-plant' 
shortages, i.e. parts which are manufactured in the company. ,On 
average each job kitted has 20 shortages, an overall shortage can be 
roughly divided into 80~~ in-plant and 2m~ suppliers. 
The company operate an order point system fo'r the control of stock 
using maximum and minimum levels of stock for the system parameters and 
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replenishment of stock is stated in batch quantities. The maximum 
and minimum levels and replenishment batch quantities are set by 
estimation by the Production Control Department. The up-dating of 
stock is not initiated automatically by the computer. Stock levels 
of the investigated items frequently fell below the minimum set level 
for stock. It would appear that the company carries out a stock 
planning function but control is mainly achieved by expediting 
requirements, sometimes regardless of cost, to replenish depleted stock. 
Inevitably this type of control results in delays in satisfying customers' 
orders, causes disruptions and frustration in the manufacturing 
departments within the company and results in excess levels of work-in-
process. 
The company manufacture and assemble products, with the plant layout 
in the process format. The meaning of jobbing in this thesis will cover 
any manufacturing facility which has the following attributes. 
The jobbing shop employs a variety of manufacturing resources which 
are used for processing raw material to produce a specified item. 
The jobbing.shop will also affect the assembly of items into sub-assemblies 
and the final assembly of the sub-assemblies into a saleable product; 
alternatively, certain items and sub-assemblies will be available for 
supply as customer spares. 
The facilities are of various types which generally have a flexible 
processing capability. Each facility may exist on its own or may be a 
member of some generic group. 
The production - inventory system may be classified as an intermittent 
system where manufacturing is geared to producing in batches. A second 
basis for classification depends on whether or not final products are 
held in inventory for.immediate use or sale, or whether goods are 
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produced only after a specific need for them has been established. 
This method of differentiating. among systems addresses the issue of 
product positioning in terms of elapsed time bebieen the receipt of 
a customer's order for a product and the manufacturar's delivery of 
that product to the customer. The product positioning decision is 
largely determined by the manufacturer's marketing policy regarding 
customer service and response time. Some factors which will influence 
this decision are competition, manufacturing lead time and product life 
cycle. 
The stock record cards of the sub~assemblies investigated indicate 
that the company has no firm policy on product positioning. 
9.5 A Product 
The company manufacture approximately five hundred and fifty different 
products which require a varying amount of production capacity. . There 
are approximately twelve thousand different parts held in stock to 
support the manufacture of products. 
To assist in the selection of a product to investigate, a Pareto analysis 
was applied to actual customers orders received at the company during a 
one month period. The company had previously carried out their own 
Pare to analysis of their products; the 'A' category products were named 
the 'top .35' by the company. The product chosen came under the 'A' 
classification in both surveys. 
The product requires a total of five hundred and seventy six parts, 
these are presented in a 'bill of materials' which involves five levels 
of structure from product (level 1) to raw material. 
The product selected is one supplied to the ~Iational Coal Board which is 
identified as a major customer of John Davis with fifty per cent of its 
mining communication needs being satisfied by the company. It is thought 
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that an investigation of such a product will enable the findings 
to be associated with other industries and customers who have a 
similar relationship albeit not· in the actual product. 
A contractual agreement exists bebveen the company and the Na tional 
Coal Board which sets the price and supply lead time for each product 
but not the quantities. The agreement is reviewed annually. 
Orders are received from the National Coal Board at random intervals 
and may be sent from a number of sources, e.g. central stores or an 
individual coal mine. Repeat orders are normal but the final 
configuration of the product can change. This encourages the man-
ufacture of items and sub-assemblies in batches, leaving the final 
assembly of the product until an order is received stating the exact 
form in which the product is required. The supply lead time currently 
stipulated by the customer allows adequate time for the final assembly 
to take place. 
Stock levels and usage of parts consumed in the manufacture of the 
product selected were collected as follows; stock record cards for 
level 2 requirements (items and sub-assemblies required for final 
assembly build) were investigated for all parts valued at £1 and over~ 
It was considered that lower cost parts should be held in stock in 
quantity and controlled by a simple stock control system such as the 
two-bin method. 
The investigation identified eleven items valued at £1 and over. The 
number of items issued and received at monthly intervals, together with 
the balance of stock at each month end, is presented over a one year 
period, i.e. 1980. (See Item 1 - 11 Apprendix A). 
The actual demand for the product selected for investigation is shown 
in Figure 24. Although orders can be· received at any time, the 
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cumulative orders over four week periods are shown for 1979 and 
1980. The quantities in each period represent the amount to be 
deli vered to the customer in that period as disfinct from the order 
receipt period. 
It, will be noticed that actual demands show apparent random peaks. 
These excessive demands have been, investigated and several large 
orders from different sources contribute to the demand. The sources 
were further investigated to identify the cause which might help to 
predict such future occurrences. The conclusion was that the high 
irregular demands could not be associated with any know~activity of 
a customer; consequently, such demands might occur at random intervals 
in the future. 
Table 5 and Figure 25 offer further information about each item which 
will assist in the investigative procedure. 
The lead times used in the research are average lead times derived 
from actual data. The' cumulative lead time for the product in question 
is 83 weeks, but it is considered that the lead times observed will be 
inflated to some extent by the physical kitting arrangement, releasing 
orders to the shop floor before a full complement of items required are 
available, and releasing certain orders to the shop floor for quantities 
in excess of immediate requirements. 
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TABLE 5 
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ITEM LOT 
NO SIZE 
-
60 
1 60 \ 
- I. 
2 200 
14 
3 200 
4 ?50 
5 ~OO 
6 BOO 
~ -
7 500 
-
B 2000 Bought out item 
9 500 " " 11 
--
10 1000 
" 
.. 
" 
--
11 400 
- .. 
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CHAPTER X 
BATCH SIZE DETERtHNATION 
10.1 Model Formulation and Application 
It has been stated earlier that the master production schedule is 
_the driving force behind the material requirements planning concept. 
It should be recognised that the master production schedule represents 
a plan for production and should not be confused with a forecast. 
Early in the-investigation various dynamic and adaptive forecasting 
techniques were considered. These were abandoned after the cumulative 
lead time for the selected product was calculated; there would be 
little advantage in changing a forecast as a result of actual dew.and 
when certain raw materials required for the product have to be ordered 
83 weeks before the product is made available to the customer. 
It appeared reasonable to accept the product forecast presented by 
the Production Director and formulate a system which could adapt to any 
change in demand from -the forecast. The Batch Size decision and batch 
scheduling approach can adversely affect the successful application of 
the master production schedule, making it necessary to consider in detail 
which batch size and SCheduling technique will prove most suitable for 
the product in question. 
The order point approach currently used by the company has the dis-
advantage of a low stock service level which is the result of multiple 
different items being required at the same time. Should a high aggregate 
stock service level be called for, it would mean excessive levels of 
stock being carried with a resultant high cost. 
The following alternatives, identified earlier, may be applied to allow 
for the changes in demand from a set production schedule; 
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(i) adjusting the batch size; 
(ii) keep the ·batch size constant and adjust the timing 
of the batch replenishment period; 
(iii) a combination of batch size adjustment and 
replenishment timing. 
After. careful consideration of the literature surveyed on batch size 
decisions it was thought.necessary to avoid nervousness of the· system 
which could present severe problems when applying the dependent demand 
concept to lower level items in the product structure. The decision 
was therefore made to select a fixed batch quantity and manipulate the 
batch replacement frequency which assumes that the queue time component 
of the lead time may be controlled within the limits necessary to meet 
changing priorities. 
The validity of this assumption rests on the very high proportion of 
queue time within a product lead time. and if necessary the possible 
use of additional resources such as overtime work, etc. 
It was decided to avoid the theoretical models founded on economic 
criteria which are generally difficult to define with any degree of 
certainty. One approach which is not influenced by the limitation of 
stock holding. cost and order/set-up cost was developed by Corke [19]. 
However, although the application showed a cost saving over the 
company's current batch size and ordering approach, it was limited by 
the fact that the resulting Batch Sizes varied for the eleven items 
investigated, thereby ignoring the dependent demand relationship in 
material requirements planning. 
The "exchange curve" approach by Feeney [26] was excluded for the same 
reason as Corke's method,· although the strategic decision on the amount 
of capital made available for stock has implications for high management 
and should be given serious consideration. 
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The model used in this reasearch has discounted the usual economic 
parameters but instead has tested different batch sizes and associated 
periods between batch replenishment to determine the degree of 
disruption of the master production schedule, resulting in" the application 
of the "two variables. 
The model assumes a "one hundred per cent customer service level; this 
is achieved by the manipulation of the batch replacement frequency. One 
of the major difficulties in the company investigated is the manufacture 
of the product in appropriate quantities to satisfy the volatile demand 
rate of the product in question. To allow for the volatile demand a 
constant batch size rule is applied. In addition a maximum stock level 
is set, the effect of which is to delay the scheduling of future batches 
as long as this level is exceeded. Once the stock level falls below 
the maximum level of stock, replenishment batches are again scheduled. 
Conversely, when the demand is higher than anticipated "to the extent 
that stock levels will fall to zero, the batch schedules in progress 
will be brought forward to cover this. 
This approach allows for the build of a variable but limited buffer 
stock when demand is low, to cushion the high demand rates, and it 
also offers a safeguard against excessive levels of stock being built. 
10.2 Simulation of Demand 
Elsewhere in the thesis is the recognition that a demand forecast "for 
the product cannot be reliably produced. This presents a major barrier 
to the derivable and calculable dependent item quantities used in 
material requirements planning. It should be acknowledged that if a 
relieable forecast is available, the problems associated with material 
provisioning and scheduling are greatly reduced, and it might then be 
argued that the problems. are non-existent. 
143 
The actual demand for the product could not ,be associated with 
a known frequency distribution, and consequently the probability 
distribution used in the model was empirically derived using the 
actual product demand over a two year period. From this the 
effects of different batch sizes on the resulting stock levels and 
schedule disruptions were assessed by a computer simulation. The 
stock levels were updated weekly. 
It'is suggested ,that if this model is employed by the company the 
two year actual product demand used for the probability distribution 
data in the simulation exercise would be updated yearly. 
Figure 26 shows the' frequency of actual demand quantities observed 
at weekly intervals during 1979 _and 1980. From this information the 
following data was obtained : 
Weekly demand quantity standard deviation 
mean value 
coefficient of variation 
= 
= 
= 
14.2757 
6.8269 
2.09 
Maximum level of stock = batch size + buffer stock 
Let buffer stock 
where k = management service level factor (3 used in the model) 
~ d = standard deviation of demand/week 
R = duration in weeks between batch orders. 
The management demand forecast was 360 units for one year and therefore 
the' duration between batch orders commensurate with a batch size of 
52 
21 units = 360 : 21 3 weeks = R 
Hence for a batch size of 21 units with a 3 week re-order cycle, the 
buffer stock will be :-
3 x 14.2757 .;-J 74 units 
Maximum stock level = 21 + 74 = 95 units 
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FIG. 26 QUANTITY DEMANDED IN WEEKLY PERIODS 
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The time between batch replenishment periods commenced with a 
one week duration and was progressively increased by weekly amounts 
to a maximum of twenty four weeks. Table 6 shows the batch sizes, 
replenishments interval, buffer stock and maximum stock levels 
appropriate to a forecast of 360 units supplied during a one year 
period. 
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Batch Size Duration Buffer Maximum Between Batches 
(Units) (weeks) Stock Stock Level 
7 1 43 50 
14 2 61 75 
21 3 74 95 
28 4 86 114 
35 5 96 131 
42 6 105 147 
48 7 113 161 
55 8 121 176 
62 9 128 190 
69 10 135 204 
76 11 142 218 
83 12 148 231 
90· 13 154 244 
97 14 160 257 
104 15 166 270 
111 16 171 282 
118 . 17 177 295 
125 18 182 307 
132 19 187 319 
138 20 192 330 
145 21 196 341 
152 22 201 353 
159 23 205 364 
166 24 209 375 
TABLE 6 
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10.3 Application of r·lodel 
To overcome the instability of the results caused by the 
inertia of the initial periods of supply and demand, and to 
allow for the maximum level of stock to be achieved and to 
demonstrate its effect on the results, a 100 year period was 
used for each batch size tested, each period being repeated 
six times. 
The iterations were carried out on a Systime 6000 computer. A 
flow chart showing the, proyramme logic and data processing operations 
is shown in Fig. 27. 
When the stock level reached a negative value the next batch 
supply is brought forward to satisfy the demand; the resulting 
number of weeks which the batch supply is moved, is calculated and 
shown as the 'number of weeks of disruption'. Once a batch supply 
period is changed the periods between subsequent batch replenishments 
are also brought forward by the same amount, thus keeping the time 
periods constant. (see Fig. 28). 
When the maximum stock level is exceeded the following batch 
replenishments are delayed until the stock level falls below the 
maximum stock level allowed (see Fig. 29). Disruptions r.reated by 
this rule are considered not to cause undue concern to the' 
manufacturing facility and providing they occur infrequently, such 
disruptions may be ignored. However, should the cancellation of 
future batch replenishments occur frequently, this will be a sign 
that the mean demand forecast used in the master production schedule 
is overestimated and steps may be taken to review the batch size or 
planned period between batch replenishment, or both, in an attempt 
to stabilise the system. Conversely, should the forecast be underestimated 
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resulting in 'excessive weekly djsruptions which cannot be 
stabilised by the maximum level of stock ,again this will 
indicate a review of the batch size or planned period between 
batch rep.Jenishment, or both. 
Figure 30 shows the results obtained from the model with 
each dependent variable representing the mean value of the six 
trials taken. Dividing the weekly disruption (disruptions to 
schedule caused by shortages only) by one hundred gives the 
average yearly disruptions expected with the batch size and the 
associated replenishment period tested. 
10.4 Analysis of Component Lead Times 
The final assembly lead time and the contract time agreed between 
, ' 
the customer's order placement and product deli':ery date will 
determine the amount of time in which any changes in the master 
production schedule can be considered. Figure 31 shows the current 
'planned' lead times. 
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Period 'A' will depend on the contract agreement between the 
manufacturer and customer. With the current contract agreement 
of 17 weeks, a 10 weeks notice is given of the actual requirements 
prior to commencing the final assembly operation. This period 
will allow the master production schedule to be expedited or 
de-expedited to meet changing demand. When a signal to expedite 
is given, the action may require the shortening of planned lead times 
in' lower levels of production unless a decision has been made to 
hold excess levels of stock in these areas. 
The eleven 'level 2' items previously identified as the 'major' 
requirements in the final assembly have been analysed separately to 
assess each item's capability of.responding to a 'make in less than 
planned. lead time' request. The analysis gave the following results: 
ITEM 
No.1 
ITEM 
No.2 
ITEM 
No.3 
Cost/each 
£ 105 
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Planned Lead Time 
22 weeks/batch of 60 
Other Considerations: 
Actual Work Time 
9 weeks/batch of 60/person 
Assembly operation - the planned lead time and work time 
depend upon the'number of people employed on the assembly 
of the item. There should be no barriers to reducing the 
times considered. This item i"s also issued as a spare, and 
hence additional quanti ties wili be manufactured to meet 
the forecast of demand for spares. 
Cost/each 
£ 56 
Planned lead Time 
27 weeks/batch of 200 
Other Considerations: 
Actual Work Time 
8. 34 weeks/batch 
This item is manufactured in the machine shop, which has a 
history of overtime working. Three machines are available 
which are capable of manufacturing this item although only 
one fixture is available. The times given may be reduced. 
Cost/each 
£ 16 
'Planned Lead Time 
19 weeks/batch of 200 
Other Considerations: 
Actual Work Time 
3.34 weeks/batch 
These items are machined castings; the raw casting is 
ordered from an outside supplier in quantities of 200. 
The castings are not used elsewhere. Castings may be 
received which prove unsuitable due to blowholes which 
are only evident on machining. It is recommended that 
all castings are machined as soon as possible after they 
are received at the company so that additional castings 
can be supplied to replace the faulty ones. The relatively 
IT HI 
No.4 
IT HI 
No.5 
ITEM 
No.6 
ITEM 
No.7 
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low cost of these items and quality difficulties suggest 
a two bin system of stock control. Consquently, 
expediting should cause no problem. 
Cost/each 
£ 9 
Planned Lead Time 
13 weeks/batch of 250 
Other Considerations: 
Actual Work Time 
0.92 weeks/batch 
These Are machined castings and therefore the same reasoning 
as Item No. 3 can be applied, i.e. use a two bin system. 
Cost/each 
£ 4 
Planned Lead Time 
9 weeks/batch of 200 
Other Considerations: 
Actual \~ork Time 
0.125 weeks/batch 
Assembly operation. Issued also as a spare. Treat as 
Item No. 1. 
Cost/each 
£ 4 
Planned Lead Time 
10 weeks/batch of 800 
Other Considerations: 
Actual Work Time 
0.44 weeks/batch 
Only one machine available for each operation to be 
performed. The large batch size and extended queue time 
suggests the 10 week lead time is inflated. 
Cost/each 
£10 
.Planned Lead Time 
20 weeks/batch of 500 
Other Considerations: 
Actual Work Time 
8.8 weeks/batch of 500 
The two longest operations could be performed on other 
machines to reduce work time. The large batch size could 
be reduced if required. 
ITEM 
No.8 
ITEM 
No.9 
ITEM 
No.10 
ITEM 
No.11 
Cost/each 
£ 2· 
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Planned Lead Time· 
4 weeks/ba tch of 2000 
Other Considerations: 
Bought out item. Oifficult to reduce lead time. 
Should not present a shortage problem when bought 
in batches of 2000. 
Cost/each 
£ 2 
Planned Lead Time 
9 weeks/batch of 500 
Other Considerations: 
Bought out item - apply same reasoning as Item No.B. 
Cost/each 
£ 2 
Planned Lead Time 
11 weeks/batch of1000 
Other Considerations: 
Bought out .item - apply same reasoning as Item No.B. 
Cost/each 
£ 1 
Planned Lead Time 
17 weeks/batch of 400 
Other Considerations: 
Actual Work Time 
0.6 weeks/batch 
The longest operation on this item can be performed on 
another machine which will reduce the lead time. The 
large batch size and extended queue time suggests that 
the 17 week lead time is inflated. Issued also as a 
spare. 
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The analysis indicates that the reduction of lead time is 
feasible for all manufacturing and assembly items. Items from 
outside are currently supplied in large quantities which should 
not present shortage difficulties when additional demand is made. 
Although the contract delivery lead time agreed· between the 
customer and the manufacturer for the supply. of goods was stated 
to be 17 weeks during 1980, Fig. 32 shows the actual lead time 
requested by the customer during the period. 
lead time requested is 10.83 weeks. 
The arithmetic mean 
The actual delivery performance during 1980 is shown in Fig. 33. 
An order is considered complete when the'quantity required is'made 
available to the customer; .this ignores any part fulfilment of an 
order which may occur. 
Fig. 34 shows, for the 1980 orders investigated, how an improved 
delivery performance could have been achieved by the manufacturer 
if the contract lead time had been honoured by the customer. 
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CHAPTER XI 
SUt·iHARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
It is necessary, to achieve the objective of this study, to 
recognise how effective the applied·production planning and 
control theory is within the company investigated, and also to 
determine if the current effectiveness of the prodLlction control 
department can be improved by the application of additional or 
alternative theories. 
The effectiveness ·of production planning and control may be 
measured in a number of ways depending upon which ·parlicular 
body is effected by the outcome. To allow a rational judgement 
to be made on. the overall effectiveness of the current production 
planning and control system within the company investigated, it is 
suggested that the system is measured by the delivery performance 
of goods to the customers. Perhaps in any situation the delivery 
of products on time, at the correct quality and in the. correct 
quantity should be a prime objective of a company. However,one 
must recognise"that the strategic decisions made by higher management 
on the availability of resources and finance will have a profound 
effect on the tactical decisions made by lower management who have 
to implement the company policy to achieve some set objective. 
One basic decision which needs to be made at the inception of a 
production control system is the 'product ,positioning' policy, i.e. 
where stock levels are to be held. 
It is considered th2.t the company concerned should adopt an 
'intermediate position.' for the product investigated, which requires 
the anticipation of customers' orders by forecasting future demand 
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and holding stocks of raw materials and semi-finished products. 0 It 
has been mentioned earlier that the product can be supplied in 
alternati ve final arrangements to suit the particular neoed of the 
customer; to keep these alternatives in stock would commit excessive 
capital in finished goods stock. The intermediate product positioning 
policy results in a quicker response to orders than a pure make to 
order policy. 
The decision to stock semi-finished goods'is particularly advantageous 
when these goods are also offered as spares. It can be claimed that 
products and the associated spares have an 'extended' life cycle in 
this type of industry. This is due to the special needs of the 
customer where the safe operation and worker confidence in the product 
are of paramount importance. Products which are used in highly 
inflammable atmospheres are awarded a certificate of conformance only 
after rigorous and extensive tests have been carried out. Design or 
material changes to existing products necessitate the re-testing and 
certification of the product. These stringent conditions, however, 
offer some advantages too the manufacturer. Once a product has been 
accepte~ and installed by the customer, the decision to change 
allegiance to another manufacturer is a difficult one to make, 
particularly when, for example, a coal mine is equipped with a complete 
system manufactured by one company and competitors products are not 
compatible. Obviously, this will also guarantee the orders for the 
supply of spare parts to the company who installed the system. 
Obsolesence ef any product would be known well in advance if the' 
producing company is aware or involved in the manufacture and testing 
of replacement products. 
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T~is type of customer commitment to a manufacturer can have serious 
repercussions, particularly when the manufacturer has a poor 
customer service record for. spare parts. The customer will have 
little choice but to wait for his needs to be satisfied; however, 
when the time comes to install a new system there is the likelihood 
that the customer will change the supplier. In the instance of 
the ~ational Coal Board, an order for a complete system and.associated 
spares will represent a vast amount of money. The scale of future 
orders is a factor which the supplier should bear strongly in mind 
when he makes decisions on the service.levels for his customers. 
The following.observations may be made from studying stock control 
record cards and associated graphs (Appendix 'A'). The company 
generally does not hold sub-assemblies in stock. The immediate usage 
of parts upon their receipt in stores suggests that production i.s 
delayed until the parts are available. Table 5 indicates that 
overtime is being worked due to custom, not necessarily job priority. 
For example, assembly department 1 has the highest 'out-of-stock' 
record yet over the period documented only 3.72% of overtime was 
worked. This is mainly due to the labour resources available in the 
assembly department which is predominantly female. The experience 
of the company is that this category of labour resists overtime working. 
Additional output in the area would not necessarily commit the company 
to excessive expenditure on equipment if it is thought desirable to 
maintain female workers (renowned for ·their dexterity on fine assembly 
work). A 'twilight' shift might be· considered to reduce a constant 
overload in the department. 
The delivery performance of the product investigated indicates that 
the. production planning and control function within the company is not 
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as effective as it might be. It is acknOldedged that the 
production control problem is compounded with the inherent 
volatile product demand and long lead times. Although the 
volatile demand is not under the control of the company's 
production department, it is suggested that the long lead times 
observed could be substantially reduced by production control 
action. The relationship behlBen lead time and work time indica tes 
excessive queue times for most items; this could be caused by one, 
or by a combination of, the following conditions: 
(a) Orders are released to the shop floor irrespective of the 
availability of resources, i.e. men, materials or machines. 
(b) Orders are released to the shop floor well in advance of need. 
(c) Large batch sizes are requested on the order but parts are 
supplied in smaller batches, either to meet an immediate need 
or limited by the availability of resources. This can result 
in the completed order date not revealing a progressive 
fulfilment of the order. 
Although the company have a computerised production control system 
the·re is little evidence of any proper control of the manufacturing 
resources. In fact the evidence suggests an abdication of any 
thorough planning and control, with the system merely reacting to 
immediate needs. However, it is considered that the production 
planning and control problem can be minimised and the customer service 
improved if the company apply the theory developed in this research. 
Because of the shortfalls of the statistical inventory control theory, 
particularly when it is applied to large quantities of parts needed 
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to manufacture a product similar to the one investigated, and the 
'lumpy' demand for lower level 'parts associated with manufacturing 
in batch quantities, it is recommended that the company adopt the 
material requirements planning concept for all its manufactured 
products. 
For the particular product investigated, the yearly forecast supplied 
by the Production Director should be used for the independent demand 
and the dependent demand quantities of lower level sub-assemblies 
and parts can be calculated from the product forecast. Additional 
quantities of sub-assemblies and parts which are also .issued as 
spares will be added to the dependent demand quantity after an 
independent forecast for spares has been made. 
The previous observation on product positioning should be more 
speci fic and the·refore it is recommended that the eleven sub-ass·emblies 
and parts (at level 2) are held in stock thereby enabling the company 
to meet the customers volatile requirements whilst maintaining a 
relatively stable pr09uction environment. 
The stock holding model developed attempts to minimise the disruptive 
effects on the company's manufacturing facilities caused by the 
volatile demand and long lead times. The model employs the time 
phased order point approach and develops a constant batch size for 
use in the master production schedule to overcome lDl<er level 
component nervousness. Any excessive variation in the actual demand 
compared to the forecast demand may be accommodated by adjusting the 
batch replenishment period. 
The system reaction to demand change is dampened by the application 
of a maximum stock level. This allows for the build up of stock to 
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the maximum stock level, whereupon future planned replenishment 
batches are suspended until the stock level drops below the maximum 
level. 
Due to the difficulty in forecasting future requirements, disruptions 
in the production schedule are inevitable. The degree of disruption 
is a corollary of the batch size employed. The amount of disruption 
to the production schedule increased with the decrease in batch size. 
However, thts does not necessarily imply that large batch sizes should 
be encouraged. On the contrary, one objective is to reduce batch 
sizes until a tolerable disruption level is achieved. The rationale 
of reducing batch sizes is to limit the amount of work in process and 
increase the flexibility of the manufacturing facility. 
For the product investigated, a batch size of 55 is recommended with 
an eight week replenishement cycle, allowing a maximum stock level of 
176. This is a fictitious level of stock for the product, the figure 
being used to make available sufficient level 2 components and sub-
assemblies to build 176 products for the time when an order is 
received from a customer identifying the product final arrangment. 
The batch size chosen will result in an average of four weeks disruption 
per year. The analysis of the major components and sUb-assemblies shows 
that it is feasible to accommodate this amount of disruption. 
An analysis was carried out of the linear regression of the logarithm 
of the average weekly disruptions on the batch size, using data 
arising from the simulation exercise. A good fit was obtained 
(see Fig. 35) with a correlation coefficient of 0.9285, indicating that 
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the number of disruptions (N) and the batch size (D) 
are related by the expression: 
D = Ae B~ 
where A and B are constants. 
Values for A and B were calculated using the method of 
least squares, indicati~g that D and N are related 
through: 
D = 7.1e -O.0075N 
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Should batch sizes of 30 and 80 be chosen, the nu~ber of weeks 
disruption to the master production schedule would be approximately 
5~ weeks and 3~ weeks respectively. The curve (Fig. 30) indicates 
that the weekly disruptions do not have a linear relationship with 
the batch size and the principle of 'diminishing return' is 
appropriate with the increase in batch size. There is another 
consideration when associating batch sizes and disruption; will a 
one week, say, disruption with a small batch size be as significant 
as a one week disruption with a large batch size when changing a 
schedule? Probably the manipulation of a smaller batch size will 
create less difficulties to a shop load than will the manipulation 
of a larger batch size. This observation may possibly be related 
to the scheduling literature previously reviewed where the shortest 
processing time priority rule generally exhibits the best shop 
performance when compared with other scheduling rules. 
One. must consider additional factors as well as the affect of 
changing the batch size to minimise the disruption to a master 
production schedule caused by fluctuating demand. 
It is also necessary to ensure that: 
1. The machines and equipment used in the manufacturing process 
are well maintained and that additional excessive disruptions 
are not caused by plant breakdown. 
2. . The labour force is aware of what the production department is 
trying to achieve and it is fully trained to effectively use 
the plant and equipment at its disposal. 
3. Disruptions are not caused by lateness and absenteeism due 
to low morale. 
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4. Correct working methods are.selected, installed and 
continuously monitored and up-dated. 
5. Set-up time between batch changeover are at a minimum with 
the application of fixtures and standby equipment where 
necessary. 
6. The correct and well maintained tools are readily available 
to assist in the continuity of the manufacturing process. 
The above points are not exclusive. It is necessary for management 
to fully back any action necessary to promote. any of the above 
requirements without which the use of computers and improved 
production control techniques will prove merely cosmetic resulting 
in little, if any, improvement in the manufacturing of goods to meet 
the requirements of the customer •. 
It should also be recognised that if there is any substantial 
increase in demand for products on the master production schedule, 
it will be necessary to re-think the strategy if the demand is to 
be satisfied. The new strategy could include: 
(i) sub-contracting work. 
(ii) additional shifts. 
(iii) additional resources. 
Should the company choose to adopt material requirements planning, 
it will be necessary for the following areas to be fully scrutinised 
by management. These areas are the pre-requisities for the successful 
application of M.R.P. 
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(i) A master production schedule; an effective master 
production schedule can be produced if the procedure 
used during this research is followed for all products 
or provisionally all category 'A' products. 
(ii) A bill of material and bill of material structure; the 
company have these available for a limited number of 
products. The authenticity of some earlier bills of 
material and structures was in doubt due to changes made 
by unauthorised personnel. It is of paramount import'ance 
that a well documented procedure is followed whereby any 
modification to a bill of material or structure can be 
carried out at'one source only and such changes fully 
communicated throughout' the organisation, with the appropriate 
erasure of previous data. 
(iii) Valid, up-ta-date inventory records; it is necessary for the 
company to overhaul the method of recording stock movement 
on the computer file. It is not uncommon for dual systems 
to operate during the, introduction of a new technique but 
when the computer file is generally ignored and preference 
given to the manual card system with no attempt to phase out 
the manual system, confidence in ~omputer read-outs will never 
be achieved. 
M.R.P. can only be· effective when the dependent demand relationship 
between ~omponents and products can be exploited. The extended 
lead times identified in this study and the volatile demand make the 
quantities of lower level 'requirements calculated from the master 
production schedule, questionable. 
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The writer cannot accept the inference that M.R.P. will work 
effectively with a master production schedule produced by a bad 
forecast [49]. Long lead times in excess of the customer requirement 
lead time, when associated with a random, highly variable demand, 
will need safety stocks of lower level· components if the customer 
requirements are to be met. Otherwise the long lead times will not 
allow sufficient time for the provision of components. However, 
should the batch and batch replenishment technique developed 
during the research be adopted, the resulting stable production 
programme showing minimal disruption from the planned programme 
will enable material requirements planning and capacity requirments 
planning to be successfully applied particularly when safety stocks 
are held on critical lead time comp~nents. 
Probably material requirements planning will act as the catalyst 
needed to co-ordinate the activities of the separate parts of the 
organisation. It may promote a dialogue between these parts and 
facilitate the customer service objective to be achieved with the 
optimum use of the resources available. 
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PRODUCTION PL~NN!NG AND CONTROL 
Analvsis by s!:~ of manu~~cturin, uni~ 
Percenta'le o.f' Resocncents who state they have: No. af 
Employees 
in Unit 
No. aT 
Respcndents A ·Prcducticn 
Planning and 
Control Ceet. 
A Senior ?~duct!on A Comcuter 
Executive Responsible used by 
Tor the Prcducticn Production 
Plannin~ \ Control Qect. Cont:'Cl 
Under SO 295 S6.S 51.5 
50 99 199 ' 76.9 69.3 
100 149 204 85.3 77.0 
150 249 227 88.1 77.5 
250 439 336 89.3 76.5 
500 959 286 95.8 78.3 
lCOO - 4959 253 95.3 79.8 
50CO - 9999 35 97.1 88.6 
over 10.000 28 96.4 92.9 
Not classified 
by size 3 
Over~ll 84.1 73.0 
Totals 1866 1570 lZ63 
The a:::lva -figures , .. ,,;!; cca:-!.1J9d f=-c~ a surve~' ~~C'nso:-~r;: "=y t!":e !nst!tuticrl cf" 
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g1'"e ~;-. t..i;JWt3!"'ct tias -,:cl;'a:-c3 ',:!"'.a :-g;:c!"""t~:"!g of "b=oc"m~02g!!:-:31 ta':~":-li-=Li~S •. 
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25.6 
33.a 
43.2 
52.7 
52.2 
75.9 
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Professor of Ocerations Man~ement: KG LOCK YEA BSc CEng MaiM 
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PRODUCTION PLP.NNING AND CONTROL 
Analvsis by Nationalitv aT Ownershi~ 
Percentage of Responcents who state they have: 
NATIONALITY 
OF 
PRINCIPAL 
OWNERSHIP 
U.K. 
U.S.A. 
E.E.C. 
Ot~er 
Not 
~UMBER 
OF 
RESPONOENTS 
1474 
260 
67 
61 
Classified 4 
Overall 
Totals 1866 
Product!on 
Planning and 
.Control Dept. 
82.2 
94.6 
92.5 
82.0 
84 .1 
1570 
A Senior 
Product!on 
Executive' 
Responsible 
Tor the 
Production 
Planning & 
Control Dept. 
71.8 
81.5 
76.1 
68.9 
73.1 
1364 
A comouter 
used for' 
Production 
Control 
42.3 
73.1 
52.2 
49.2 
47.1 
879 
The above figures were derived from a survey sponsored by t~e Institution aT 
Industrial Managers and carried out by the Production Management Group aT the 
Management Centre. Bradford. 10.000 members of the I.I.M. were askec in 
Autumn 1980 to Till in a questionnaire on their work and it is the responses 
to this request which are here analysed. This s~mpling frame is likely to 
give an upward bias towards the reporting of'good' managerial techniques. 
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Anal'lsis Cv 5iz9 c~' manUT3cturin1 cni":: 
Percentage of Responcents who stated they use a: 
No. of 
Erro lcyecs-
1n Uni: 
Under :0 
50 
lea 
150 
250 
sea 
99 
149 
249 
499 
999 
1000 - 4999 
5000 - 9999 
over 10.000 
No. of 
Respon c::e;"1ts 
295 
199 
204 
227 
335 
285 
253 
35 
28 
Not clas~ified 
by size 3 
Overall 
Totals 1866 
Main Frame 
COlT'puter 
~1.9 
17.6 
21.6 
2S.9 
41. 7 
48.3 
64.0 
S8.6 
75.0 
35.4 
660 
Mi"n1 
Comp utar 
3.1 
5.5 
8.8 
10.S 
7.1 
8.0 
S.7 
14.3 
7.1 
7.1 
133 
M~cro 
Comp uter 
3.1 
1.5 
2.0 
2.2 
2.1 
1.4 
1.2 
0 
0 
1.9 
35 
Total 
18.1 
24.S 
32.4 
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50.9 
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71.9-
82.9 
82.1 _ 
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At.!t:..:;-:-n 12.:;0 to fill !n a questicr."a=".:-e on t!"'.e::- :..fOrf, ar:~ :: ::; :r.a :-esocl:ses 
tu t~.i5 :-s~u~st ·",h:':.M ~:-~ ;-'S~'3 =:i-31~j3:<:. T~!::. 5e~:Jli.i,g T~~r:e :s 11;':e1y tc 
g!.ve -!r. WO"'/.:!:-:: ties !.o'oo/e:-c3 the rl2;:2:-::'r.i; oi gcoc' ii\ar.;'!g:s:-'i.;j,l. :3·:~ .• 1i~U2~. 
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Professor of Cperations M.nagement: KC; LOCKYEA 8Sc CEng MaiM 
THE PRACTICE OF PRODUCTION MANAGEMENT 
IN THE U. K . 
I. I. M. SURVEY - AUTUMN 1980 
THE USE OF CO~UTE;;S FOR PROOUCTION pL.~NmNG AND CONT;;CL 
Analysis by National1 ty of Ownershio 
Percentage of Respcncents who stated they use e: 
NATIONALITY 
OF 
PRINCIPAL 
OWNERSHIP 
U.K. 
U.S.A •. 
E.E.C. 
Other 
Not 
NUMBER 
OF 
RESPONDENTS 
1474 
260 
67 
61 
Classified 4 
Overall 
Totals 1866 
Main 
Frame 
COr.1putar 
30.9 
59.2 
41.8 
~6 .1 
35.3 
659 
Mini 
Computer 
6.9 
8.5 
4.5 
11.5 
7.2 
134 
Micro 
Computer 
1.9 
2.3 
1.5 
o 
1.9 
35 
Total 
39.7 
70.0 
47.S 
47.6 
44.4 
829 
The above. figures were derived frem a survey sponsored by the Institution of 
Industrial Managers and car~ied out by the Production Managerr.ent Group of the 
Management Centre. Bradford. 10.000 rr.embers of the I.I.M. were asked in 
Autumn 1980 to fill in a questionnaire on their work and it is the responses 
to this request which are here analysed. This sampling frame is likely to 
give an upward bias towards the reporting of good mar.agerial techniques; 
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No. of . 
Employees 
in Unit. 
Uncer 50 
SO 
100 
ISO 
ZSO 
SCD 
9S 
149 
249 
499 
999 
1000 - 4999 
5eOO - 9999 
ever 10 ,ODD 
No. of 
Respondents. 
295 
199 
204 
227 
326 
286 
253 
35 
28 
Not classified 
by size 3 
Overall 
Totels laES 
IN"T H ElI,K 
I. I. M. SUP.':EY - AUTUr-N 15eO 
THE USE OF A CO~UTER 
Analy~is by s1z9 of menuf~ctu~!n~ un~t 
Percentage of Respondents whc state a 
Computer is usec: 
For 
Product!on 
Centrol 
19.3 
25.5 
33.8 
43.2 
52.7 
62.2 
75.9 
91.4 
8S.3 
47.1 
. 
879 
By 
first line 
Supervision 
9.5 
a.5 
9.3 
15.0 
18.8 
23.1 
24.1 
42.9 
42.9 
16.9 
315 
For 
Stock 
Control 
23.1 
27.1 
38.2 
49.3 
57.1 
64.7 
77 .9 
88.5 
96.4 
50.6 
944 
The ebc'/e figures ,,:e:-s c3:,ivl£d from a survey s~cnso:,~c by t:-:g Ins~i":u~::'=r: of 
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Professor of Cperations Management: le G LOCK YEA asc CEng MBIM 
THE PRACTICE OF PRODUCTION MANAGEMENT 
NA TIONALITY 
OF 
PRINCIPAL 
_OWNERSHIP 
U.K.. 
U.S.A. 
E.E.C. 
Other 
Not 
I NTH E U. K . 
I. I. M. SURVEY - AUTUMN 1980 
USE OF COMPUTER 
Analysis by Nationality of Ownershi~ 
Percentage of Respondents who stata a Computer is used: 
NUMBER 
OF 
RESPONCENTS 
1474 
260 
67 
61 
for 
Production 
Control 
42.3 
73.1 
52.2 
49.2 
by 
first Une 
supervision 
14.6 
29.5 
19.4 
14.8 
for 
stock 
control 
46.4 
74.6 
49.3 
50.8 
Classified 4 
Overell 47.1 16.8 50.5 
Totals 1866 879 314 942 
-The above figures were derived from a survey sponsored by the !~stitut10n of 
Industrial Managers and carried out by the Production Managemen, Group of the 
Manag9~ent Centre. Bradford. 10.000 members of the I.I.M. were asked in 
Autumn 1980 to fill in a questionnaire on their work and it is the responses 
to this request which are here analysed. Th1s sampling freme 1s likely to 
g1ve an u",o/ard bias towards the reporting of good manager1al techn1ques; 
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Profauor of Cce~atjcns ,\'araQOlrr:ent: KG, LOC;,;,yc.Fi =$c C:fflJ :"':Z:~.I 
T fiE' PR fJ, Cll (-E'" or'p ROD UC 11 0 N t1 ANA GE 1'1 EHT 
1N'T H EU II~ I 
I. I. M. SUR'-'EY - ;,L'TU~~N 1geO 
STOCK CONTROL 
-
~- I. " " ., " . 
Percentage of Respcncents who state they use: 
No. of No. of , An Explicit Technique to Con t:'C 1 Stcc~ 
Emplcyee::; Responcents Levels of: A Conputer for 
in Unit Purchased Wor~-in- Prooucts Stock. Control 
- Material' Progress for Sale 
-
UnC8I' 50 295 63.4 54.9 57.3 23.1 
50 - 99 199 71.9 57.S 59.6 27.1 
100 - 149 204 62.8 63.7 72 .1 38.2 
150 - 249 227 80.6 67.4 69.6 49.3 
250 
· 
499 336 76.5 62.5 68.8 57.1 
500 
-
959 286 88.8 72.7 76.0 64.7 
lCOO 
· 
4939 253 84.2 71.5 74.3 77.9 
saeo 
· 
9999 35 91.4 74.3 77 .1 88.6 
over la ,dca 28 96.4 78.6 75.0 96.4 
Not clae~1fied 
by size. 3 
Ove:'ell 76.5 64.7 68.8 50.6 
Totals 1866 1465 1207 1283 944 
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Professor at Operations ManaQement: KG LOCKVER BSc C::"IJ M91M 
THE PRACTICE nF PRODUCTION MANAGEMENT 
NATIONALITY· 
OF 
PRINCIPAL 
OWNERSHIP 
U.K. 
U.S.A. 
E.E.C. 
Other 
Not 
I NTH E U, K , 
I. I. M. SURVEY - AUTUMN 1980 
STOCK CONTROL 
Analysis by Nat~onal1ty of Ownersh~o 
Per=entage of Respcncents , .. ho s.tate they use: 
~UMBER 
OF 
RESPONCENTS 
1474 
260 
67 
61 
An Explicit Technique to Control 
Stock Levels of: 
Purchased Work-in-
Material Progress 
76.6 63.0 
90.0 75.4 
83.5 70.1 
73.8 60.7 
Procucts 
for Sale 
67.0 
81.9 
70.1 
62.3 
A Computer for 
Stock Control 
46.4 
74.6 
49.3 
50.8 
Classified 4 
Overall 78.S 64.7 68.8 50.5 
1866 1464 12C!8 1284 542 
The above figures were derived from a ·survey sponsorsd by the Inst~tution of 
. Industrial Managers and carried out by the Production ~anag9ment Group of the 
Management Centre. Bradford. 10.000 ~embers of the I.I.M. were asked in 
Autumn 1980 to fill in a questionna!rs on their work and it is the responses 
. to this request which are here analysed. This sampling frame is likely to 
give an upward bias towards the reporting of good m~nagerial techniques. 
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OirKtor and Profl!uor ot'Managemeru Sc:il!nces: J C HIGC1NS· asc MA MSc PhD CEng MIEE F31M 
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THE . PR ACT re E '0 F P R onu C TI ON MAN rIG E r~ EN T 
IN THE U.K. 
I. I. M. SURVEY - AUTUMN 1980 
STOCK C2NTROL (USAGE) 
Analysis ey Size of Manuf~ctur!ng Unit 
NUr"llER OF 
EI"PLOYEES 
IN UNIT 
Under 50 
50 - 99 
100 - 149 
150 - 249 
250 - 499 
500 999 
1000 - 4999 
5000 - 9999· 
Over 10.000 
NUr'!EER OF 
RESPONDENTS 
295 
199 
204 
227 
336 
286 
253 
35 
28 
Not Classified 3 
Overall 
Totals 1.866 
Percentage of Responcents who state that they use: 
Economic 
Order 
Quantity 
51.9 
51.8 
58.8 
66.1 
58.0 
52.7 
48.3 
51.4 
35.7 
57.0 
1.064 
M. R.P. 
60.7 
68.3 
69.1 
71. 8 
71.1 
71. 7 
5a.6 
71.4 
64.3 
68.0 
1.256 
Re-Orcer Re-Order Coverage 
Cycle Level Analysis 
44.1 
52.3 
58.8 
64.8 
57.4 
59.4 
53.4 
42.9 
50.0 
55.1 
1.028 
57.3 
74.4 
70.5 
78.0 
74.4 
72.7 
65.6 
57.1 
60.7 
69.6 
1.299 
6.6 
5.0 
5.9 
4.6 
9.6 
6.4 
7.1 
11.4 
14.3 
7.6 
142 
The above figures we~ cerived from a survey sponsored by the Institution of Indus~rial 
Manage:-s and carried out by the Production r-:anagement Group of the r-:anagement Centre. 
Bradford. 10,OOe member-s of the I. I. M. were asked in Autumn 1980 to fill in a 
questionnaire on their work and it is the responses to this request which are he:-e 
analysed. This sampling frame is l1~ely to give an upward bias tOl.'arcs the reporting 
of "goad"' "'.anagerial techniques. 
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Director and Professor of Management Sciences: J C HIGGINS BSc MA MSc PhD CEng MIEE F61M 
Proleuor of Ooerations Man<lgement: KG LOCKYEA BSc CEng MaIM 
THEPRAC1Itf OF PROnUCTION MAfl~~fKfflT 
INTHf' U.K. 
I. I. M. SURVEY - AUTU~N 1980 
STOCK CONTROL (US~.GE J 
Analvsis by Ownership 
Percentage of Respondents who state that 
they use: 
NATIONALITY OF 
PRINCIPAL OWNERSHIP 
NUr.EE.'l OF 
RESPONCENTS 
E.O.Q.· M.R.P. Re-Order Re-Order 
Cycle Level 
Coverage 
Analysis 
U. K. 1474 54.8 66.8 53.5 68.7 7.6 
U. S. A. 260 65.0 73.5 63.8 73.1 6.9 
E. E. C. 67 67.2 71.6 .61.2 73.1 9.0 
OTHER 61 65.6 68.9 52.5 75.4 8.2 
NOT CLASSIFIED 4 
OVERALL 56.9 67.8 55.1 69.6 7.6 
TOTALS 1,866 1.062 1.266 1.029 1.298 142 
• E.O.Q •• Ecor.omic Order Quantity 
The above fi'gures were ·derived from a survey sponsored by the Insti tution of Industrial 
Managers and carried out by the Production r.anagerrent Group of the r.anagement Centre, 
.Bradford. 10,000 rrembers of the I. I. M. were asked in Autumn 1980 to fill in a 
questionnaire on their work and it 1s the responses to this request which are here 
analysed. This sampling fram~ is likely to give an upward bias towa.ds the repor";:ing 
of "good" managerial techniques. 
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T H E-P RAeT ICE o F PRODlICTjON -- M All fI G E rHN T 
I N THE U • K • 
r. I. M. SURVEY - AUTUMN 1980 
MATHEMATICAL TECI'NI!:JUES (USAGE) 
Analysis by Size of Manufactur-tng Unit 
Percentage of Responcents who state that they use: 
Branch Critical Decision Exponent!al Line of Linear 
and Path Networks - Smoothing Balance P:-ogr:m-
NUMBER DF· NUMBER OF Bound Analys:!.s ming 
E!':PLOYEES RESPONCENTS 
IN UNIT 
Under 5D 295 2.4 37.6 24.4 -lD.8 13.2 12.9 
50 - 99 199 1.0 39.2 22.1 ID .1 11. 6 14.1 
IDO - 149 2D4 1.4 44.1 27.0 17.2 17.2 13.7 
150 - 249 227 . D.4 50.7 25.r 13.7 ID. 1. 17.2 
250 - 499 336 1.2 57.1 29.2 20.8 15.5 18.8 
500 - 999 286 D.3 59.1 34.6 24.8 17.5 27.3 
~OOO - 4999 253 0.4 68.4 43.1 22.9 18.6 27.7 
'5000 - 9999 35 D 6D.0 _57.1 21.4 37.1 34.3 
Dller 10.000 28 3.6 64.3 53.6 35.7 25.0 42.9 
Not Class1f!ed 3 
Ollerall 1.1 51. 8 30.5 18.9 15.5 19.7 
Totals 1.866 20 967 569 351 289 368 
The 2bolle figu:-es were' ce:-!IIed from a survey sponsored by the Institution of Indust:-i2l 
r.anage:-s and carried out by the Product'!.on r.~;magsr..ent Group of the r.anager.1ent Cent;-e. 
Bradford. 10.000 me~bers of the r. I. M. were 2sked in Autumn 1980 to fill in a 
questionnaire on their work and it 1s the responses to this request which are he~e 
analysed. This samClling frame is likely to gille an upward bias tOlOarcs the repo:-ting 
of "good· managerial techniques. 
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Oire-e~or an~ Professor of Management Sciences: J C H IGCI NS asc MA ~"'Sc PhO C E ng M I EE Fal M 
Prol~50' of Operations Management: KG LOCKYE:l BSc CEng MBIM 
THE PRACTICE OF" P R ODU CTI ON M AN AGE 1HN T-
I N THE" U. K. 
I. I. M. SURVEY - AUTU~~ 1geO 
MATHEr'!ATIOL TECHNICUES (USIIGEJ 
Anal'!si. bv Ownership 
Percentage of Responcents who state 
that thev use: 
8rancn Critical Decision Exponen- Line 
NA TIONALITY OF 
PRINCIPAL OWNERSHIP 
NUr-:BER OF 
RESPONDENTS 
.. and Path Netl;orks tial of L.P." 
Bound Analysis Smcothing"Salanca 
U. K. 1474 1.0 49.6 28.5 16.S 14.4 19.2 
U. S. A. 260 1.5 61.5 36.9 31. 2 23.1 23.1· 
E. E. C. 67 0 61.2 38.8 17.9 13.4 19.4 
OTHER 61 1.6 55.7 41.0 21. 3 13.1 16.4 
NOT CLASSIFIED 4 
OVERALL 1.1 51.8 30.4 18.8 15.5 19.5 
TOTALS i,866 20 966 567 351 299 
"L.P •• Linear Programming 
The above figures were derived from a survey sponsored by the Institution of !ndustrial 
Managers and carried out by the Production Management Group of the ~anagement Cent~. 
Bradford. ID,OOe l1'embers of the I. I. M. were asked in Auturm 1980 to fill in a 
questionnaire on their work and it is the responses to this request which are .here 
analysed. This sampling frame is likely to gille an upward bias towards the reporting 
of "good· managerial techniq~es. 
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